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Abstract 
My dissertation focuses primarily on credit markets from a corporate finance 
perspective, with a concentration on corporate bonds and security offerings. My 
dissertation consists of three essays. Essay One is titled “Underpricing of Corporate 
Bond Offerings: Evidence and Determinants”; Essay Two is titled “Calculating 
Abnormal Returns in Bond Market Event Studies”; and Essay Three is titled “Bond 
Market Reaction to Earnings Surprises and Post Earnings-Announcement Drift”. My 
research is partially motivated by the 2007/2008 financial crisis, which highlighted the 
importance of sound credit markets. 
 
In recent years, the Federal Reserve policy has pushed base interest rates to record lows, 
which has helped fuel trillions of corporate-bond issuance activities.  “Underpricing of 
Corporate Bond Offerings: Evidence and Determinants” examines whether and to what 
extent newly-issued corporate bonds are underpriced. The availability of the TRACE 
database, which contains comprehensive secondary market bond transaction prices, 
enables me to measure bond underpricing as the return from the offering price to the 
secondary market price immediately after the issue. This measure of underpricing is 
largely adopted by equity offerings literature. Whereas other recent studies find 
evidence of underpricing only for speculative grade bonds and/or initial public issues, I 
find significant underpricing for corporate bonds across all rating classes including 
investment grade bonds and seasoned offerings. My results raise questions concerning 
the efficiency of capital raising process in the bond market. 
xii 
 
 “Corporate Bond Market Event Study Methods” examines issues in the construction of 
corporate bond event studies using bond transaction data. Procedures used in studies to 
date have relatively low power to detect an event impacting bond prices. We show that 
this low power is largely due to the substantial heteroskedasticity in bond returns and 
infrequent trading. Focusing on handling these obstacles, we propose tests that yield 
considerably higher power. 
The essay “Bond Market Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift” examines the bond 
market post-earnings announcement return patterns. While post-earnings announcement 
drifts (PEAD) is, as Fama put it, the granddaddy of all market anomalies in the equity 
market, whether PEAD exists in corporate bond market is understudied. We find 
evidence of bond market PEAD following especially positive earnings surprises, 
suggesting that negative information gets impounded into bond prices more efficiently 
than positive information. We further find that bond market PEAD appears to be driven 
by illiquidity, which we interpret as evidence that bond market efficiency is likely 
hampered by lack of liquidity.
1 
 
Chapter 1: Essay One 
Underpricing of Corporate Bond Offerings: Evidence and 
Determinants 
Abstract 
I document significant underpricing of new corporate bond issues in that 
offering prices are significantly below immediate post-offering secondary market prices 
– also, for additions to an existing indenture, below pre-offering secondary market 
prices. In contrast to previous studies, I find underpricing of both investment and 
speculative grade issues, for both firms with and without bonds outstanding, and for 
financial as well as non-financial firms. My evidence supports the valuation uncertainty, 
asymmetric information, and price pressure hypotheses. Further, underpricing appears 
due partially to agency conflicts between underwriters and issuers, as it is considerably 
lower when underwriters are marketing their own issues. 
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1. Introduction  
The efficiency of the capital-raising process is of interest to both researchers 
and practitioners. While it is well-documented that both initial and seasoned public 
equity offerings are generally priced below their opening secondary market prices,
 
it is 
less clear whether and to what extent newly-issued corporate bonds are underpriced.
1
 
The amount of academic research dedicated to corporate bond issuance is small in 
comparison to its economic importance. For example, from 2005 through 2013, firms 
issued a total of $9.4 trillion in corporate bonds targeted at US market, compared to 
$2.2 trillion in equity issuance.
 2
 Given the size of this market, any inefficiency in the 
capital raising process in the bond market will be costly to issuing firms.  
This paper studies the efficiency of the bond market capital raising process by 
investigating whether corporate bond offerings are underpriced and if so, why. 
Recently, the SEC is reportedly probing the bond offering process.
3
 Of particular 
interest to the SEC is whether underwriters give preferential treatment to big customers, 
thus allowing these investors to make a quick profit by re-selling the bonds at a higher 
price to investors that were shut out of the deal initially.
 
For example, Bloomberg (4 
March 2014) reported “a one-day profit of $2.54 billion reaped by buyers of Verizon 
Communications Inc.’s $49 billion offering in September (2013), a deal for which 
money managers put in orders of as much as $100 billion.” Meanwhile, practitioners 
expressed concern: 
                                                 
1
 See Ljungqvist (2004), Ritter and Welch (2002), and Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) for related 
reviews on initial and seasoned equity offerings. Existing evidence on corporate bonds is discussed in 
section 2.1. 
2
  Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA),  
http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx 
3 “Regulators Probing How Goldman, Citi and Others Divvied Up Bonds”, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 28, 
2014; “Bond Allocation Probe Seen Symptomatic of Race for Yield”, Bloomberg, March 4, 2014; “Finra 
Scrutinizes Banks’ Role in Bond Market”, Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2014. 
3 
 
“Even worse than getting a smaller-than-wanted chunk of a new bond deal is 
then being offered the bonds from a trader right after the deal is priced at 
some unjustifiably higher price” − Christopher Sullivan, chief investment 
officer, United Nations Federal Credit Union. (Wall Street Journal, 10 April 
2014) 
I investigate 2,380 bond offerings by 534 non-financial firms and, in a separate 
sample, 1186 offerings by 195 financial firms, from February 2005 through September 
2012. I measure bond underpricing as the percentage difference between the offer price 
and the price at which the bond subsequently trades in the secondary market, an 
approach that is commonly used in the equity issuance literature but was not adopted by 
most previous bond studies due primarily to data limitations. The availability of the 
TRACE database, which contains comprehensive bond secondary market transaction 
prices, enables me to follow the above approach and therefore makes it easier to relate 
my bond market evidence to the existing stock market evidence. In contrast to existing 
bond studies that find underpricing for only speculative grade and/or initial bond 
offerings (IBOs), i.e., issues by firms with no outstanding public bond issues, I find 
investment grade and seasoned issues (issues by firms with outstanding public bond 
issues) are also underpriced. Additionally, I find underpricing for issues of financial as 
well as non-financial firms. For issues by non-financial firms, seasoned bond offerings 
(SBOs) underpricing averages 0.58% of the offer price among investment grade and 
1.10% among high yield issues.
4
 The magnitude of IBOs is slightly higher as 
investment grade (high yield) IBOs are underpriced by 0.59% (1.68%) on average. The 
extent of underpricing also varies over time and is substantially larger during the recent 
                                                 
4
 To gain perspective, U.S. Treasury bond underpricing is found to be tiny. For example, measuring 
underpricing as difference between the secondary market price and the auction stop-out price, Goldreich 
(2007) find the average U.S. Treasury bond underpricing to be 1.3 cents per $100 of face value. 
4 
 
financial crisis, peaking at 0.87% (1.37%) for investment grade (high yield) SBOs in 
2009.  
A potential concern is whether the estimated underpricing is sufficiently large 
to offer a trading opportunity for investors who acquire bonds in the primary market or 
if it merely reflects bid-ask spreads. To address this issue, I use aftermarket prices from 
only non-dealer customer sell trades and find underpricing still significant. Specifically, 
an investor who purchases a non-financial investment grade SBO at the offer price 
could immediately sell for a price 0.51% higher on average, and a high yield SBO for a 
price 1.05% higher.  
While this level of underpricing is considerably smaller than that generally 
estimated for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), it is non-trivial if we consider the size 
and frequency of bond offerings. For example, an average investment grade (high yield) 
seasoned bond offering raises $701 ($527) million based on my sample and thus the 
estimated underpricing translates to a loss in proceeds of over $4 million ($5.8 million) 
per deal. In contrast, the documented average SEO underpricing is around 2% and the 
average amount raised by an SEO is about $62 million (Altinkilic and Hansen (2003) 
and Corwin (2003)), translating to less than $2 million left on the table per deal.
5
  
Moreover, corporate bonds generally have a finite life of less than ten years. Thus if a 
firm does not substantially change its capital or debt structure, periodic refinancing of 
these bond issues will involve repeated issuance costs in the future.
6 
 
                                                 
5 
I compare the magnitude of bond underpricing to seasoned instead of initial equity offerings as bond 
issuers are overwhelmingly seasoned issuers. Specifically, only 17 of the 2380 bond issues were issued 
by privately held firms. 
6 
Bond underpricing also accounts for a large portion of the total direct and indirect floatation costs, as the 
underwriter gross spread is 0.57% (1.67%) on average for investment grade (high yield) issues. 
5 
 
Underpricing of this magnitude, especially for seasoned investment grade 
issues, is puzzling since bond issuers represent large and frequent seasoned issuers. 
Additionally, the pricing of bonds is less complicated than equities as it is relatively 
easy to find comparable traded bonds with the same rating and maturity. To explore the 
possible explanations for bond underpricing, I develop and test hypotheses based on 
existing underpricing theories of: (1) price uncertainty, (2) information asymmetry, (3) 
aftermarket illiquidity, (4) price pressure, and (5) agency conflicts between issuers and 
underwriters. I explore both cross-sectional and time-series determinants. 
Consistent with the price uncertainty hypothesis (but possibly also with the 
information asymmetry and the aftermarket illiquidity hypotheses), I find that lower 
rated and longer maturity issues exhibit higher underpricing. Moreover, underpricing is 
higher for bonds with greater post-offering price volatility. Underpricing also increases 
as the time lag between offer pricing and distribution lengthens, consistent with 
Corwin’s (2003) argument that the longer lag increases the likelihood of a change in 
market conditions prior to offer completion and thus increases underwriter uncertainty. 
Higher underpricing is also observed in periods when stock market and/or interest rate 
uncertainty is greater. These findings suggest that bond underpricing is related to both 
issue-specific and market-wide price uncertainty. In contrast, I find information 
asymmetry measures such as analyst coverage and whether the issuer is publicly traded 
or privately held do not significantly affect underpricing. It is possible that information 
asymmetry is less severe in bond offerings than in equity offerings since bond issuers 
are typically large seasoned issuers. I do not find a reliable relation between bond 
underpricing and common illiquidity measures such as the aftermarket bid-ask spread.  
6 
 
Moreover, I find evidence that bond underpricing reflects price pressure. First, 
even after accounting for changes in leverage, underpricing is positively related to the 
offer amounts, consistent with the notion that larger offer amounts exert greater 
downward price pressures. To further explore whether the price pressure is permanent 
due to a downward sloping demand curve for bonds or a temporary liquidity shock, I 
collect and exploit a unique sample of additional bond offerings to an existing indenture 
(which I term ABOs). ABOs differ from SBOs in that SBOs are new bond issues of a 
firm with other bonds outstanding while ABOs are additional bond issuance to an 
existing bond series (same CUSIP). I compare the ABO offer price with the pre-offer 
secondary market price and again find evidence of underpricing. Since an identical 
bond is already trading on the market, ABO underpricing is less likely to be driven by 
valuation uncertainty. Focusing on the secondary market, I find that the secondary 
market price drops significantly on the ABO issue date, and recovers partially, but not 
completely, after the offering. The partial recovery in the secondary market price 
indicates that temporary liquidity shocks play a part in ABO underpricing. Since the 
post-offer secondary market price does not fully recover to the pre-offering level, I 
cannot rule out the possibility that the bond demand curve is downward sloping as the 
market may not view different bonds with the same rating and maturity as close 
substitutes.  
Further, I explore whether bond underpricing is partly due to agency conflicts 
between issuers and their underwriters. This hypothesis inherently assumes the 
existence of information asymmetry between the issuers and the underwriters, where the 
underwriters are better informed about the pricing of the security through their expertise 
7 
 
in book-building (Baron (1982) and Biais, Bossaerts, and Rochet (2002)). Thus 
underwriters may underprice intentionally to minimize their marketing efforts, or to 
steer bonds to favored clients for quid pro quos (Loughran and Ritter (2004)).  
To test the agency hypothesis, I begin by analyzing trading activities in the 
immediate aftermarket as the observed trading may shed some light on the unobservable 
offering allocation. I present evidence indicating possible “flipping” activities. 
Specifically, after excluding trades among market makers, secondary market trading 
activities are dominated by institutional sized sales (trades of $100,000 or more) and 
retail sized buys during the first few days after the offering. This finding suggests that 
some of the large investors who acquired bonds in the primary market were 
immediately reselling them to cash in and that smaller investors, whose desired 
allocations were unmet, were acquiring bonds in the secondary market at higher-than-
offering prices. This finding is consistent with Aggarwal (2003), who observes that hot 
equity IPOs are commonly flipped, especially by institutions. Note that this finding does 
not necessarily indicate that underwriters underprice in order to steer bonds to favored 
clients. If underpricing occurs for any reason so that there is excess demand for the 
underpriced bonds, then those obtaining the bonds will be able to sell in the aftermarket 
at a profit. 
To examine possible agency conflicts more directly, I turn to bond issues of 
financial firms. I study the financial sample separately from the main non-financial 
sample to make my findings comparable to existing studies which generally exclude 
financial firms from their analysis. However, the financial sample offers a unique 
opportunity to test the agency conflict hypothesis, since in some cases banks serve as 
8 
 
lead managers when marketing their own bonds. Specifically, the underwriting bank’s 
informational advantage is eliminated in a self-marketed issue (Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1989)) and any underpricing represents a direct cost to the underwriter. I 
find that the average underpricing is considerably lower for self-marketed offerings than 
non-self-marketed financial offerings, a finding consistent with the agency conflict 
hypothesis. The evidence of lower underpricing in self-marketed issues is robust after 
controlling for different characteristics between self-marketed and non-self-marketed 
offerings, market-wide conditions, and possible self-selection.  
This study joins a large literature on security issuance costs and contributes to 
our understanding of the bond issuance process. To my knowledge, this is the first study 
dedicated to publicly-traded corporate bond issuance costs to document significant 
underpricing across all rating classes. More specifically, I find that bond underpricing is 
not restricted to high yield or initial bond issues, but is also significant for investment 
grade and seasoned offerings. This is to be contrasted with previous studies that either 
do not find evidence of bond underpricing or find underpricing only among high yield 
issues and/or initial offerings. The finding of underpricing of investment grade issues is 
of particular interest as the corporate bond market is dominated by investment grades 
issues. Specifically, of the total $9.4 trillion corporate bonds issuance from 2005 to 
2013 on US market, $7.7 trillion were investment grade issues and only $ 1.7 trillion 
were high yield issues. 
In addition, this study is one of the few studies to measure bond underpricing 
using the TRACE dataset, which contains comprehensive secondary market trades. 
Empirical evidence of corporate bond underpricing has been elusive, largely due to the 
9 
 
absence of comprehensive second market data and therefore existing studies usually 
rely on a small subset of secondary market trades. For example, using transaction data 
from the NYSE, Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel (1997) find underpricing only among 
high yield IBOs (1.86%) and even find overpricing for investment grade offerings. 
Likewise, based on secondary market trades by insurance companies only, Cai, 
Helwege, and Warga (2007) find IBO (SBO) underpricing averages 0.47% (0.18%) 
only among speculative-grade debts but no significant underpricing for investment 
grade bonds. 
7
  
Further, this study provides a more comprehensive analysis of the potential 
reasons for bond underpricing. Besides finding evidence consistent with prior studies 
that bond underpricing is attributable to issue-specific price uncertainty, I observe that it 
also varies with interest rate risk and market-wide uncertainty. My results on the 
importance of market-wide conditions for bond underpricing complement those of 
Lowry, Officer, and Schwert (2010) for equities, who analyze the importance of 
market-wide uncertainty for IPO underpricing. Additionally, I find evidence that bond 
underpricing reflects price pressure by collecting and analyzing the unique sample of 
ABOs.  
Importantly, this study provides the first evidence among bond offering studies 
that agency conflicts potentially contribute to bond underpricing and thereby lends 
support to the agency conflict hypothesis modeled by Baron (1982) and Biais, 
Bossaerts, and Rochet (2002). In order to directly test the agency conflict hypothesis, 
this study examines and provides evidence for financial firms, which were largely 
                                                 
7
 Earlier studies measured underpricing indirectly by comparing yield spreads between the newly issued 
bond and a seasoned benchmark but also find mixed results (e.g., Ederington (1974), Sorensen (1982), 
and Lindvall (1977)). Section 2.1 reviews prior evidence of corporate bond underpricing in detail. 
10 
 
excluded from analysis in existing studies. My finding that underpricing is considerably 
lower when financial firms underwrite their own bonds joins the growing empirical 
evidence by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), Reuter (2006), and Liu and Ritter (2009), 
who find that agency conflicts attribute to equity IPO underpricing. My findings suggest 
the agency problem not only matters for equity IPO market, arguably dominated by 
small and young issuers facing powerful underwriters, it also matters for corporate bond 
issuers, who are typically large and frequent issuers. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the existing literature and develop 
testable hypotheses related to bond underpricing. Section 3 provides a description of the 
data on non-financial bond issues. Section 4 presents evidence of bond underpricing and 
provide tests of alternative hypotheses. In Section 5, I introduce bond issues by 
financial firms and further investigate the agency conflict hypothesis. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Existing Evidence of Corporate Bond Underpricing  
Although the underpricing evidence is well established for new equity issues, 
fewer empirical studies have investigated pricing efficiency for corporate bond 
offerings. In equity offering literature, over- or under-pricing is typically estimated as 
the “initial return” from the offer price to the post-offer secondary market price, in 
particular, a positive “initial return” indicates underpricing. For bond offerings, 
however, since this “initial return” measure requires secondary market transaction 
prices, research has been hampered historically by the lack of quality bond transaction 
11 
 
price data. To circumvent this problem, early studies examined “yield spreads” between 
new bonds and a benchmark index of seasoned bonds with similar credit rating and 
maturity. For example, Ederington (1974) and Sorensen (1982) find new bonds on 
average have a higher offer yield than their matched seasoned bonds, and thus conclude 
that corporate bonds are generally underpriced. In contrast, Lindvall (1977) finds a 
negative yield spread, suggesting that new bonds are overpriced. However, the “yield 
spreads” approach may suffer from inaccurate estimation of the benchmark yield due to 
difficulties in properly matching the new bonds with seasoned bonds because they can 
differ in built-in options, covenants, and liquidity. In addition, as Weinstein (1978) 
points out, the aggregation procedure used in constructing an index of seasoned bonds 
averages yields rather than prices, which means that the bond yield indexes do not 
measure the yield on any real bond. 
Later bond studies try to use “initial return” approach. For example, Weinstein 
(1978) finds a positive initial return over the issue month for a sample of 179 new bonds 
and concludes that bonds are underpriced. In contrast, focusing on newly issued 
investment-grade bonds, Fung and Rudd (1986) calculate “initial return” from the offer 
price to the bid price (using indicative dealer quotes) on the issue date and find little 
evidence underpricing. Focusing exclusively on initial bond offerings, Datta, Iskandar-
Datta and Patel (1997) find underpricing for high yield issues but overpricing for 
investment grade issues based on NYSE transactions, which are dominated by small, 
retail trades. 
More recently, Cai, Helwege, and Warga (2007) find that underpricing 
averages 47(17) Bps for high yield IBOs (SBOs) between 1995 and 1999 but no 
12 
 
significant underpricing for investment grade bonds. It is important to note that their 
study is based on transactions from insurance companies only, which account for about 
12.5% of dollar trading volume in TRACE-eligible securities (Bessembinder, Maxwell, 
and Venkataraman (2006)). Moreover, prices from only insurance company trades may 
not be representative of the entire bond market. First, insurance companies tend to be 
buy-and-hold investors who might not be engaged in frequent secondary market trading. 
Indeed, of the 439 bond IBOs in their sample, Cai et al. observe only 167 bonds traded 
by insurance companies on the issue day and only 82 bonds traded the next day. 
Second, even when insurance companies do trade in the aftermarket, their trading 
motives may not be representative of those of bond traders at large. For example, if 
insurance companies are in a better position than the average investor to obtain the 
desired bonds at the offer price, then their post-offer trades may be predominately sales 
(i.e., at dealer’s bid prices) and thereby tend to underestimate the underpricing. 
Alternatively, if their appetite for corporate bonds has not yet been met during the 
offering, then they are likely to accumulate positions in the aftermarket, which makes 
their post-offer trades largely at the ask prices and thus tend to overestimate the 
underpricing. Cai et al. observe that for 590 bonds with insurance company trades 
during the first week of offer, only 196 bonds have sell trades, suggesting that insurance 
companies are net buyers on the secondary market and that their post-offer trades are 
primarily at the ask prices. 
Two studies shed some light on bond pricing using TRACE data. Based on a 
sample of non-publicly disseminated TRACE data, Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2007) find 
evidence of underpricing for investment grade as well as high yield debt offerings. 
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Their focus, however, was on dealer behavior around offerings so that they lumped 
together initial and seasoned bond offerings issued by both financial and industrial 
issues. In addition, 54.1% of their sample consisted of Rule 144A offerings. Given that 
Rule 144A offerings are private placements, it is not clear whether publicly traded 
corporate bonds are underpriced. Another study by Kozhanov and Ogden (2012) uses 
both TRACE and FISD data. They study a sample of 923 investment grade bond issues 
from 2005 through 2009 and conclude that corporate bonds are generally overpriced at 
issuance since new bond issues have lower yields than seasoned benchmarks.   
 
2.2 Hypotheses and Empirical Predictions on Corporate Bond Underpricing 
Determinants        
2.2.1 Valuation Uncertainty Hypothesis 
U.S. corporate bonds are typically issued via ﬁrm-commitment offerings, 
where an underwriter syndicate guarantees the proceeds of the issue (net of fees) to the 
issuer and organizes the sale of the bonds.
8
 The underwriter accepts issue price risk 
when it signs the “Underwriting Agreement” to purchase the entire issue at an agreed 
upon fixed price. As Smith (1977) notes, this is similar to the underwriter selling a put 
option on the issue to the issuer for a fee. As such, the underwriter bears all the risk 
associated with price volatility between offer pricing and distribution. Thus, 
underpricing benefits the underwriter by lowering the risk of an unsuccessful sale and 
reducing their marketing efforts (Ederington (1974) and Edelen and Kadlec (2005)). 
The valuation uncertainty theory implies that the degree of underpricing should 
be greater for issues with characteristics associated with higher valuation uncertainty. 
                                                 
8
 Only 11 out of the 2380 offerings in my sample bonds are non-firm commitment offerings. 
14 
 
Also underpricing should be greater during periods when interest rates are more volatile 
and market uncertainty is higher. Finally, As Corwin (2003) pointed out, a longer lag 
between offer pricing and distribution means more time for the market condition to 
change. Therefore the valuation uncertainty hypothesis predicts that underpricing 
should increase as the time lag lengthens. 
2.2.2 Information Asymmetry Hypothesis 
Traditional theories based on information asymmetry can be classified into 
theories in which investors are more informed than the underwriters and the issuers, 
theories in which some investors are more informed than others, and theories in which 
issuers are more informed than investors. All underpricing theories based on 
asymmetric information share the prediction that underpricing is positively related to 
the degree of information asymmetry.  
In a setting where investors are more informed than the underwriters and the 
issuers, Benveniste and Spindt (1989), and Chemmanur (1993) suggest underpricing 
facilitates book-building by inducing the information production and revelation. 
Underpricing is used to compensate informed investors for revealing positive 
information to the underwriters. Empirically, the more positive the information (and so 
the greater the incentive to withhold it), the more underpricing is required. 
In a setting where some investors are more informed than others, Rock (1986) 
develops a model in which underpricing is necessary to compensate uninformed 
investors and thereby ensure their participation in the new issue market. Rock’s theory 
is based on the assumption that informed investors will buy only the good offerings, 
leaving the bad for uninformed investors. Knowing this, uninformed investors will be 
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reluctant to buy unless underwriters underprice in general. Therefore, underpricing is 
required to compensate uninformed investors for the winner’s curse. However, since the 
corporate bond market is dominated by institutional investors, Rock’s theory seems less 
applicable to bond offerings than to equity offerings. 
Underpricing is also proposed as a mechanism to signal firm quality in equity 
initial public offerings (IPOs) when issuers have better information than investors 
(Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989)). This 
strand of literature argues that though underpricing is costly, it allows the (high quality) 
issuers to recoup their upfront sacrifice post-IPO by returning to the market to sell 
future securities on better terms. Since bond issuers are overwhelmingly large seasoned 
issuers, signaling theory seems less applicable here. 
Although hypotheses based on valuation uncertainty and on information 
asymmetry are conceptually different, empirically, they imply relation of the 
underpricing with many of the same variables. For instance, one natural proxy for 
uncertainty at the bond level is the credit rating as bond issuers with higher ratings are 
typically large and mature firms and have less uncertainty. Meantime, these firms are 
subjected to closer scrutiny by the market so that they are subject to less information 
asymmetry. Therefore, underpricing theories based on either uncertainty or information 
asymmetry would predict bonds with higher rating exhibit lower underpricing.  
Moreover, uncertainty and information asymmetry may reinforce each other in 
affecting underpricing. The intuition is that an investor who decides to engage in 
information production implicitly invests in a call option on the security offering, which 
will be exercised if the ‘true’ price exceeds the strike price, that is, the offer price. The 
16 
 
value of this option increases in the extent of valuation uncertainty. Thus, greater 
valuation uncertainty results in greater extent of information asymmetry (Beatty and 
Ritter (1986)). These theories therefore predict a positive relation between underpricing, 
ex ante uncertainty and information asymmetry.  
2.2.3 Aftermarket Illiquidity Hypothesis 
Ellul and Pagano (2006) propose a theory to explain IPO underpricing where 
investors worry about the after-market illiquidity that stems from the unresolved 
information asymmetry at the offering stage. Equilibrium stock returns must 
compensate investors for the losses expected from trading with better informed 
investors. In their model, some residual private information not resolved during offering 
stage creates an adverse selection problem in the aftermarket and is reflected in the bid-
ask spread. They further argue that the amount of private information that remains 
undisclosed after the IPO depends partly on how much information is released at the 
IPO stage. Hence, their model predicts that bookbuilding process mitigates the residual 
information asymmetry and thereby reduces aftermarket illiquidity-related underpricing.  
If there is unresolved information asymmetry at the bond offering stage, then it 
is possible that bond underpricing may be used to compensate investors for the relative 
illiquidity. Empirically, the aftermarket illiquidity hypothesis predicts that bond 
underpricing increases with aftermarket illiquidity measures, such as the bid-ask spread. 
However, since bond issuers are mainly large seasoned issuers and corporate bonds are 
typically issued via bookbuilding, aftermarket illiquidity is less likely to affect bond 
underpricing. 
2.2.4 Price Pressure Hypothesis 
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Exploring the reasons for seasoned equity underpricing, Corwin (2003) argues 
that the SEO underpricing may be related to either permanent or temporary price 
pressure. The permanent price pressure hypothesis states that the firm is faced with a 
downward sloping demand curve for its security and a seasoned offer can be viewed as 
a permanent shift in the supply of the existing issues, which will therefore decrease the 
price of the outstanding security. Alternatively, one can view a seasoned offer as a 
temporary liquidity shock that must be absorbed by the market such that a discounted 
offer price may be necessary to compensate investors for absorbing the liquidity shock. 
If the shock is temporary, post-offer secondary market prices should return to pre-offer 
prices, resulting in a positive return “sweetener” to investors who purchase shares in the 
offering (Scholes (1972)).
 
 
Both temporary and permanent price pressure hypotheses predict that issues of 
larger size (relative to outstanding security) call for greater underpricing, ceteris 
paribus. However, the two hypotheses predict different price patterns of the existing 
security before and after the offerings. Specifically, the temporary price pressure 
hypothesis predicts that the post-offering secondary market prices should gradually rise 
and return to the pre-offer prices, i.e., prices will exhibit a V-shaped trend with the 
offering date price being the lowest. Whereas the permanent price pressure suggests that 
the post-offering prices will not (completely) return to pre-offering prices. 
A sample of additional bond issues to an existing indenture (ABOs) allows me 
to further test the price pressure hypothesis. ABOs are similar to seasoned equity 
offerings in the sense that an existing bond is already trading on the market such that 
open market prices are easily observable. Therefore, these ABOs should bear less 
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uncertainty and information asymmetry. However, adding more issues to the existing 
bonds would result in a sudden increase in the supply of the identical bonds, leading a 
price drop according to the price pressure hypothesis. Bond prices will return to the pre-
offer prices if the drop was due to temporary liquidity shock, whereas they remain at a 
lower price if the drop was due to permanent price pressure. 
2.2.5 Agency Conflicts of Interest Hypothesis 
An alternative explanation to why firms leave money on the table can be 
attributed to an agency problem between the issuer and the underwriter. Early models 
such as Baron (1982) focused on how an underwriter’s informational advantage over 
issuing companies might allow the underwriter to exert sub-optimal effort in marketing 
and distributing the security. If effort is not perfectly observable and verifiable, banks 
find themselves in a moral hazard situation when acting as the issuers’ agents. Biais, 
Bossaerts, and Rochet (2002) combine the agency cost setting of Baron (1982) with 
Benveniste and Spindt’s (1989) assumption that some investors hold pricing-relevant 
information, and highlight the possibility that bankers and institutional investors collude 
to extract informational rents from issuers. 
Recent research also explores potential agency conflicts due to joint production 
of underwriting and other financial services such as brokerage, security analysis, 
lending, and asset management (Loughran and Ritter (2004)). Some evidence suggests 
that underwriters allocate underpriced issues to enrich buy-side clients in return for quid 
pro quos or for other prospective underwriting business in a practice known as 
“spinning” (Liu and Ritter (2009)).  
19 
 
Therefore, the agency conflict hypothesis assumes underwriters have an 
informational advantage and argues that underpricing saves underwriters’ selling efforts 
and has the added benefit of enlarging investors’ potential profit. If underwriters 
intentionally underprice bond issues to minimize their underwriting effort or steer bonds 
to favored clients for quid pro quos, the costs to them are much higher when they are 
underwriting their own bonds. As such, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) studied a set 
of 38 self-marketed investment bank IPOs in the 1970s and 1980s, in which agency 
conflicts should be eliminated. However, they find the 38 IPOs appear to have been 
underpriced by roughly as much as other IPOs, which they interpret as contradicting the 
agency hypothesis. There were very few cases for a bank to underwrite its own IPO, so 
it is hard to draw large sample inference from their study. But it is not unusual for a 
bank to self-market its own bonds. I therefore study banks’ self-marketed issues 
compared to non-self-marketed issues by financial firms. The agency hypothesis 
predicts lower underpricing when banks underwrite their own bonds. 
 
3. Data Description and Variable Construction 
3.1 Sample description  
Data are collected from five main resources: 1) Securities Data Company’s 
(SDC) Global New Issues Database for corporate bond offerings; 2) Mergent’s FISD 
for supplementary bond characteristics; 3) Enhanced Trade Reporting and Compliance 
Engine (Enhanced TRACE) for bond secondary market transaction data; 4) BofA 
Merrill Lynch Index for market benchmark returns; and 5) Prospectuses on the SEC 
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) service. 
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I begin with the sample of all corporate nonconvertible bonds issued by non-
financial firms from February 1, 2005 through September 30, 2012 from the SDC 
database (I examine the sample of financial issues in Section 5 separately from the main 
sample). The sample period ends in September 2012 since the enhanced TRACE data 
are only available with an 18 month lag. I exclude Rule 144A issues, as their trades are 
exempt from reporting to TRACE. I also exclude private placements, pay-in-kind 
bonds, corporate pass-thru trusts, agency issues, and bonds not denominated in USD. 
This results in a sample of 2960 bond issues. I further delete 9 putable bonds, 49 
emerging market issues, and 265 issues that are not fixed rate or bonds with coupon 
paying with irregular frequency. 2637 issues remain.  
Since SDC contains little information on bond characteristics such as face 
value, coupon and rating, additional data are obtained from Mergent’s FISD. 2581 of 
the 2637 issues are matched with a FISD record.
 9
 Moody’s rating is used if available; 
otherwise Standard & Poor’s or Fitch’s rating is adopted.10  I then delete 9 bonds with a 
face value not equal to $1000 and 6 not-rated issues.  
Both SDC and FISD provide detailed offering information, including issue 
date, offer price, offering yield, maturity, and gross spread. Given potential errors in 
SDC’s variables reported by prior studies, I cross-check these variables between SDC 
and FISD and find 858 observations with disagreement for one or more of the four 
variables. I verify them against prospectuses on SEC Edger and news sources from 
                                                 
9
 FISD and SDC are matched on bond CUSIP. Bond issues that have not been assigned CUSIPs in SDC 
are match by issuer CUSIP, issue date, offer price, and offer yield.  
10
 There are 75 observations with rating disagreement between Moody's and S&P. I.e., one 
agency rated as investment grade and the other rated as high yield. In these cases, I adopt the 
higher rating for two reasons. First, the related SEC rule suggests “at least one NRSRO" for determining 
whether an issue is rated as investment grade. Second, SDC classifies all of these observations as 
investment grade issues. 
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Factiva. The prospectus on Edgar provides detailed information about offer price, gross 
spread, underwriters and brief on firm risk. I found much of the inconsistency between 
SDC and FISD was due to rounding errors but 253 issues were not identified in either 
Edgar or Factiva and therefore are deleted. I further deleted 39 bonds issued by 
university endowment funds or asset-backed pass-throughs which were misclassified as 
straight debts by SDC. 
Secondary market bond trade prices and trading volume are obtained from the 
enhanced TRACE database, which also reports whether a trade represents a sale to a 
regular customer (S), a buy from a regular customer (B), or an inter-dealer trade (D). 
This information allows me to estimate underpricing accounting for bid-ask bounces 
and analyze aftermarket trading activities. Following Dick-Nielsen (2009), I eliminate 
duplicate, canceled, withdrawn and reversed transactions. Following Bessembinder, 
Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009), I compare the yield-to-maturity (YTM) reported on 
TRACE to the YTM estimated from coupon, maturity date, and the trade price reported 
on TRACE and FISD and eliminate those trades with disparity more than ten basis 
points. The final sample for the main analysis consists of 2380 bond offerings by 584 
non-financial firms.  
To analyze agency hypothesis in section 5, I also collected data on financial 
issues, i.e. bonds issued by banks, credit institutions and insurance companies. These 
data allow me to test whether and to what extent underwriters underprice their own 
bonds. After applying the same data clean procedures as for the non-financial sample, I 
have 1186 bond offerings by 115 financial firms.  
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3.2 Calculation of Underpricing (Initial Returns) 
For my baseline analysis, underpricing on bond issue i is measured as the 
initial return from the offer price, 𝑃𝑖,𝑜, to the secondary market price on day t, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡. 
Specifically, 
                                              𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑃𝑖,𝑜
𝑃𝑖,𝑜
 ,                                                      (1) 
where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the average trade price on day t, where individual trade prices are weighted 
by trade size.
11
 I use an average trade price (instead of the closing price as most equity 
studies did) because corporate bonds are thinly traded and have large bid-ask bounce. 
For instance, analysis from TRACE data suggests that an average corporate bond only 
trades 52 days a year (Bessembinder, et al. (2009))  and if traded on a day, the average 
daily number of trades is only 6 (Ederington, Guan, and Yang (2014)). 
Most equity offering studies estimate underpricing as the percentage difference 
between the offer price and the first-day price. Using later prices, say at the end of the 
first week of trading, typically makes little difference because the full extent of any 
underpricing is evident fairly quickly (Ljungqvist (2004)). However, since bonds are 
thinly traded, it is unclear whether the full extent of any bond underpricing is captured 
by measuring the price change from offer price to the first-day secondary market prices. 
Also, as will be seen later, first-day trades are largely seller initiated trades (i.e., at the 
bid prices). I therefore not only estimate underpricing using trades on the first trading 
day, but alternatively measure underpricing using trades on later days. 
To control for price changes due to any market movement between the offer 
pricing day and the day when the secondary market trades are observed, I calculate the 
                                                 
11
 I repeat all the analyses using equal weighted prices and the magnitude of underpricing is even larger 
than using trade size weighted average prices. 
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excess return of an individual bond over the return on a bond index of the same rating 
class during the same period. BofA Merrill Lynch Corporate Indices are used as 
benchmarks, which are broken down by ratings (AAA, AA, A, BB, B, and C). 
Benchmark returns are calculated as changes in index level from the offer pricing day 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,0to the day when the secondary market trades are observed 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡:  
                                             𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡  =   
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,0
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,0
                                                (2) 
Then an adjusted discount that accounts for bond market movements is 
calculated by subtracting from the raw discount the same period index return of the 
same rating class. 
                       𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐵𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡                             (3) 
 
3.3 Offer Announcement Date (Pricing Date) and Issue Date 
Since I calculate the adjusted discount by subtracting from the raw discount the 
same period benchmark return, it is important to identify the exact day when the offer is 
priced to get 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,0. When a bond issue is set, issuers usually file a form with SEC 
under rule 424(b) with specifics such as offer price, coupon rate, gross spread, and 
syndicate members. This day is usually termed the “pricing date” or “issue date” in 
SDC. I verify the SDC issue date against the form 424(b) filing date on Edgar and 
various newswire services on Factiva and make sure the issue date is the earliest date 
when the specifics, especially the pricing, of the offer is announced. I correct 98 SDC 
issue dates.
12
 The actual offering date is identified as the first day when a bond issue is 
                                                 
12 
SDC sometimes identifies the registration data as the issue day. However, 2217 out of the 2380 bond 
offerings are shelf-registered. Shelf offerings are often deferred by months or years after registration or 
even lead to no actual offerings. Moreover, a large proportion of them are universal shelf offerings, which 
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traded and reported to TRACE. Given that all secondary trades, including trades for 
newly issued bonds, are required to report to TRACE after February 2005, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the first day with trading is the actual offering date. 
I observe that in most cases, the offer price is set just few days (or even just a 
few hours) before the first TRACE trade. In my sample, 1766 issues are offered on the 
same day as the announcement dates and 2361 issued within one week from the pricing 
announcement. This means that market movements between pricing and offer are 
generally negligible.  
 
3.4 Initial Bond Offerings (IBOs), Seasoned Bond Offerings (SBOs), and Additional 
Offerings to an Existing Indenture (ABOs) 
I compare differences in underpricing among initial bond offerings (IBOs), 
seasoned bond offerings (SBOs), and additions to an existing indenture (ABOs). IBOs 
are offered by firms with no publicly traded debt and SBOs are offered by firms with 
publicly traded debt. 197 issues are “initial” bond issues (IBOs) and 2183 are issues 
with bonds outstanding. Note that for SBOs, the existing bonds of the same issuer may 
vary in maturity and covenants.  
I also examine additional bond offerings (ABOs) which prior studies have 
lumped together with SBOs. ABOs are additions to an existing bond indenture. 
Appendix 1 illustrates an example of an ABO via excerpt from the prospectus filed with 
SEC. Since the secondary market prices before and after the offering are observable, the 
                                                                                                                                               
can lead to either an equity or a bond offering. Therefore, the registration usually just indicates a 
“possible” bond offering at a later time and issuers usually don’t provide pricing information on the 
registration dates. 
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sample of ABOs provide a unique setting for testing the price pressure hypotheses. I 
identify 84 ABOs in the sample.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the non-financial issues sample. Panel 
A partitions the issues by rating categories and years to maturity for IBOs, SBOs, and 
ABOs, respectively. Panels B and C report issue characteristics for investment grade 
and high yield offerings, respectively. Bond offerings are dominated by investment 
grade issues, especially by A- and BBB- rated issues. Investment grade issues tend to be 
somewhat larger in offer size and with longer maturity than high yield issues. An 
average investment grade (high yield) SBO raises $701 ($527) million of proceeds and 
investment grade (high yield) IBO raises $707 ($383) million per deal. Issue 
characteristics of IBOs and SBOs do not differ appreciably. Relative offer size is 
defined as the amount of proceeds raised in the issue divided by pre-offer total bonds 
outstanding of the issuer. ABOs raise a substantially smaller relative offer size than 
SBOs. For investment grade issues, the mean relative offer size of an SBO is 33.57% 
while the mean relative offer size of an ABO is 10.59%. The underwriter gross spread is 
about 0.57% for investment grade SBOs and 1.67% for high yield SBOs. Underwriter 
gross spread is similar among SBOs, ABOs and IBOs. Unlike equity offerings which 
are typically underwritten by a solo lead manager, a bond offering is usually 
underwritten by more than three lead managers on average.  
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4. Empirical Findings 
4.1 Overall Evidence of Underpricing and Time Trend 
Evidence of corporate bond underpricing is reported in Table 2. I find 
significant evidence of underpricing for both investment grade and high yield bond 
offerings for IBOs, SBOs, and ABOs. Underpricing tends to be higher on speculative 
grade than on investment grade issues and slightly higher on IBOs than SBOs or ABOs. 
Calculated from offer prices to first-day average trade prices, for investment grade 
issues, the discount averages 0.46% for SBOs, 0.55% for IBOs and 0.48% for ABOs. 
For high yield issues, the discount averages 0.95% for SBOs, 1.50% for IBOs, and 
0.96% for ABOs. 
In sum, all types of offerings are significantly discounted including SBOs and 
IBOs for both investment grade and high yield offerings. This is to be contrasted with 
previous studies that only find underpricing for initial bond offerings among high yield 
bonds but find no underpricing for seasoned and/or investment grade issues (Cai et al. 
(2007) and Datta et al. (1997)). Moreover, this study is the first to look at ABOs 
separately and find that they are also significantly underpriced. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Note that underpricing estimated based on second day trades are significantly 
higher than that estimated from the first day trades, especially for SBOs. The mean 
discount for investment grade SBOs is 0.58% and 1.10% for high yield SBOs.
13
 I 
explore the possible reasons in section 4.2.  
                                                 
13
 Underpricing estimated based on the third day trades is even slightly higher than that estimated from 
second day trades, but the differences are not statistically significant for all issue types. Results are 
available upon request. 
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The magnitude of underpricing varies substantially over time. This time-series 
pattern is illustrated in Figure 1. Before the 2008/2009 financial crisis, underpricing 
averaged less than 0.30% for investment grade SBOs and around 0.60% for high yield 
SBOs but it rises sharply during financial crisis and peaks in 2009. Specifically, 
underpricing rises to 0.87% for investment grade SBOs and 1.37% for high yield SBOs 
in 2009. Underpricing for IBOs follows the same pattern. Notably, underpricing slightly 
increased from pre-crisis to post-crisis. The time-series variation may suggest that 
underpricing is associated with market-level uncertainty.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
4.2 Underpricing and transaction Costs  
A potential concern with underpricing estimates using average prices is that the 
average includes prices from both buy and sell transactions i.e., at both the bid and ask 
prices. As such, an investor may not be able to profit by buying at the offer price and re-
selling in the immediate aftermarket. To address this concern, in Table 3, I estimate 
underpricing based on prices from customer buys (trades at the ask prices) and customer 
sells (trades at the bid prices) separately.
14
  
[Insert Table 3] 
Consistent with the existence of bid-ask bounce, the underpricing estimated 
using customer sell prices (Panel A) is lower than that using customer buy prices (Panel 
B). Using second-day trades, estimated underpricing for investment grade SBOs is 
0.51% based on customer sell prices and 0.69% based on customer buy prices. Panels C 
                                                 
14
 I also calculated underpricing based on interdealer trades only and the estimation is close to that based 
on all trades. Results are available upon request. 
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and D report results for high yield issues; the estimated underpricing is 1.05% based on 
sell prices and 1.20% based on buy prices for SBOs. These results indicate that after 
accounting for bid-ask spreads, traders who obtain new bond issues in the primary can 
sell in immediate aftermarket at a profit. 
Noteworthy, the implied bid-ask spreads, approximately 18 bps for investment 
grade and 15 bps for high yield bonds, are lower than Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar’s 
(2007) estimate of the spreads at 24 bps for trades of 200 bonds. In untabulated results, I 
find that the bid-ask spread rises as trading subsides in the days and weeks following 
the offering.
15
 The finding that the bid-ask spreads immediately after the offerings are 
much smaller than later when trading falls off is somewhat consistent with the evidence 
found for treasury bonds that “on-the-run’ bonds are more liquid than “off-the-run” 
bonds (e.g., Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath (2005)). 
Table 3 reveals three more interesting results. First, there are many more sells 
than buys on the first trading day, while the number of sell and buy trades are 
comparable on the second day. For instance, on the first day, there are 22851 sales of 
investment grade SBOs and only 11747 buys. But on the second day, there are 26385 
sells and 28792 buys. This suggests that average prices based on trades on the first day 
tend to include more trades at the dealer bid prices than ask prices, resulting in lower 
underpricing estimates, as Table 2 reports. However, this is not the whole reason that 
average prices are higher on the second day since the estimated underpricing is also 
higher on the second day than on the first day when estimated from bid and ask prices 
                                                 
15
 I calculated bid-ask spread post-offer and the spread gets larger over time. The average investment 
grade SBO bid-ask spread is 0.05% on the first day, 0.12% for the first week, and 0.23% for the fourth 
week. Please note that the implied bid-ask by underpricing is the average buy price across all bonds 
minus the average sell buy across all bonds, while the average bid-ask spread is estimated by first 
calculating individual bid-ask spread and then averaging across all bonds.  
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separately. If we look at underpricing estimated using customer sell trades only, 
investment grade SBOs underpricing averages 0.51% using second day prices, as 
compared to 0.42% using first day prices. A third point worth mentioning is that the 
number of trades on the second day is larger, which should provide better price 
estimates. Given these potential issues in first-day prices, hereafter, I use average prices 
from second day trades as the primary underpricing estimates. 
A potential concern with the estimates of underpricing using secondary market 
prices is that these could represent only a limited amount of trades, i.e., it is possible 
that market prices are bid up by a small number of investors whose demand was unmet 
during the primary market. To address this concern, I calculate the turnover rate in the 
immediate aftermarket as the total trading volume divided by the amount of bonds 
issued. On the first trading day, the average turnover rate (from both buy and sell 
trades) is 10.62% for investment grade SBOs and 20.37% for high yield SBOs.
16
 During 
the first week of issuance, the average turnover rate for investment grade SBOs is 
32.70% and 63.22% for high yield SBOs. These results are reported in Table 5. This 
evidence suggests that bond underpricing is not driven by just a few trades but indicates 
fairly active trading and possible immediate post-offering flipping activities.  
   
4.3 Determinants of Bond Underpricing  
             Having shown significant underpricing of corporate bond issuance across all 
types of issues for both investment grade and high yield bonds, I next examine the 
relative importance of the economic and institutional factors suggested by the various 
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 By comparison, Professor Jay Ritter reports an average turnover rate of 39% on the first day of IPO. 
Available at  http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/Ritter/IPOs2011Turnover_04162012.pdf   
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underpricing theories discussed in Section 2. In Table 4, I report multiple regressions 
where the dependent variable is underpricing estimated from the offer price to the 
second-day average price, adjusted by bond market movement. Statistical significance 
is based on White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
17
 
To compare with previous studies, I first present a baseline analysis with 
explanatory variables from previous studies, such as rating and maturity. Cai et al. 
(2007) find that only speculative grade bonds are significantly underpriced and Datta et 
al. (1997) and Kozhanov and Ogden (2012) even find overpricing for investment grade 
bonds. Cai et al., also include maturity but they do not find maturity to be significantly 
related to underpricing. I also include an indicator for built-in call option as bonds with 
call options may be priced differently (Weinstein (1978) and Fang (2005)). The omitted 
category is bond issues rated AA or above with a maturity of five years or less. As 
shown in Table 4 Column (1), credit rating is a significant determinant of underpricing. 
The estimated coefficients on “A”, “BBB”, “BB” and “B and below” are monotonically 
increasing, which suggests that the underpricing is increasing as credit rating gets lower. 
In addition, underpricing increases as maturity lengthens. Finally, the estimated 
coefficient on “Call” option is negative, suggesting that bond issues with a call exhibit 
lower underpricing. I next conduct different regression tests by adding in explanatory 
variables specific to the hypotheses developed in Section 2. 
4.3.1 Testing the Uncertainty and Asymmetric Information Hypotheses 
I first test how underpricing relates to factors suggested by the price 
uncertainty and asymmetric information hypotheses. I investigate issue-specific and 
                                                 
17
  I have tested several alternative specifications: OLS standard errors, issuer cluster standard 
errors, issuer fixed effect, and year fixed effect and get qualitatively same results. Also, results using 
underpricing measures based on first day trades are qualitatively unchanged and available on request. 
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issuer-specific characteristics, and market-wide conditions. A bond’s credit rating is a 
natural proxy for both valuation uncertainty and information asymmetry. As discussed 
in section 2.1, highly rated bonds likely have less valuation uncertainty. Also, highly 
rated issuers are typically large and mature firms, subjected to closer scrutiny by the 
market and therefore, the information asymmetry problems are likely less severe. 
Therefore, both the valuation uncertainty and information asymmetry hypotheses 
predict that bonds with higher ratings should exhibit lower underpricing. Indeed, we 
have already observed greater underpricing on speculative grade than on investment 
grade bonds in the univariate analysis in Tables 2 and 3 and multivariate regression in 
Table 4 Column (1). Bond maturity is another possible proxy for valuation uncertainty 
because for the same amount of change in market interest rates, the price change is 
greater on bonds with longer duration. As Table 4 model (1) shows, underpricing 
increases as maturity lengthens, consistent with the uncertainty hypothesis since longer 
maturity bonds are subject to higher price volatility and risk. 
However, higher rated/shorter maturity bonds differ from lower rated/longer 
maturity bonds in other respects than just perceived risk. In fact, empirical evidence 
suggests credit rating may simultaneously affect bond liquidity and relative bargaining 
power between the issuer and the underwriter as well (Edwards et al. (2007) and Datta 
et al. (1997)). Maturity also tends to be correlated with liquidity (Edwards et al. (2007)). 
Therefore, finding a higher underpricing for lower rated/longer maturity issues may not 
disentangle which underlying factor(s) is dominant in driving bond underpricing. 
Therefore, I adopt other variables related to valuation uncertainty. First, I use return 
volatility, which also represents the underwriting syndicate’s level of uncertainty 
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concerning the securities’ actual value (Yeoman (2001)). Since it is hard to measure ex-
ante uncertainty, I use ex post bond price volatility as a proxy, measured as the standard 
deviation of daily bond price changes over the one month period after the offer. Another 
proxy for uncertainty is a rating disagreement dummy. A bond typically get ratings 
from more than one rating agencies, when the rating agencies do not agree on a bond’s 
rating, it likely indicates either uncertainty about the bond’s default risk or information 
asymmetry in that one of the rating agencies has information that the others do not. 
“Rating Disagreement” equals one if the specific issue is rated as investment grade by 
one rating agency but as speculative by another. My last proxy for uncertainty at the 
bond level is the time between pricing date and the actual offer day (the first day with 
trading). As Corwin (2003) points out, the longer the time span, the more likely that 
market conditions will change between the pricing and completion and thus more 
underwriter uncertainty. 
 
I expect uncertainty and asymmetric information to be related to three issuer-
specific characteristics. First, SBOs (and especially ABOs) are expected to exhibit less 
uncertainty than IBOs since the firms’ bonds are already trading on the second market. 
Second, information asymmetry may depend on whether an issuer is a privately-held or 
publicly-traded firm as firms with publicly traded stocks are subject to periodic 
disclosure and market monitoring, and therefore are less likely to suffer from 
information asymmetry. To identify whether a bond issuer is a privately-helf firm, I use 
the issuer’s company identifier (PERMCO) from CRSP’s historical name file, 
supplemented by a manual search on Capital IQ.
18
  I use analyst coverage as the last 
                                                 
18
 Bonds issued by the same firm but at different times may have different firm identifiers (CUSIPs) if a 
firm changes its name, experiences M&A or reorganizes. Moreover, bonds issued by a subsidiary may be 
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proxy for issuer-level information asymmetry. Many studies argue that security analysts 
amalgamate and distill private information in a manner that reduces information 
asymmetry (e.g., Frankel, Kothari, and Weber (2006)), and therefore more analyst 
coverage should result in less information asymmetry. 
Finally, to examine the relation between market-wide uncertainty and 
underpricing, I use the VIX index to measure expected stock market volatility and the 
MOVE index to capture expected interest rate risk. VIX index is the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange (CBOE) measure of the implied volatility of S&P 
500 index options. MOVE Index is developed by Merrill Lynch to measure implied 
volatility of US Treasury bonds and is essentially the interest rate equivalent of the 
VIX. Examining the association between bond underpricing and these two market level 
risk measures sheds light on possible time-varying pattern of bond underpricing.  
[Insert Table 4] 
Table 4, Models (2) and (3) provide evidence of uncertainty and information 
asymmetry hypotheses and lend support to the two hypotheses at the issue and market 
level. At the issue level, underpricing increases with bond price volatility and days from 
pricing to issue, consistent with price uncertainty hypothesis. But the coefficient on 
‘“rating disagreement” is not significant, implying that the underpricing is not higher 
for the issues that have different ratings among rating agencies, after controlling for 
other uncertainty and information asymmetry factors. Bond underpricing also strongly 
                                                                                                                                               
guaranteed by the parent but trade under the name and identifier of the subsidiary. As such, failure to 
track a firm’s history may misclassify a publicly traded firm as private. After performing a manual search 
from Capital IQ, only 17 of the bond issues in my sample were issued by privately held firms as of the 
offering date. 
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increases with market uncertainty, as the estimated coefficients of the VIX and MOVE 
indices are significantly positive. 
At the firm level, however, multivariate results are not as the price uncertainly 
and asymmetric hypotheses predict. Specifically, while IBO (ABOs) underpricing is 
slightly higher (lower) in univariate tests than SBOs, the underpricing is not 
significantly larger (less) for IBOs (ABOs) than for SBOs after controlling for other 
variables. The coefficient of the “private” firms dummy in Model (2) is also not 
significant, suggesting that underpricing is not higher for private firms. The latter results 
may be due to the fact that bond issues are overwhelmingly public firms as only 17 
bonds are issued by private firms and all these private firms have existing public bonds 
outstanding. Model (3) includes the number of analysts covering the stock as a proxy 
for information asymmetry. Since a firm needs to be public to be covered by analysts, I 
dropped the observations of private firms in Model (3). There is no evidence that 
underpricing varies with analyst coverage.  
Overall, the results for Models (2) and (3) suggest that variables related to both 
price uncertainty and information asymmetry are generally significant determinants of 
underpricing at the issue level and market-wide level but not at the firm level. 
Specifically, proxies for price uncertainty such as price volatility, days between pricing 
and issue completion and market uncertainty are significant, while proxies for 
information asymmetry such as the private firm dummy and number of analyst coverage 
are insignificant.  
4.3.2 Testing the Aftermarket Illiquidity Hypothesis 
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To test the aftermarket illiquidity hypothesis proposed by Ellul and Pagano 
(2006), I use the daily post-offer bid-ask effective half-spread as explanatory variable, 
calculated as:  
                                        𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑑,𝑖,𝑡
𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡+𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑑,𝑖,𝑡
   ,                                              (4) 
where 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is the weighted average of price on all customer buy trades (at dealer’s 
ask prices) for bond i on day t, and 𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑑,𝑖,𝑡 is the weighted average of price on all 
customer sell trades (at dealer’s bid prices) for bond i on day t. This daily measure is 
then averaged over the first month of after the offering.
19
 A higher bid-ask spread 
implies higher aftermarket illiquidity. As suggested by Ellul and Pagano (2006), 
liquidity risk may also affect the underpricing and therefore I include the volatility of 
bid-ask spread to measure liquidity risk. 
The results are presented in Table Column (4). I find some evidence that 
higher bid-ask spreads are associated with higher underpricing but bid-ask spread 
volatility doesn’t seem to be associated with bond underpricing. I use two alternative 
liquidity measures in untabulated tests: 1) Turnover, measured as total dollar trading 
volume for bond i during period t divided by the total offer amount and, 2) Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity measure, modified for bonds, following Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and 
Lando (2012). Neither of the two alternative liquidity measures is found significant.  
4.2.3 Testing the Price Pressure Hypotheses 
I next test the price pressure hypothesis, which suggests underpricing should 
increase with offer size, as larger offerings require the market to absorb more bond 
issues. Relative offer size is defined as follows: 
                                                 
19
 Using the average bid-ask spread over the first week after the offering yields similar results. 
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                     Relative Offer Size𝑖 =
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑖
                        (5) 
Table 4 Model (5) presents results for testing price pressure. The coefficient on 
relative offer size is significantly positive, suggesting that price pressure plays a role in 
bond underpricing. One might argue that a larger offer amount likely increases the 
leverage ratio of the firm and thus increasing the risk of default and lowering the bond’s 
price but note that this leverage change should affect both the offer and the post-offer 
prices so should not impact the underpricing measure.
20
     
To further investigate whether the price pressure is due to a downward sloping 
demand curve for bonds (permanent price pressure) or due to temporary liquidity shock, 
I examine the sample of additions to an existing bond indenture (ABOs). Since both 
pre- and post- offering market prices of the bond are observable, I can track the price 
pattern around the offering.  
For each day t in the window from 25 days before and after the offering date, I 
measure a relative price as the average secondary market price on day t divided by the 
offer price, adjusted for market movements between the offer date and day t. A relative 
price above 100% means that the market price is higher than the offer price and 
therefore represents underpricing. Results are shown in Figure 2 where I include the 
offering price for illustrative purposes. As shown there, both pre- and post-offering 
secondary market prices exceed the offer price, indicating underpricing. For an average 
investment grade issue, the offer price is set about 1.17% below the average secondary 
market price on day t-1. After the offering, the secondary price is also higher than the 
                                                 
20
 Nonetheless, to mitigate this concern, I include in the regression the change in the book leverage, where 
book leverage calculated as total debt divided by total assets. In untabulated results, the coefficient on 
leverage change is significantly positive (t= 3.11), suggesting that underpricing is greater the larger 
leverage changes. However, after controlling for leverage change, the coefficient on relative offer size 
remains significantly positive (t=4.86) and the similar economic magnitude. 
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offer price (estimated underpricing is 0.46%). Moreover, the average price on day +1 is 
about 0.75% below the average secondary market price on day -1, which indicates a 
permanent price drop.
21
 Similarly, for an average high yield issues, the offer price is set 
about 1.97% below the average secondary market price on day t-1, and is 1.20% below 
the post-offer secondary market price on day t-1. This is to be contrasted with the equity 
study by Corwin (2003), who finds that secondary market prices recover completely 
after seasoned equity offerings.  
There are caveats associated with finding of the permanent price drop after the 
offer. Though we cannot rule out a permanent price pressure, it is somewhat surprising 
since there are many bonds with the same rating and maturity, which one would expect 
to be close substitutes. It is possible that the permanent price decline is due to the 
information brought by the new bond issue - especially the change in leverage. 
However, in a regression of the change from the pre-offer price to the post-offer price 
on the leverage change the adjusted r-square is only 4%. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
4.2.3 Full Set Regression 
Results from model (1) to (5) of Table 4 suggest that bond underpricing is 
positively related to proxies for price uncertainty, aftermarket liquidity, and price 
pressure and to a lesser degree to proxies for information asymmetry. Next, I present a 
regression with the full set of explanatory variables in Model (6). This specification has 
fairly good explanatory power. The adjusted R-square increases from 5.5% in the 
                                                 
21
 In efficient markets, traders should anticipate any price pressure effect so secondary market prices 
should start declining prior to the offer date if the issue is announced earlier. There is no evidence of this 
in Figure 2 likely because there is little pre-offering news since ABOs are additions to a pre-existing 
indenture and registration. 
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baseline regression to 18.6%. The Model (6) result still strongly supports price 
uncertainty hypothesis in that related explanatory variables remain significantly 
positive. Relative offer size still significantly increases underpricing, suggesting price 
pressure matters for bond underpricing. Note that the coefficient on the bid-ask spread 
becomes insignificant in the full set regression, suggesting that aftermarket illiquidity 
measures lose explanatory power after accounting for other factors. Overall, the results 
show strong support for uncertainty and price pressure and to a less extent, for 
information asymmetry. The regression results fail to find a reliable relation between 
underpricing and aftermarket illiquidity.  
 
5. Agency Conflict Hypothesis       
The hypotheses tested above view underpricing as a mechanism to solve or 
mitigate problems associated with underwriter uncertainty, asymmetric information, 
aftermarket illiquidity, and/or price pressure. The underlying assumption of these 
theories is that underwriters behave in the best interests of their clients−the issuing 
firms. However, if underwriters have informational advantage over issuers such that 
underwriters are in a moral hazard situation, then their interests may not always be 
aligned with the issuers. The agency conflict hypothesis posits that underpricing saves 
underwriters’ selling efforts and also possibly allows them to allocate hot offerings to 
favored customers in return for quid pro quos. Whether agency problem is relevant to 
bond underpricing is of special interest due to (as discussed above) the tremendous 
demand for corporate bond issues especially since the financial crisis has raised SEC 
concern. Of particular interest to the SEC is whether underwriters give preferential 
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treatment to certain customers in bond offerings at the expense of the issuers or smaller 
investors. 
 
5. 1 Post-Offering Trading Activities  
An ideal test of whether underwriters underprice to tip favored investors would 
rely on detailed bond allocation information, which, however, is not publicly available. 
Since observed aftermarket trading activities may reveal the (unobserved) allocation 
and price setting conditions during the offerings (Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999)), 
I conduct a trading volume analysis, and in particular, look for possible flipping 
activities by certain investors. 
[Insert Table 5] 
Table 5 reports average secondary market trading activities for the first day, 
the second day, and the first week of trading, with results for investment grade in Panel 
A and high yield bonds in Panel B. On the first day of trading, the number of trades and 
trading volumes are aggregated for each bond issue for institutional-sized versus retail-
sized trades and by non-dealer customer sells (designated “S” on TRACE) and buys 
(“B” on TRACE), separately. I then calculate the turnover rate for a bond on day t as: 
                                        Turnover𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖
                 (6) 
We can see that on the first day, there is a disproportionally higher incidence of 
institutional size (trades of 100 or more bonds) sell trades than buys. For investment 
grade SBOs, there are on average 13.7 institutional sells, amounting to $34.24 million 
dollar volume versus 7.21 institutional buys, amounting to $30.52 million. The sale 
turnover rate averages 5.88%, which is higher than the average buy turnover rate of 
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4.70%. In contrast, retail size (trades of 100 or less bonds) buys outweigh sells. 
Specifically, for investment grade SBOs, there are on average 4.8 retail size buys but 
only 1.5 sells on the first day. On the second day, the disparity in trade numbers 
between institutional sells and buys is reduced but retail size buys still exceed sells. For 
an average investment grade SBO, there are 16.1 (12.4) institutional sized sells (buys) 
versus 1.4 (10.3) retail sized sells (buys). Over the week, institutional size buys and 
sells become roughly even but retail sized buys continue to be active.  
These findings suggest possible “flipping” activities by institutional investors. 
It also indicates that smaller investors whose demand may be unmet during the offering 
are purchasing in the aftermarket at higher prices. However, it should be noted that this 
does not necessarily indicate that underwriters intentionally underprice to steer bonds to 
favored clients. If underpricing occurs for any reason so that there is excess demand for 
the underpriced bonds, then those obtaining the bonds will be able to resell the bonds in 
the aftermarket at a profit. My bond market evidence is consistent with Aggarwal’s 
(2003) study for equities. Aggarwal uses a unique IPO data from May 1997 to June 
1998, the only period when SEC data on allocation from the lead underwriter are 
available. She finds evidence that hot IPOs are commonly flipped, especially by 
institutions. Specifically, shares are sold in the immediate aftermarket by investors who 
receive an initial allocation at the offer price. 
5. 2 Self-marketed Vs Non-self-marketed: Financial Sample  
In the underwriting process, underwriters negotiate both the underwriting 
spread and the offer price with the issuer. Issuers can readily compare the underwriting 
spread to that of other recent issues but likely find it difficult to judge if the offer price 
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is appropriate as they have less information than the underwriters on investors’ demand 
for the issues. Thus this informational advantage may lead underwriters to minimize 
their selling costs and risks by underpricing the issue while charging a “standard” 
spread. 
To test the agency hypothesis of underpricing more directly, I study cases in 
which a bank serves as one of the lead managers while marketing its own bond issues. 
In these situations, the agency problem is largely mitigated. Moreover, if banks 
intentionally underprice in order to minimize their underwriting efforts or steer bonds to 
favored clients for quid pro quos, the costs to them for leaving money on the table are 
much higher when they are underwriting their own bonds. 
Specifically, I examine bond offerings by financial firms during February 2005 
to August 2012, because the self-marketed offerings are all issued by banks. I study the 
financial sample separately from the non-financial sample to facilitate comparison of 
my main results with previous bond studies which usually exclude financial firms from 
analysis. Mine is the first to explore bond offerings by financial firms in a context of 
examining offering expenses. There are 1186 straight bond issues of financial firms, of 
which 1155 are investment grade issues. 536 are self-marketed issues all of which are 
investment grade. Hence the analysis is restricted to investment grade issues.  
Table 6 reports summary statistics for financial issues, with statistics for all 
financial offerings in Panel A and Panels B and C restricted to investment grade 
offerings. Financial firms have considerably larger mean outstanding debt than 
industrial firms though the median is similar. The non-self-marketed financial offer 
amount is comparable to non-financial offerings reported in Table 1 but the self-
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marketed offer amount is slightly larger. Moreover, self-marketed offers take fewer 
days from pricing to distribution and have fewer lead managers. Given the small 
number of self-marketed IBOs and ABOs, subsequent analysis is restricted to SBOs. 
[Insert Table 6] 
Table 7 reports general underpricing evidence for the 1155 investment grade 
issues by financial firms for self- and non-self-marketed issues respectively. The mean 
discount (comparing offer price to the first day average trade prices) is only 0.08% for 
self-marketed SBOs versus 0.35% for non-self-marketed SBOs and the difference is 
significant at the 1% level. Based on second day secondary market prices, the mean 
discount is 0.23% for self-marketed SBOs and 0.43% for non-self-marketed SBOs and 
the difference is still statistically significant. The univariate analyses suggest that SBO 
underpricing is consistently lower when banks underwrite their own bond issues.  
[Insert Table 7] 
To examine whether the underpricing disparity between self- and non- self-
marketed SBOs exists after controlling for issue characteristics and other underpricing 
determinants explored above, I repeat the Model (6) regression from Table 4 for the 
sample of investment grade SBOs by financial firms in Table 8 and include a dummy 
variable equal to one for self-marketed and zero for non-self-marketed issues. In 
addition, the regression includes a year 2009 dummy designating offerings with issue 
dates between October 2008 and October 2009, when bank debts were possibly covered 
by FDIC’s debt guarantee program. Results from Table 8 show that most of the findings 
for non-financial issues apply to financial issues as well. Specifically, underpricing is 
higher for issues with lower ratings and/longer maturities and for issues with greater 
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post-offer bond price volatility. Likewise, underpricing increases with interest rate risk 
and/or stock market uncertainty. Hence the evidence for the underwriter uncertainty 
and/or asymmetric information hypotheses also holds for the financial sample. 
However, the relative offer amount is no longer significant, suggesting that the price 
pressure hypothesis does not hold for financial offerings. 
Notably, the coefficient for the “self-marketed” dummy variable is -0.137 and 
is statistically significant at the 5% level. The estimated difference between non-self-
marketed and self-marketed offers is therefore 0.137%, which is lower than the 0.26% 
difference between the mean adjusted discounts in the univariate result from Table 7. 
This suggests that differences in other (observable) characteristics explain part, but not 
all of the underpricing difference between self-marketed and non- self-marketed SBO 
issues. 
[Insert Table 8] 
It is possible that (unobservable) factors that influence the decision to self-
market are also correlated with those impact bond underpricing. It is also possible that 
the above explored factors impact underpricing differently for self- and non- self-
marketed issues. To control for possible self-selection in the self-marketing decision 
and allow other (observable) underpricing determinants to have differential effects on 
self-marketed and non-self-marketed offerings, I therefore adopt a switching regression 
following similar procedures to Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005) and Fang (2005). 
Like Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure models, a switching regression first 
performs a decision regression, where the inverse Mills ratio (endogeneity control) is 
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generated. It then incorporates this decision into the second stage regression. The 
complete model is as follows: 
First Stage:                         𝐶 = 𝐸 ≡ 𝑍𝑖𝛾 +  𝜂𝑖 > 0 ,                                       (7) 
                                    𝐶 = 𝑁𝐸 ≡ 𝑍𝑖𝛾 +  𝜂𝑖 ≤ 0,                                  (8) 
Second Stage:                     𝑌𝐸,𝑖 = 𝑋𝐸,𝑖𝛽𝐸 + 𝜖𝐸,𝑖,                                             (9) 
                                    𝑌𝑁𝐸,𝑖 = 𝑋𝑁𝐸,𝑖𝛽𝑁𝐸 + 𝜖𝑁𝐸,𝑖                                    (10) 
where the dependent variable C 𝜖 {E, NE} in the first stage Probit model is the decision 
to self-market (E) or non-self-market (NE). 𝑍𝑖 denotes factors influencing a financial 
firm’s decision to self-market. The Probit models (7) and (8) generate estimates of 𝛾 
and the inverse Mills ratio 𝜆𝐶(. ), the conditional expectation of 𝜂𝑖 given C.  𝑌𝑖 is 
observed only when a firm picks either E or NE (but not both). So equations (9) and 
(10) require the appropriate conditioning and can be compactly rewritten in regression 
form as: 
                                       𝑌𝐶,𝑖 = 𝑋𝐶,𝑖𝛽𝐶 + 𝜋𝐶𝜆𝐶(𝑍𝑖𝛾),                          (11) 
where the estimates of 𝛾 and the inverse Mills ratio 𝜆𝐶(. ) from stage one regression are 
fed into to derive parameters {𝛽𝐸 , 𝛽𝑁𝐸 , 𝜋𝐸 ,𝜋𝑁𝐸}. As Li and Prabhala (2007) point out, a 
key advantage of the switching regression is that we obtain more useful estimates of 
(unobserved) counterfactual outcomes.
22
  Specifically, if a financial firm i chooses to 
self-market, we observe underpricing  𝑌𝐸,𝑖. However, we can ask what the outcome 
might have been had firm i chosen not to self-market, the unobserved counterfactual, 
and what the gain is from firm i’s having chosen to self-market its own issue. The net 
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 It is even superior than a propensity score match (PSM) since the PSM can only control for explicit 
factors but the switching model can control for unobservable private information (captured by the inverse 
Mills ratio).  
45 
 
benefit from choosing self-market is the actual underpricing of self-marketed issues less 
the counterfactual had it chosen not to self-market, estimated as follows: 
                   𝑌𝐸,𝑖 −  𝑌𝑁𝐸,𝑖 =  𝑌𝐸,𝑖 − (𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑁𝐸 +  𝜋𝑁𝐸𝜆𝑁𝐸(𝑍𝑖𝛾))  ,               (12)  
where  𝑌𝑁𝐸,𝑖 is the “counterfactual” underpricing estimated, had the firm chosen not to 
self-market and is obtained by using the coefficients from the non-self-marketed 
equation (10). Likewise, the expected difference for non-self-marketed issues is the 
actual underpricing of non-self-marketed issues less the counterfactual had it chosen to 
self-market, i.e.,  𝑌𝑁𝐸,𝑖 −  𝑌𝐸,𝑖. 
 Table 9 Panel A reports the Probit regression for decision to self-market, 
where I include an explanatory variable indicating “possibility to self-underwrite” its 
own bonds, in addition to variables from Tables 4 and 8. A bond offering is possible to 
be self-marketed if the issuer is an investment bank or a commercial bank that has 
investment banking as one of its major businesses. Based on my sample, banks that 
provide bond underwriting services do not always choose to underwrite their own bond 
offerings. Further, a bank may choose to underwrite its own issues some of the time but 
not all of the time. The first stage results show that banks are more likely to underwrite 
their own bond issues if their bonds are rated A or above, and when they issue long term 
bonds. As expected, the possibility of self-underwriting is a significant determinant. 
[Insert Table 9] 
Table 9 Panel B reports the second stage regression for underpricing of self- 
and non-self-marketed offerings respectively. Most of the major underpricing 
determinants have roughly similar effects on underpricing for both self- and non- self-
marketed issues. More importantly, the inverse Mills ratio derived from the first stage is 
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included along with the other explanatory variables. The coefficients of the inverse 
Mills ratio are insignificant at conventional significance levels indicating that a 
selection bias does not seem to be relevant in this context.  
Table 9 Panel C compares the actual and counterfactual underpricing for self- 
and non-self-marketed SBOs where the sample is restricted to issues possible to be self-
marketed. The figure labeled “Counterfactual” for self-marketed issues is the estimated 
underpricing had the firm chosen not to self-market, and the counterfactual underpricing 
of 0.774% is calculated by applying equation (12) and using the coefficients estimated 
from the non-self-marketed regression in Panel B, the inverse mills ratio estimated in 
Panel A, and the issue characteristics of the self-marketed sample. The estimated mean 
underpricing had the self-marketed issues been not been self-marketed is 0.774% which 
is 0.533% greater than the mean actual underpricing for self-marketed offerings of 
0.241%. Likewise, the “Counterfactual” of -0.322% for non-self-marketed issues 
represents the estimated underpricing had the firm chosen to self-market.
23
 The 
estimated mean underpricing had they been self-marketed is negative (-0.322%), which 
is 0.800% lower than the mean actual underpricing for non-self-marketed offerings of 
0.478%. In addition, the difference between the two counterfactual means is 1.096%, 
which is significant at the 1% level. These results reveal that after accounting for 
(unobservable) self-selection, the estimated difference in underpricing between self- and 
non-self-marketed issues is even greater than those estimated in Tables 7 and 8.  
In summary, there is considerably less underpricing when underwriters are 
underwriting their own bonds among financial seasoned bond offerings. In other words, 
                                                 
23
 The number of observations is slightly lower than Table 8 because I restricted sample to publicly traded 
firms issues to facilitate the analyst coverage variable in the two-stage regression. 
47 
 
they are clearly “leave less money on the table” when marketing their own bond 
offerings, after accounting for observable bond characteristics, market conditions and 
possible self-selection. 
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper documents significant underpricing of corporate bond offerings 
measured as the initial return from the offer price to the post-offer secondary market 
price. In contrast to prior studies that find no bond underpricing or underpricing only 
among high yield issues and/or initial offerings, I find significant underpricing among 
both investment grade and seasoned bond issues and for both initial and seasoned 
offerings. Specifically, investment grade seasoned (initial) bond underpricing averages 
58 (59) basis points, which transfers to over $4 million left on the table per deal, given 
that an average seasoned bond issue raises $701 million of proceeds based on my 
sample. Underpricing is even higher on speculative grade issues. Given that an average 
corporate bond matures in ten years and assuming that firms do not change leverage or 
debt structure substantially over time, periodic refinancing represents substantial 
cumulative issuing costs to bond issuers. 
I further show that the significant underpricing does not merely reflect the bid-
ask spread in that investors who obtain the bonds at the offer price are able to 
immediately resell in the secondary market at a profit after accounting for bid-ask 
spreads. Further, I find evidence suggesting possible “flipping” activities in that 
secondary market trading during the first week tends to be dominated by institutional 
size sales and retail size purchases. These findings have policy implications since it has 
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been reported that the SEC is currently probing whether underwriters unfairly allocate 
new corporate debt issues to reward certain clients at the costs of the issuers or smaller 
investors. 
In exploring the potential reasons for bond underpricing, I find support for the 
valuation uncertainty, asymmetric information, and price pressure hypotheses. Further, I 
find evidence that underpricing is significantly lower when underwriters underwrite 
their own bonds, suggesting agency conflicts between issuers and underwriters at least 
play a part. U.S. corporate bonds are predominantly issued via firm-commitment 
offerings in which the underwriters play an important role in setting the offer price. 
Since underwriters have more information about investor demand for the issue than 
issuers and do not bear the cost of underpricing except when underwriting their own 
bonds, it is possible they deliberately underprice in order to lower their risks and selling 
costs – or possibly to reward favored investors.  
There is growing literature investigating the costs and benefits of the 
alternative security offerings mechanisms such as auctions. Existing evidence suggests 
auctions incorporate the information of all market participants into the setting of the 
offer price. Lowry, Officer, and Schwert (2010) suggest that for large seasoned equity 
issuers, the complexity of the pricing problem is not as severe and the value of auxiliary 
services provided by underwriters such as aftermarket price support and analyst 
coverage should be less important. To the extent that most bond issuers are large, well-
known seasoned issuers (WKSIs), one wonders if they might find an auction to be the 
better alternative. Why corporate bond offerings stick to the traditional firm 
commitment offerings is of research interest.  
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                                        Chapter 2: Essay Two 
Corporate Bond Event Study Methods 
Abstract 
The procedures used in corporate bond event studies to date fail to control for 
heteroskedasticity due to differences in return volatility by term-to-maturity, rating, and 
other factors resulting in low test power. Bond return standardization yields 
considerably more powerful tests. Also, due to infrequent trading, use of bond 
transaction price observations over several days before and after an event, while giving 
more weight to returns calculated from transactions closer to the event, yields 
considerably more powerful tests than returns based solely on transactions the day 
before and the day after the event. Exploring the test bias caused by overlapping event 
dates, we find that, adjusted for rating and maturity, the correlation among standardized 
abnormal bond returns is small but that even fairly small correlations can result in 
biased test statistics. A bond market modification of the Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) 
procedure corrects this bias. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
1. Introduction  
This paper explores issues in the construction of corporate bond event studies. 
How bond prices react to events or new information is relevant to numerous issues in 
finance. For instance, is a dividend increase good news for bondholders because it 
signals that management expects high earnings in the future or bad news because it 
lowers the cash available to service the debt? There are multiple instances in which 
competing theories explaining the stock price reaction to an event have different 
implications for bond prices. For instance, do existing equity prices react negatively to a 
new seasoned stock offering announcement because investors reason that it signals that 
management thinks the firm’s assets are overvalued (which would likely be bad news 
for bond holders as well) or because leverage is reduced thus benefitting bondholders at 
the expense of stockholders? 
While equity market event studies are legion, the bond market event study set 
is much smaller. As discussed in Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009), 
historically this was probably partially due to the lack of quality data. Until the recent 
decade, bond market researchers were limited to either monthly quotes from Moody’s, 
Standard and Poor’s, or Lehman Brothers or daily closing prices from the NYSE Bond 
Exchange, which is a small, odd-lot market, accounting for only a sliver of bond trading 
volume. However, in July 2002 the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 
began reporting over-the-counter trades of some bonds through its Trade Reporting And 
Compliance Engine (TRACE). In February 2005, coverage was extended to virtually all 
corporate bond trades. In addition, Mergent FISD and other sources now provide 
insurance company trades from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
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(NAIC), Datastream and Reuters provide daily dealer price estimates, and several 
providers sell credit default swap data. The availability of these new corporate fixed 
income databases raises the prospect of conducting the same sort of event studies for 
corporate debt that have become ubiquitous in equity markets.
24
 
In the seminal paper on bond event study methods, Bessembinder, Kahle, 
Maxwell, and Xu (2009) (hereafter BKMX) show that: (1) among the bond databases 
they examine, the TRACE data yield the most powerful event test statistics, (2) t-test 
statistics are mis-specified for monthly data, (3) non-parametric tests are better specified 
and more powerful than the t-test – though likely to be less powerful when bond returns 
are skewed. For TRACE based event studies, they recommend: (1) calculating bond 
returns from average daily trade prices where each transaction price is weighted by 
trade size, (2) excluding trades of less than $100,000 par value when calculating 
average daily prices, (3) calculating abnormal bond returns using value-weighted 
rating/maturity benchmarks, and (4) combining returns on a firm’s bonds into a single 
firm return. We build on their study showing that whereas the test procedures used in 
bond event studies to date (including the BKMX procedure) have relatively low 
statistical power to detect bond price reactions to events or new information, it is 
possible to construct much more powerful tests. We also explore the test bias caused by 
overlapping event dates and adapt the Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) t-test correction to 
the bond market. 
                                                 
24
 Bessembinder et al. (2009) discuss major bond event studies to that date. More recent bond event 
studies, with databases in parentheses, include Chava et al. (2012) (TRACE and credit default swaps 
(CDS)), Clayton (2011) (TRACE, Lehman Brothers, and NAIC), Gao et al. (2011) (TRACE), Klein and 
Zur (2011) (FISD and TRACE), Wei and Zhou (2012) (TRACE), DeFond and Zhang (2008, 2014) 
(TRACE), Michayluk and Zhao (2010) (Datastream), Plunus et al. (2012) (Datastream), May (2010) 
(TRACE), Easton, Monahan, and Vasvari (2009) (FISD), Wei and Yermack (2011)(Reuters and CDS), 
Billingsley and Kovacs (2011) (TRACE), Ellul et al. (2011) (NAIC), and Deng et al. (2013) (TRACE). 
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In designing a bond market event study, a researcher faces hurdles which are 
either not present in the equity market or are less serious there. To begin, bond returns 
are characterized by considerable cross-sectional heteroskedasticity. Specifically, prices 
of long-term bonds are much more volatile than prices of short-term notes and prices of 
low-rated bonds are more volatile than prices of high-rated bonds. Also, volatility varies 
over time. Since the t-test assumes bond returns are identically distributed, failure to 
control for this heteroskedasticity (as is the case in all extant studies to our knowledge) 
results in mis-specified t-tests. We find that the low t-test power documented by 
BKMX(2009) is primarily due to this violation of the homoskedasticity assumption. 
More importantly, we find that reducing the heteroskedasticity by standardizing each 
bond’s event window return by its return volatility leads to a substantial increase in t-
test power. While the improvement in the power of the t-test is most dramatic, 
standardization also leads to a substantial increase in the power of the signed-rank test. 
As an example of how much standardization matters, we find that for an event which 
shifts bond returns by 15 basis points, the likelihood of Type II error for a t-test based 
on a sample of 300 possible firm-event dates falls from 78.4% for tests based on 
unstandardized abnormal returns over the (t-1, t+1) window to 31.5% for tests based on 
standardized returns.
25
 Aside from running separate tests for investment grade and 
speculative grade bonds, to our knowledge, no bond event studies to date have corrected 
for the heteroskedasticity in bond returns. Another serious problem is that bonds trade 
much less frequently than equities. On an average day in our January 2005-December 
2011 TRACE sample, 54.6% of industrial bonds do not trade at all. Since a return 
                                                 
25
 These are averages for events that shift returns up by 15 basis points and down by 15 basis points as 
reported in Table 2 and Panel B of Table 4. 
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calculation requires price observations on two days, the problem is magnified. 
Supposing an event occurs on random day t, 2-day returns from day t-1 to day t+1 can 
only be calculated for 31.3% of bond-days even after eliminating rarely traded bonds. 
Since some firms have several bonds outstanding, the percentage of firm-days for which 
firm-bond returns for the (t-1, t+1) event window are calculable is somewhat higher but 
still only 38.6%. Since most days have no return observations, this makes the panel 
regression procedures sometimes used in equity event studies very difficult for bonds. 
Moreover, when bonds do trade, the number of trades is small; the median number of 
trades in a bond given at least one trade is only three per day. Since bid-ask bounce is 
fairly large for bonds, this results in considerable return noise raising the question of 
whether it is advantageous to enlarge the event window to obtain more trade 
observations -- for instance, to utilize transaction prices on days t-2, t-3, etc., in addition 
to t-1, and on days t+2, t+3, etc., as well as day t+1, in calculating event window 
returns. Broadening the event window increases the number of trade observations but 
also increases the likelihood that forces other than the event of interest will cause bond 
prices to change so the net impact on test power is not clear a priori. We find that, 
despite the greater non-event noise over longer windows, using transaction prices on 
several days before and after an event to calculate event window returns (while giving 
greater weight to trades closer to the event), substantially increases the power of the 
tests. It also brings more small firms into the sample. Of course, the window width 
choice also depends on other factors, such as how likely it is that other important 
contaminating information is released in the window. As an example of the increase in 
test power which results from expanding the event window, we find that using 
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transaction price observations over three days before and three days after the event to 
calculate event window returns reduces the t-test’s likelihood of Type II error for a 15 
basis point event in a sample of 300 firms to only 11.8% compared with 31.5% for 
standardized returns (and 78.4% for unstandardized returns) based on trades on single 
days before and after the event. For the signed-rank test, the likelihood of Type II error 
falls from 44.1% for tests based on unstandardized (t- 1,t+1) abnormal bond returns to 
20.0% for tests based on standardized (t-1,t+1) returns to only 5.6% when the event 
window is expanded.
26
 
We also explore several sampling and calculation issues – to wit: which trades 
to include when calculating daily bond prices and how to weight different trades in 
calculating average bond prices and returns. Restricting the sample to trades of 100 or 
more bonds, as BKMX recommend, reduces the noise in trade prices but sharply 
reduces the number of observations. Considering both noise and the sample size effects, 
we find that test power is roughly the same whether trades of fewer than 100 bonds are 
included or not. On the other hand, we find that test power is reduced if the sample is 
restricted to inter-dealer trades. Since small trades have more noise than large trades, a 
related issue is how to weight various size trades in calculating average prices. We find 
that test powers differ little depending on whether average bond/day prices are 
calculated by weighting individual transaction prices: (1) by trade size, (2) by the square 
root of trade size, or (3) equally - with the square root weighting giving slightly more 
powerful tests. Comparing the power of different test statistics, we find that the signed-
rank test is generally more powerful than the t-test or sign test. Finally we explore the 
                                                 
26
 Based on the average powers for negative and positive events from Tables 2, 4 and 9 using figures for 
ABSR{t-3,t+3} in Table 9 as explained below. 
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possible bias in test statistics caused by cross-sectional correlation among bond returns 
of different firms when their event dates overlap. Our results indicate that cross 
sectional correlations among abnormal standardized bond returns are slight when 
abnormal returns are calculated relative to bonds of the same rating and maturity 
suggesting that Type I errors are likely less in appropriately constructed bond event 
studies with overlapping event dates than in equity event studies. Nonetheless, even 
minor cross-correlations can lead to biased t, signed-rand, and sign tests. Importantly, 
we find that a bond market adaption of the Kolari-Pynnönen (2010) correction yields 
unbiased t-statistics. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next 
section, we describe our data and return calculations. In section 3, we explore the size, 
i.e. the probability of Type I error, and power, i.e., the probability of not committing 
Type II error, of various test statistics for returns calculated over a (t-1, t+1) event 
window following existing bond market event study procedures. In section 4, we 
develop our heteroskedasticity correction procedure and show how it improves the 
power of the test statistics. Issues of trade sampling, in particular whether it is better to 
calculate returns from all trades, only institutional size trades or only inter-dealer trades, 
are considered in section 5. In section 6, we explore how individual trade prices are best 
weighted in calculating daily bond prices. In section 7, we consider the consequences 
for the power of the tests of broadening the event window. In section 8, we explore the 
possible bias created by cross-correlation in bond returns when event dates overlap and 
extend the Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) t-test correction to bond markets. Section 9 
concludes. Our analysis is conducted using bond transaction prices from non-enhanced 
TRACE. Our results concerning the need to correct for heteroskedasticity by 
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standardizing returns in section 4, and the possible bias when event dates overlap in 
section 8 should apply equally well to tests based on dealer price estimate databases, 
such as Datastream, and on credit default swap spread data. The results in sections 5, 6, 
and 7 are specific to transaction data sources, such as TRACE and NAIC.  
 
2. Data and measures 
From TRACE we obtain bond trade data from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2011. 
Bond attributes, such as coupon, maturity, and ratings, are obtained from Mergent’s 
FISD database. Statistics on issuer total assets are obtained from COMPUSTAT and 
internet searches. Like BKMX (2009), we restrict our sample to industrial, non-
convertible, non-putable, and non-zero coupon bonds. In addition, we require that the 
bonds be denominated in US dollars, have $1000 par value, make semi-annual coupon 
payments, mature in 50 years or less, be rated by Moody’s and/or S&P, and neither be 
in default nor have a tender offer outstanding. Since price changes on short maturity 
debt are small unless default is imminent, we only include bonds and notes with at least 
one year to maturity. 7296 bonds issued by 2206 firms meet these requirements.  
            A number of bonds in this sample are very rarely traded. To obtain a workable 
sample, we further require that a bond trades at least 100 times over the 2005-2011 
period and that 2-day returns are calculable for at least 10 days over this period. Bonds 
are dropped from the sample when they default, are called or retired, or maturity drops 
below one year. We clean the TRACE data following the suggestions of Dick-Nielsen 
(2009) and BKMX (2009) dropping canceled, corrected, reversed, and commission 
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trade observations.4 We also eliminate: (1) trades with settlement dates more than a 
week in the future, (2) “when issued” or “special price” trades, (3) trades with special 
sale conditions attached, (4) irregular trades as indicated by TRACE’s “as of” flag, or 
(5) trades at less than $25 per $100 par value (which we regard as effectively in 
default). Finally, as a check, we compare the yield-to-maturity (YTM) reported on 
TRACE to the YTM calculated from the trade price reported on TRACE and coupon 
and maturity date from FISD. While generally the two YTM’s are virtually identical, in 
1.77% of trades they differ by ten or more basis points. A difference indicates that: (1) 
either the TRACE price or YTM is incorrect, (2) a CUSIP mismatch between TRACE 
and FISD, (3) the FISD coupon or maturity date is incorrect (in a few cases TRACE 
reports trades after the FISD maturity date), or (4) there was a commission (which is 
included in the TRACE YTM but not the price) on the trade despite the fact that the 
TRACE data indicates no commission. Eliminating these trades leaves a sample of 
15,247,340 trades, 5507 bonds, and 1495 firms.  
          Bond returns from day t-1 to day t+1 are calculated as:  
𝑅(𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 + 1)𝑛 =
𝑃𝑛,𝑡+1−𝑃𝑛,𝑡−1+∆𝐴𝐼𝑛
𝑃𝑛,𝑡−1+∆𝐴𝐼𝑛
,                             (13) 
where 𝑃𝑛,𝑡 is the trade-size-weighted average “clean” price of bond n on day t, 𝐴𝐼𝑛,𝑡 is 
accrued interest on bond n on day t, and ∆𝐴𝐼𝑛 is the change in accrued interest from day 
t-1 to day t+1.
27
 While BKMX measure 1-day returns from t-1 to t, we have chosen to 
                                                 
27
 Note that this symbolism differs from that commonly used in equity market event studies. Here R(t-1, 
t+1) represents the return from the average price on day t-1 to the average price on day t+1 – an average 
time of two days. In equity market event studies, R(t-1,t+1), or CAR(-1,+1), represents a 3- day return 
from the closing price on day t-2 to the closing price on day t+1. Since we are calculating returns from 
average, rather than closing prices, we think our symbolism is more suitable in our context. While 
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use returns calculated from the average price on day t-1 to the average price on day t+1 
since announcements may occur before, during, or after trading on day t and since all 
the studies we have seen to date use at least a two-day window. Use of 2-day returns 
increases slightly the non-event noise vis-a-vis 1-day returns resulting in slightly lower 
test powers but qualitatively the results are the same for both 2-day and 1-day returns. 
In section 7, we consider wider event windows. Following the procedure in BKMX 
(2009), abnormal bond returns are calculated as: 
𝐴𝐵𝑅(𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 + 1)𝑛 = 𝑅(𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 + 1)𝑛 − 𝐵𝑀(𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 + 1)𝑛,               (14) 
where 𝐵𝑀(𝑡 − 1, 𝑡 + 1)𝑛 is the mean return on a benchmark rating/maturity matched 
portfolio corresponding to bond n. We utilize 24 benchmark portfolios: six rating 
classes (Aaa and Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, and below B) and four maturity groupings (1 to 3 
years, 3+ to 5 years, 5+ to 10 years, and over 10 years).
28
 Moody’s rating is used to 
assign bonds to portfolios if available. If Standard & Poor’s (S&P) rates the bond and 
Moody’s does not, S&P’s rating is used. In order to calculate the benchmark return for 
each rating/maturity group, we require that at least five bonds in that rating/maturity 
group trade on days t-1 and t+1.  
An issue in bond event studies is how to calculate firm returns when a firm has 
more than one bond outstanding. A few studies (Jayaraman and Shastri (1988); Marais, 
Schipper, and Smith (1989); Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992); Warga and Welch 
                                                                                                                                               
TRACE and Datastream report what is known as the “clean” price, a bond purchaser pays the “dirty” 
price which is the clean price plus accrued interest since the last coupon payment. Both we and 
BKMX(2009) also calculate returns using clean prices ignoring accrued interest and find that it makes 
little difference in the size and power tests. 
28
 These differ slightly from BKMX’s benchmarks in that they do not include bonds rated below B and 
separate Aaa and Aa rated bonds. Their three maturity classifications are 0 to 5 years, 5+ to 10 years, and 
over 10. 
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(1993); and Cook and Easterwood (1994)) treat each bond as a separate observation. As 
BKMX (2009) observe, this biases the sample toward larger firms. Moreover, returns 
for bonds of the same firm will be correlated leading to biased test statistics. Hence, 
BKMX combine a firm’s various bond returns into a single firm-bond return weighing 
each bond return by its volume of bonds outstanding relative to the firm total. We 
follow their example.
29
 Descriptive statistics for bond and firm returns are reported in 
Panel A of Table 10 and descriptive statistics for bonds in the bond return sample are 
reported in Panels B and C. Note that this is for the bond return sample so bonds with 
many observed returns receive a higher weight than rarely traded bonds.  
[Insert Table 10] 
 
3. The size and power of existing bond event study test statistics 
            To test the size and power of various test procedures and statistics, we employ 
Monte Carlo procedures as in BKMX (2009), Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), Barber 
and Lyon (1997), Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen 
(1991), and Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). To test the size (or Type 1 error probability) 
and bias of the tests, we choose firms and days at random and calculate how often the 
tests find evidence of an event when none in fact occurred. Specifically, we choose 300 
firm/days at random and test whether the t-test, sign test, and signed-rank test find false 
evidence of an event. Since some of the 300 randomly chosen event dates do not have 
trades on both days t-1 and t+1, the number of calculable returns is less averaging about 
                                                 
29
 In an earlier version of this paper available on request, we consider other possible weightings including 
weights based on the size and number of trades and a simple average. We find it makes very little 
difference in terms of the bias and power of the tests. 
60 
 
120.
30
 Repeating this procedure for 10,000 random samples, we record the percentage 
of the 10,000 samples in which the tests incorrectly find significant evidence of an 
event.  
[Insert Table 11] 
                  Test size results for a two-tailed test at a 5% significance level are reported 
in Panel A of Table 11. A well-specified test is one in which the test falsely finds 
evidence of a negative event approximately 2.5% or less of the time and falsely finds 
evidence of a positive event approximately 2.5% or less of the time when no event 
occurred. As shown in Panel A, although the sign and signed rank tests display a slight 
tendency to find false evidence of negative events (due to the small negative median 
reported in Table 10), all three tests are reasonably well-behaved. Next we explore the 
power of various bond event study test statistics measured as the likelihood of detecting 
an event when one actually occurs, i.e., one minus the probability of Type II error. For 
this, we induce an artificial event in which returns from t-1 to t+1 are shifted upward by 
15 basis points for a positive event or downward by 15 basis points for a negative event. 
Using two tailed tests with a 5% significance level, we record whether each test 
correctly rejects the no-event null. This is repeated for 10,000 random samples. Results 
are reported in Panel B of Table 2. Like BKMX (2009), we find that the sign and 
signed-rank tests are considerably more powerful than the t-test. The t-test correctly 
                                                 
30
 Our procedure differs from BKMX's in that they choose 200 firm days at random from the sub-sample 
of firm-days with calculable returns, i.e. trades on both days t-1 and t. In later sections, we consider event 
study methodologies which impact the number of days with observations, such as restricting the sample 
to large trades or interdealer trades and broadening the event window. In order to consider the impact of 
these alternatives on test power, we choose firm event days from the sample of all possible firm-days 
regardless of whether or not trades occurred on days t-1 and t+1. Hence, the number of calculable return 
observations on which the tests are based is less than 300, initially averaging 120. When we broaden the 
event window in section 7, the number of events with calculable returns rises. 
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rejects the no event null less than 23% of the time for both positive and negative shocks. 
In contrast, the signed rank and sign tests correctly reject the null more than twice as 
often. The sign test appears slightly more powerful than the signed-rank test.  
 
4. Abnormal return standardization  
A likely candidate for the low t-test power observed in Table 11 is a violation of the 
homoskedasticity assumption. While the t-test assumes that all abnormal returns have 
the same variance, that is clearly not the case. As BKMX (2009) report, the abnormal 
return variance is higher for speculative grade than for investment grade bonds. 
Moreover, prices are more variable on long term bonds than short-term notes. In Table 
12, we report bond ABR standard deviations for our 24 rating/maturity classes.
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Clearly, return volatility rises as the time-to-maturity lengthens and the rating falls. The 
standard deviation for bonds rated below B maturing in 10+ years is about seven times 
that for Aaa-Aa rated bonds maturing in 1 to 3 years. In addition, our data indicate that 
returns on illiquid bonds are more volatile than on heavily traded bonds and that 
volatility was higher in the financial crisis period, 2008 and early 2009. 
[Insert Table 12] 
A possible solution to this heteroskedasticity is to standardize each bond’s 
return by an estimated standard deviation for that bond returns and base the event study 
test statistics on standardized returns – a reasonably common procedure in equity event 
                                                 
31
 In Table 3, standard deviations for each rating/maturity are calculated over a combined sample for that 
rating/maturity bucket. We also calculated an alternative in which the standard deviation was calculated 
separately for each firm and then averaged. The average standard deviations are slightly higher but the 
results are basically the same. 
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studies. By reporting separate results for investment and speculative grade issues, 
several bond studies seem to acknowledge and partially ameliorate the problem. 
However, to our knowledge, to date no bond event studies have standardized returns – 
including the older studies based on monthly data. 
Both standardized and unstandardized return measures are employed in equity 
event studies. Many equity event studies base their test on unstandardized abnormal 
returns (ARs), or cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in which the t-statistic is 
calculated as T1=AAR/σAAR where the average abnormal return AAR=(1/N)∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 
𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the abnormal return around an event for stock i, and σAAR is a measure of the 
standard error of the mean return AAR. σAAR may be either the cross-section standard 
deviation of the 𝐴𝑅𝑖 or an estimate based on a time series standard deviation for each 
firm i. The former estimate of σAAR, which we use for the tests in Table 2, has the 
advantage of allowing the event to impact volatility. An alternative, suggested by Jaffe 
(1974), Mandelker (1974) and Patell (1976) is to calculate standardized abnormal 
returns as SARi = ARi /σi where σi is an estimate of the standard deviation of ARi based 
on the time series of returns over a non-event estimation period. The alternative t-
statistic, T2, suggested by Jaffe (1974), Mandelker (1974) and Patell (1976) is then 
calculated as (1/N)
.5∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  . While T2 assumes that the event does not induce a 
change in the variance, Boehmer et al. (1991) show that this is easily corrected by 
marrying the standardization technique of Patell (1976) with the cross-sectional 
standard deviation suggested by Charest (1978) and Penman (1982) and calculating the 
t statistic as: 
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𝑇3 =
1
𝑁
∑
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑆𝐷(𝑆𝐴𝑅)
𝑁
𝑖=1 ,                                            (15) 
where 𝑆𝐷(𝑆𝐴𝑅) is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖 . In this paper, we 
employ this T3 t-statistic. Comparing the power of tests based on standardized and 
unstandardized returns, Brown and Warner (1985) find (their Table 8) that tests based 
on standardized returns are more powerful. However, after presenting both test 
statistics, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) assert, “In most [stock market event] 
studies, the results are not likely to be sensitive to the choice of J1 [tests based on 
CARs] versus J2 [tests based on SCARs] because the variance of the CAR is of a similar 
magnitude across securities” (p162). Similarly, according to Kothari and Warner 
(2006), “While a test using standardized abnormal returns is in principle superior, under 
certain conditions, especially in short-horizon event studies, it typically makes little 
difference” (their footnote 5). While violations of the homoskedasticity assumption may 
be minor for equities, it is serious for bonds as Table 12 indicates. Whether return 
standardization makes much difference to the power of bond market test statistics is the 
issue to which we now turn.  
4.1 Bond return standardization 
              To estimate the standard deviation of returns, σn,t, for each bond n and possible 
event date t, we calculate the standard deviation of 2-day returns using bond n’s 
observed 2-day returns from t-55 to t-6 and from t+6 to t+55.
32
 For this, we require at 
least six return observations over this time period which reduces the 2-day bond return 
sample from 1,672,685 to 1,621,093 observations. We utilize two different standardized 
                                                 
32
 Since 2-day returns overlap, they tend to be positively correlated. Thus, while consistent, the sample 
standard deviation is biased slightly downward in small samples. These problems become more serious 
later when we lengthen the return window. 
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return measures which we label standardized abnormal returns (SABR) and abnormal 
standardized returns (ABSR). SABR(t-1,t+1)n is calculated by dividing the abnormal 
return, ABR(t-1,t+1) n, by the standard deviation of abnormal returns over the (t-55, t-6) 
and (t+6, t+55) periods where abnormal returns are calculated as described in section 2. 
For ABSR (t- 1,t+1)n, we first calculate standardized raw returns, SRR(t-1,t+1)n by 
dividing each raw return by the standard deviation of raw returns over the (t-55, t-6) and 
(t+6, t+55) periods. For each rating/maturity group we calculate a standardized 
benchmark SBM (t-1, t+1)n as an average of the SRR(t-1,t+1)n for all bonds in the same 
rating/maturity group as bond n. Finally, we calculate the abnormal standardized return 
ABSR(t-1,t+1)n = SRR(t-1,t+1)n - SBM(t-1,t+1)n. Since the ABSR procedure gives 
lower volatility bonds more weight in calculating benchmark returns than the SABR 
procedure, we prefer ABSR conceptually but, as seen below, both yield basically the 
same results. To reduce the impact of outliers, we winsorize both the standard 
deviations (within each rating/maturity category) and standardized return measures at 
the 1% level. 
[Insert Table 13] 
For both ABSR and SABR, we calculate standardized firm returns as a 
weighted average of the standardized bond returns on all the firm’s bonds where, as 
before, the weights are based on the amount of bonds outstanding. An average of a 
firm’s unstandardized ABRs tends to be dominated by the firm’s most volatile bonds. 
Since a firm’s ABSR and SABR are averages of standardized returns, the influence of 
less volatile notes and bonds on the firm average is effectively increased. Statistics for 
firm SABRs and ABSRs are reported in Panel A of Table 13. Standardization reduces 
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the excess kurtosis in firm returns from 21.50 for ABRs in Panel A of Table 10 to 1.64 
for SABR and 1.68 for ABSR in Panel A of Table 13. This indicates that most (but not 
all) of the excess kurtosis in ABRs in Table 1was due to the heteroskedasticity in 
unstandardized returns.  
4.2 Size and power results  
          Size and power test results are presented in Panels B and C of Table 13 for 
standardized returns. These tests are structured the same as in Table 2, i.e., 10,000 
random samples of 300 firm/days each with 15 basis point shocks for the power tests. 
For ease in comparing standardized and unstandardized results, the ABR results from 
Table 11 are repeated in Table 13. As reported in panel B, all three tests are reasonably 
well-behaved with type I error rates close to 2.5%.  
As reported in Panel C, the improvement in the power of the t-test when 
returns are standardized is dramatic. The likelihood of detecting a 15 basis point (bp) 
negative event jumps from 22.67% for ABR to 71.89% for SABR and 68.90% for 
ABSR. Clearly the t-test’s relatively low power which we and BKMX observe for 
unstandardized returns is at least partially due to the violation of the homoskedasticity 
assumption. Interestingly standardization also leads to a sizable increase in the power of 
the signed-rank test for which the likelihood of detecting a 15 bp negative event 
increases from 60.03% for unstandardized returns to 82.37% for SABR and 81.02% for 
ABSR. Note that this means that the likelihood of Type II error is cut roughly in half. 
Results for a positive event are similar. 
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While less than that for the t-test and signed-rank test, the increase in the 
power of the sign test is noteworthy. Since standardization does not change the sign of a 
return, the power of the sign test is unchanged by standardization at the bond level. 
However, the weightings of different bonds in calculating firm return averages differ 
with standardization giving relatively greater weight to less volatile bonds. Thus some 
firm returns switch signs leading to a modest improvement in the power of the sign test 
as well. While the sign test appeared to be the most powerful of the three tests when 
testing unstandardized returns, the signed-rank test is clearly more powerful for 
standardized returns. Powers differ little between standardized abnormal returns, SABR, 
and abnormal standardized returns, ABSR. For the t-test, SABR’s power appears 
slightly higher while results are mixed for the sign and signed-rank tests. Since results 
are approximately the same and conceptually we prefer standardized benchmarks, 
henceforth we present results for ABSR only to save space. Both ABSR and SABR are 
standardized using standard deviations over the (t-55,t+55) period excluding the 10 days 
around the event. It is possible that the event changes the firm in some way so that post-
event volatility is not representative of volatility at the time of the event. In this case, 
researchers may wish to estimate the return volatility for standardization using returns 
from the pre-event period only. In the final row of panels B and C, we present results 
(labeled ABSR-Pre) where event day returns are standardized using volatilities 
estimated from the (t-101, t-6) period only. As shown there, it makes little difference in 
terms of test power which period is used to estimate the standard deviation though for 
most tests test power is slightly lower for ABSR-Pre. In Panel D, we present test power 
results for stronger and weaker events, specifically 10 and 25 basis point events, for 
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tests based on both unstandardized (ABR) and standardized (ABSR) returns. Even 
standardized, all three tests have difficulty finding evidence of the 10 basis point event. 
The signed-rank and sign tests generally find evidence of the stronger event even using 
unstandardized returns. Excepting the sign test for a 10 basis point positive event, 
standardization yields stronger tests. 
In summary, while, to our knowledge, all bond event studies to date have 
utilized tests based on unstandardized returns, we find that bond return volatilities differ 
greatly so that standardizing each bond’s event window returns by its estimated return 
standard deviation leads to much more powerful t-tests and signed-rank tests and 
slightly more powerful sign tests. While our tests are based on the TRACE data, results 
should be similar for tests based on quote databases, such as Datastream, or credit 
default swap databases since bond volatilities differ by time-to-maturity, rating, 
liquidity, etc. regardless of the database.  
4.3  Proportional shocks  
             In our power tests, we have tested the effect of an across-the-board return 
shock. According to Table 12, 15 bp represents .361 standard deviations for an Aa rated 
bond maturing in 1 to 3 years but only .049 standard deviations for a bond rated below 
B maturing in 10 or more years. Consequently, the likelihood of Type II error is much 
less for the former as illustrated in Table 14, where we report powers by rating/maturity 
category for the signed-rank test based on ABSRs for across-the-board 15 bp return 
shocks averaging powers for positive and negative return shocks. Since conducted by 
term-to-maturity and rating, these tests are conducted at the bond level, rather than the 
firm level as in Table 13. Clearly the likelihood of Type II error varies greatly by both 
68 
 
maturity and rating from 0.0% for Aa rated bonds maturing in less than 3 years to 
86.46% (100%- 13.54%) for bonds rated below B maturing in more than 10 years. 
Results for the t-test and sign test show the same pattern.  
[Insert Table 15] 
            This raises the issue whether it is realistic to model an event as impacting all 
bond prices equally. An event which causes a given shift in the yield-to-maturity has a 
much greater impact on prices of a bond maturing in 20 years than on prices of a note 
maturing in 2 years. As an alternative to across-the-board shocks, in the remainder of 
the paper we also present results for a proportional shock where the proportions are 
based on the standard deviations in Table 12. Specifically, SHOCKr,m = 
.0015[SDr,m/.015397] where SDr,m is the standard deviation of abnormal returns of 
bonds of rating r and maturity m as reported in Table 3 and 1.5397% is the standard 
deviation of all abnormal returns. So the shocks vary from a low of 
.0015(.00416/.015397) = 4.05 bps for 1-3 year Aa rated bonds to a high of 
.0015(.03036/.015397) = 29.58 bps for 10-30 year bonds rated below B. Under this 
proportional event shock format, type II errors are roughly the same across all 
rating/maturity categories.  
 
5. Trade sampling 
         Next we turn attention to the issue of trade sampling. To this point we have 
included all trades in calculating bond returns. However, many trades reported on 
TRACE are quite small. In our sample, 69.4% are for less than 100 bonds and 53.5% 
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are for 25 bonds or less and returns based on these small trades are likely noisy. It is 
clear that there is more bid-ask bounce in smaller trades. For instance, Edwards, Harris, 
and Piwowar (2007) estimate the roundtrip spreads on trades of 20 bonds at 1.24% but 
only 0.48% for trades of 200 bonds. Ederington, Guan, and Yadav (2014) estimate a 
spread of 2.25% on trades of 10 bonds and 0.55% on 500 bond trades. Also, retail 
investors may be less informed so deviations from equilibrium prices may be larger on 
small trades. Consistent with more noise in smaller trades, in our sample, the standard 
deviation of 2-day firm ABRs is 1.10% when calculated using only trades of 100 or 
more bonds versus 1.55% using all trades. 
Reasoning that prices on institutional size trades are more reliable, BKMX 
calculate test powers: (1) including all trades, and (2) restricting the sample to trades of 
100 bonds or more. They find higher test power by restricting the sample to the larger 
trades if the number of return observations is unchanged. They note that restricting the 
sample to larger trades is likely to reduce the sample size which may reduce test power 
but do not test this effect. This is the issue to which we now turn. Restricting the sample 
to trades of 100 or more bonds reduces the number of firm days t with calculable (t-
1,t+1) returns in our sample from 40.2% to 22.1%. To explore how the power of event 
studies is affected by restricting the sample to trades of 100+ bonds taking into account 
both the noise and sample size reductions, we recalculate bond and firm returns based 
only on trades of 100 or more bonds. Again choosing 300 firm/days at random, average 
sample size is reduced from an average of 120.5 days with calculable returns to 66.4 for 
the 100+ sample. 
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 In Panel A of Table 15, test powers are reported both for an across-the-board 
15 bp return shock and for shocks proportional to the relative standard deviations for 
that rating and maturity as described in section 4.3.
33
 Results for all trades are repeated 
for easier comparison. As reported in Panel A, the t-test and signed-rank tests are 
slightly more powerful when the sample is restricted to trades of 100+ bonds, whereas 
the sign test is slightly less powerful. In other words, it appears that for the t-test and 
signed-rank test, the noise reduction effect slightly outweighs the sample size reduction 
effect and that this is reversed for the sign tests. However, for all three tests, the power 
differences are fairly small so researchers can safely make this sampling choice 
depending on their event and sample, and what they are most interested in testing.
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Limiting the sample to trades of 100+ bonds tends to restrict the sample to heavily 
traded bonds and to eliminate smaller firms from the sample. When the sample is 
restricted to trades of 100+ bonds, median total assets of the firms in the sample is $26.2 
billion. In contrast, for the firm days in the broader sample, but not in the 100+ sample, 
median total assets is $21.6 billion.
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 In unreported size tests, Type I error is approximately 2.5% in each tail for all tests in Panels A and B. 
34
 A caveat is in order here. Like Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon, 
Barber, and Tsai (1999), Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991), BKMX (2009), and Kolari and 
Pynnönen (2010), we calculate test size and power by choosing event-dates at random. Thus, the power 
calculations presume that trading volume is unaffected by the event - though our tests do allow the event 
to impact volatility. However, it seems likely that the event could induce increased trading, especially 
after the event. In that case, the decrease in sample size when the sample is restricted to larger trades 
would be less than estimated here and power results would be higher. This applies also to our results on 
broadening the event window in section 7. 
35
 Matching bond data from TRACE and Mergent FISD with firm COMPUSTAT data is complicated by 
the fact that COMPUSTAT’s header CUSIP changes over time (as for instance firms merge) whereas 
TRACE and Mergent FISD use the bond's CUSIP which is normally unchanged from the offering date. 
When possible, we match each bond to the issuer's company identifier, PERMCO, using CRSP's history 
name file. For the remaining public U.S. firms, we matched bonds and firms using tickers, S&P Bond 
Guide, and other sources manually verifying these matches on the basis of company name. Many publicly 
traded bonds are issued by firms not covered by Compustat. Various firms, such as Dun and Bradstreet, 
collect or estimate balance sheet figures for some, but not all, of these firms. We searched for these on the 
internet. Similarly we searched on the internet for the total assets of foreign firms issuing public debt in 
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Since November 2008, TRACE reports whether a trade is between a dealer and 
a non-dealer customer or an interdealer trade. Edwards, Harris, Piwowar (2007) and 
Ederington, Guan, and Yadav (2014) show that bid-ask spreads are considerably 
smaller in interdealer trades. Moreover, dealers may be more informed so deviations 
from equilibrium prices could be less. Hence, we expect less non-event noise in returns 
calculated from interdealer trades only and indeed the standard deviation of firm ABR 
returns based on only interdealer trades is 1.37% versus 1.53% for all trades. On the 
other hand, since only 43.5% of the trades in our 2008-2011 sample are interdealer 
trades, restricting the sample to interdealer trades sharply reduces sample size. Power 
results based on data from November 2008 (when TRACE started identifying 
interdealer spreads) through December 2011 are reported in Panel B of Table 6. Results 
for tests using all trades for this same subperiod are shown for comparison. As shown 
there, restricting the sample to interdealer trades reduces the power of the tests 
somewhat. Since test powers are approximately the same whether or not the trade 
sample is restricted to trades of 100 or more bonds while restricting the trade sample to 
inter-dealer trades reduces tests’ powers slightly, we continue to employ all trades in 
our analyses below. 
 
6. Calculating average prices 
As discussed in the previous section, for the same firm, standardized returns 
calculated from small trades tend to have a higher variance than returns calculated from 
                                                                                                                                               
the U.S. converting to dollars using the exchange rate at the time. If possible, we collected total asset 
figures as of December 31, 2009. If only available for a different date, we adjusted to a 12/31/2009 basis 
using the producer price index. We were unable to obtain total asset figures for 5.6% of the firms but, 
since their bonds trade infrequently, this amounted to only 1.44% of the firm return sample. 
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large trades so that even after standardization some heteroskedasticity likely remains. 
This raises the issue of how best to weight different trades in calculating the average 
price on a given day. Theoretically, if returns calculated from trades of size x have a 
standard deviation of s(x) and trades of size y on the same day have a standard deviation 
of s(y), then the weight attached to trade size x should be s(y)/s(x) times y’s weight in 
calculating the average price that day. However, this becomes very difficult to apply in 
practice since a return involves prices from two different days. Nonetheless, it seems 
clear that in calculating average prices for either day, larger trades should get more 
weight than small trades but how much more and does it matter? This is the issue to 
which we now turn. Specifically we compare test powers for three weightings: (1) 
equal, (2) trade size, and (3) square root of trade size. 
Comparing test power when bond returns are calculated from only the last 
trade price of the day and when returns are calculated from the bond’s average daily 
trade prices, BKMX (2009) find that average prices yield more powerful tests. In 
calculating these daily average prices, BKMX weight each trade by trade size which is 
the procedure we have followed to this point. Note that this weighting scheme gives a 
trade of 10,000 bonds a weight 100 times that of a trade of 100 bonds. Since it seems 
implausible that the return standard deviation on trades of 100 bonds is 100 times the 
standard deviation of trades of 10,000 bonds, we explore test powers for this and two 
alternative weighting schemes: equal and square root of trade size weights.  
[Insert Table 16] 
Test powers for the three different weighting schemes are reported in Table 16. 
Since no Type I errors rates exceed 3% for the 2.5% tail, we do not report size results. 
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While powers for all three test statistics are slightly higher for the square root of trade 
size weighting, the power differences are small. We continue with trade size weightings 
in the remainder of the paper but results for the other two are available on request.  
 
7. The event window choice 
           The next issue we consider is the event window choice when working with 
transaction databases, such as TRACE. Of the possible firm-event days in our sample, 
only about 40.2% have trades on both t-1 and t+1 so that standardized returns over the 
(t-1, t+1) event window can be calculated. The problem is likely to be even more severe 
for less comprehensive databases, such as the NAIC database, or if the sample is 
restricted to large trades. Relatedly, there may be only a trade or two on days t-1 or t+1, 
so the calculated returns may contain considerable noise if restricted to trades on those 
dates. Thus a question is whether more powerful and representative tests can be 
constructed by incorporating trades over a longer event window, such as (t-2, t+2) or (t-
3, t+3) and, if so, how. Of course, the longer the window, the greater the likelihood that 
there will be events or information flows other than the event of interest which will 
induce fluctuations in bond returns. This added noise will tend to reduce test power.     
              Within wider event windows, there are several possible return calculations. For 
instance, within the (t-2, t+2) window, returns could be calculated from t-2 to t+2 , from 
t-2 to t+1, from t-1 to t+2, and from t-1 to t+1. One possibility is to use returns 
calculated using the days with trading closest to the event before and after. For the (t-
2,t+2) window for instance, this would mean using ABSR(t-1,t+1) (and ignoring trades 
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on days t-2 and t+2) if trades occur on both days t-1 and t+1; using ABSR(t-2,t+1) if 
there are trades on t-2 and t+1 but not t-1; using ABSR(t-1,t+2) if there are trades on t-1 
and t+2 but not t+1; and using ABSR(t-2,t+2) if there are trades on days t-2 and t+2 but 
not t-1 and t+1. We calculate this measure, which we label ABSR-Short(t-2,t+2), 
standardizing ABSR(t-1,t+2) and ABSR(t-2,t+1) by the standard deviation of 3-day 
returns, and ABSR(t-2,t+2) by the 4-day return standard deviation. Without 
standardization, this is the procedure followed by Chava, Ganduri, and Ornthanalai 
(2012) who expand the window out to t-7 and t+7.  
                  In our TRACE dataset, expanding the dataset in this way from (t-1,t+1) to (t-
2,t+2) increases the number of possible firm-events for which ABSR is calculable by 
31.4%.
36
 While this increased sample size will tend to raise the power of the tests, the 
wider the event window, the greater the likelihood that some news or event other than 
the event being tested will impact returns which will tend to lower the power of the 
tests. Confirming the latter, the standard deviation of non- standardized returns is 1.67% 
for ABR(t-2,t+2) and that of ABR-Short(t-2,t+2) is 1.58% versus 1.46% for ABR(t-
1,t+1). Since it is not clear a priori whether test power is increased or decreased, this is 
the issue we now consider. Size and power results for ABSR-Short(t-2,t+2) are reported 
in Table 8 where we repeat results for ABSR(t-1,t+1) for comparison. While still very 
close to zero, the mean of ABSR-Short(t-2,t+2) is negative resulting in a slight tendency 
to find false evidence of a negative event as reported in Panel A.  
                                                 
36
 This also tends to increase coverage of smaller firms. For the 720,742 firm/day observations for which 
ABSR(t-1,t+1) is calculable, median total firm assets are $14.4 billion (as of December 2009); for the 
226,128 firm/days added due to trades on days t-2 and/or t+2, median total assets are $6.5 billion. 
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             Importantly, we see that expanding the event window in this manner leads to an 
increase in test power. For a 15 bp negative event, the likelihood of correctly finding 
evidence of the event using a t-test is 81.44% for ABSR-Short(t-2,t+2) versus 68.90% 
for ABSR(t-1,t+1). For a 15 bp positive event, the powers are 74.36% versus 68.04%. 
Similar results are observed for the signedrank and sign tests. Power is increased further 
by expanding the window to (t-3,t+3) and (t-4,t+4). Due to infrequent trading, there 
may be an advantage to bringing in trade observations on other days even if the bond 
trades on days t-1 and t+1. As an extreme case, suppose a bond’s bid and ask prices 
don’t change and there is a single trade at the bid on day t-1 and a single trade at the ask 
on day t+1. In this case, ABSR(t-1,t+1) will be large and positive even though prices 
have not changed. Bringing in trades on days t-2 and t+2 may average out some of this 
noise and thus increase test power. Of course, widening the event window increases the 
likelihood that prices move due to something other than the event of interest which will 
tend to reduce test power.  
               Hence we next consider the alternative of basing the return calculations on 
average trade prices over several trading days before and after the event. If a bond 
trades on both days t-1 and t-2, we wish to include both but clearly the observed trades 
on day t-1 should get greater weight since they are closer to the event and thus have less 
non-event noise. Thus, our approach is to average all ABSRs within the event window. 
For instance, for a (t-2, t+2) event window, we average ABSR(t- 1,t+1), ABSR(t-1,t+2), 
ABSR(t-2,t+1), and ABSR(t-2,t+2) or as many of the four as are calculable. Suppose 
for instance that the bond trades on three of the four days: t-2, t-1, and t+1, but not t+2. 
In this case, what we call the composite ABSR, which we label as ABSR{t-2,t+2}(note 
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the braces replacing the parentheses), is an average of ABSR(t-1,t+1) and ABSR(t-
2,t+1). In calculating ABSR(t-1,t+1), the abnormal return over the (t-1,t+1) window is 
divided by the standard deviation of 2-day returns for that bond. In calculating ABSR(t-
2,t+1), the abnormal return over the (t-2,t+1) window is divided by the standard 
deviation of 3-day returns. Since the standard deviation of 3-day returns exceed that of 
2-day returns, this effectively means that the trades on day t-2 receive a lower weight 
than those on day t-1 in calculating this composite return. Size and power results for this 
composite return ABSR{t-2,t+2} are reported in Table 17. As shown there, the power 
of ABSR{t- 2,t+2} consistently exceeds that of both ABSR(t-1,t+1) and ABSR-Short(t-
2,t+2).  
[Insert Table 17] 
             In summary, as compared with tests based on trades on just days t-1 and t+1, 
expanding the sample to utilize trades on days t-2 and t+2 leads to an increase in test 
power even when there are trades on days t-1 and/or t+1. While trades further from the 
event have more noise than those close to the event, they tend to average out some of 
the noise in individual trade observations.  
             The finding that event studies based on the 4-day event window composite 
returns ABSR{t- 2,t+2} are significantly more powerful than those based on ABSR(t-
1,t+1) raises the issue of whether test power could be increased more by further 
broadening the event window. To explore this issue, we consider 6-, 8-, and 10-day 
composite returns: ABSR{t-3,t+3}, ABSR{t-4,t+4}, and ABSR{t- 5,t+5} respectively. 
As before, these are measured as averages of all ABSR returns within the expanded 
window. For example ABSR{t-3, t+3} is an average of ABSR returns over the windows 
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(t-3, t+1), (t-3,t+2), (t-3,t+3), (t-2,t+1), (t-2,t+2), (t-2,t+3), (t-1,t+1), (t-1,t+2), and (t-
1,t+3). Again we would point out that since the standard deviation of ABR returns 
increases with the length of the event window, the use of standardized returns 
effectively assigns returns over the shorter windows a greater weight in calculating 
composite ABSRs.  
               As the event window is widened, sample size increases since some bonds 
which do not trade within two days of the event may trade sooner and later. For 
instance, average sample size for ABSR{t-3,t+3} is 11.5% larger than that for ABSR{t-
2,t+2} and 46.4% higher than that for ABSR(t- 1,t+1). This increase in sample size 
tends to increase test power. In addition, even for bonds which trade in the (t-2,t+2) 
window, bringing in more trades may average out some of the noise in individual trade 
prices which also will tend to increase test power. On the other hand, trades further 
away from the event date are more likely to be influenced by factors other than the 
event of interest which will tend to reduce test power. Confirming the latter, the 
variance of unstandardized returns from t-3 to t+3 is 45.0% higher than unstandardized 
returns from t-1 to t+1. Thus further widening the event window may either increase or 
reduce test power. 
[Insert Table 18] 
                Size and power results for tests based on composite ABSRs for expanded 
event windows are reported in Table 18. As reported in Panel A, as the event window is 
widened, the t and signed-rank tests show a slight bias toward finding false evidence of 
negative events due to very small negative return means and medians. As reported in 
Panels B and C, all three tests show further increases in test power as the event window 
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is broadened, albeit at a decreasing rate. For a negative 15 bp event, the likelihood of 
Type II error for the signed-rank test falls from 18.98% for ABSR(t-1,t+1) to 4.53% for 
ABSR{t-3,t+3}, to 2.83% for ABSR{t-5,t+5}. For a positive 15 bp event, the likelihood 
of Type II error for the signed-rank test falls from 21.06% for ABSR(t-1,t+1) to 6.56% 
for ABSR{t-3,t+3}, to 4.67% for ABSR{t-5,t+5}. The implication is that on balance 
widening the event window increases test power due to increasing the number of bonds 
and firms for which returns are calculable and to averaging out some of the noise in 
individual trade prices. However, the increase in power as the window is expanded 
beyond three days before and after is slight. Of course, the increase in power as the 
event window is broadened must be balanced against other considerations. For instance, 
if one is interested in testing for information leakage before the event or how quickly 
and efficiently the information is impounded, a 10-day event window is likely too long. 
Moreover, while our evidence indicates that in general the additional non-event noise 
over the longer periods is out-weighted by the increased sampling, this may not be the 
case surrounding all events. 
 
8. Event date clustering and cross-sectional correlation  
In our Monte Carlo simulations above, we have followed Brown and Warner 
(1980, 1985), Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), Boehmer, 
Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991), and BKMX (2009) in choosing firms and event dates at 
random. Consequently, there is little event date overlap. Often however an event 
impacts a number of firms in which case the usual tests, which assume independence, 
are biased if returns are cross-sectionally correlated. Suppose, for instance, one is 
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interested in testing how a single regulatory change impacts firms in a particular 
industry. The usual tests are biased toward finding false evidence that the regulatory 
change has an effect since if some other event or news affecting all or most firms in the 
industry occurs during the event window all firms will tend to have positive (or 
negative) returns which the tests will wrongly attribute to the regulatory change being 
tested. Our proposal in the previous section to increase the number of trade observations 
by widening the event window using composite returns, increases the likelihood of 
overlapping events potentially worsening this problem.  
Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) show that the bias in the usual t-test can be 
expressed as a function of the average pairwise correlation between standardized 
abnormal returns of all firms in the sample assuming that the correlations are constant 
over time. For the most extreme case when the event date is the same for all firms, 
Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) show that the variance of the mean standardized abnormal 
return, equivalent to our ABSR, can be expressed as:  
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )= [Var (ABSR)/n][1+(n-1) (?̅?) ] 
where Var (ABSR) is the cross-sectional variance of the event window 
ABSRs, n is the number of firms in the sample and is the average pairwise correlation 
between any two ABSRs. If ?̅?=0, 𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )= [Var (ABSR)/n], and the usual t-test is 
unbiased. However, according to equation 4, even small cross-sectional correlations can 
lead to a substantial bias toward falsely finding evidence of an event. If for instance, 
there are 101 firms with an average pairwise correlation of .05, according to equation 4, 
the true variance is six times the variance calculated assuming independence. Kolari and 
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Pynnönen (2010) propose calculating an adjusted t-statistic by multiplying the usual t 
by the square root of [(1 − ?̅? + (1 + (𝑛 − ?̅?)] where ?̅? is an estimate of  ?̅? . 
8.1 Testing for bias  
            Having shown above that our proposed bond event study tests are unbiased 
when event dates are unique, we now test for Type I error when all firms share a 
common event date and apply Kolari and Pynnönen’s (2010) suggested t-test correction. 
Estimating ?̅? for the Kolari and Pynnönen bias correction creates a challenge in bond 
market event studies due to infrequent trading since it requires that both bonds trade on 
the same days. Hence, in this section, we restrict the sample to bonds that have a 
calculable ABSR(t-1,t+1) on at least 10% of the days between 2005 and 2011 inclusive. 
In order to construct samples in which the firms share some attribute, we further require 
data on CRSP or Compustat. These requirements reduce our sample to 915 firms.  
            In order to test for bias, we seek subsamples in which firms share some 
characteristic so that their bond returns are likely correlated. Note that since we define a 
bond’s abnormal return relative to the average return for bonds of that approximate 
rating and maturity, rating and maturity are eliminated as correlation sources.
37
 Hence, 
we explore other similarities that might lead to correlated returns. One possibility is 
that, like equity returns, bond returns for firms in the same industry might be correlated. 
Hence, we calculate average pairwise correlations 2005-2011 for the six two-digit SIC 
                                                 
37
 If we calculate abnormal returns by subtracting from the raw return, the average return over all bonds 
instead of the average return for bonds of that rating and approximate maturity, the average pairwise 
correlations within a rating maturity group range from .0237 for Baa rated bonds maturing in 3 to 5 years 
to .2084 for Aaa-Aa bonds maturing in 3 to 5 years. Correlations are positive for all eighteen 
rating/maturity subsamples. 
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codes with at least 40 firms in our sample.
38
 The two industries with the highest average 
pairwise correlations for ABSR(t-1,t+1) are SIC28, chemicals and allied products, 
=.00327 , and SIC 67, investment companies, holding companies, and trusts, = .00485. 
In addition, we divide the sample into quintiles based on total assets, leverage measured 
as total debt divided by total assets (book value), and total bonds outstanding. As 
reported in Panel A of Table 10, the average pairwise ABSR(t-1,t+1) correlation for the 
smallest bonds outstanding quintile is .00523. Thus, despite our attempt to construct 
subsamples with correlated returns, the resulting average ABSR(t-1,t+1) correlations 
are all miniscule. None exceed .006. To construct the size test, we choose a day from 
2005-2011 at random. Then apply the t, signed-rank, and sign tests to the SIC and 
quintile subsamples. This simulation is repeated 1000 times and we record how often 
each test incorrectly finds significant evidence of an event using a 5% significance 
level. An unbiased test should find false evidence of a positive event on that date about 
2.5% of the time and false evidence of a negative event about 2.5% of the time.  
8.2 Test size results  
             Results for tests based on ABSR(t-1,t+1) returns are reported in Panel A of 
Table 10 for our SIC and quintile subsets where we also report results for samples of 
100 randomly chosen firms (which should be unbiased) for comparison. As expected, 
since the average pairwise correlations shown in column 2 are quite small, in Panel A 
there is only minor bias in any of the three tests. Of course these are only eight of the 
innumerable possible subsamples, and it is possible that there are some with much 
higher correlations and therefore more bias. Nonetheless, these results suggest that by 
                                                 
38
 We also divided the 915 firms into nine broader industry groups based on SIC codes but the average 
correlations were all very close to zero so these results are not presented here.   
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calculating abnormal returns separately by rating and maturity, as we and BKMX 
propose, two of the major sources of correlation in bond returns are eliminated so that 
there is much less cross sectional correlation in bond ABSR(t-1, t+1) returns than in 
stock returns and hence less test bias when event dates overlap. 
                Results for composite ABSR{t-3, t+3} returns are reported in Panel B. While 
still low (none exceed .02), the average pairwise correlations reported in column 2 are 
considerably higher than those observed for ABSR(t-1,t+1) in panel A. This appears 
due to a slight correlation between returns on different bonds on different days. 
Consequently, as predicted by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010), the t-test is biased toward 
finding false evidence of an event in those subsamples with higher correlations. This is 
especially true for the smallest quintiles in terms of total assets and bonds outstanding 
for which several of the Type I errors exceed 5%.
39
 This confirms Kolari and Pynnönen 
(2010) argument that even small cross-sectional correlations can result in substantial 
bias. While Kolari and Pynnönen’s analysis was restricted to the t-test, we observe a 
similar bias in the signedrank and sign tests. In the final two columns of Panel B, we 
present results of tests using Kolari and Pynnönen’s corrected t-test. As described 
above, this requires estimation of correlations between all firm pairs on day t. These are 
estimated using ABSR{t-3, t+3} over the (t-200, t+200) period excluding (t-6, t+6) 
requiring at least five return pair observations. As reported in Panel B, this test is pretty 
well-behaved with Type I errors distributed around 2.5%. 
                                                 
39
 Like the two smallest quintiles, the average pairwise correlation in SIC28 also exceeds .01 but its bias 
is considerably less. This is apparently because the subsample size is smaller. According to the Kolari and 
Pynnönen (2010) model, the bias in the estimated variance of the mean is approximately proportional to 
the number of firms. SIC28 consists of 67 firms versus about 161 in the quintiles. 
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          In summary, when abnormal standardized returns are calculated relative to bonds 
of the same rating and maturity, cross-sectional correlations appear much less serious in 
the bond market than for equities. Consequently, when event dates overlap, the bias 
toward finding false evidence of an event is less severe. Nonetheless, as predicted by 
Kolari and Pynnönen’s model, we find that even small average correlations in the range 
of .02 produce biased t-tests in samples between 60 and 200 firms. We find similar 
biases in the signed-rank and sign tests and higher correlations for wider window 
composite returns than for ABSR(t-1,t+1). Fortunately, we find that the Kolari and 
Pynnönen t-test correction yields tests with little, if any, bias. 
 
9. Summary and conclusions  
             Bond market event studies to date have employed tests with relatively low 
power to detect bond price reactions to announcements and events. We show that much 
more powerful tests can be obtained by standardizing returns and widening the event 
window. Unstandardized returns are highly heteroskedastic because bond volatility 
differs substantially by term-to-maturity, rating, and other characteristics. Return 
standardization removes this heteroskedasticity leading to a considerable increase in the 
powers of the t-test and signed-rank test and slight for the sign test. In addition, due to 
very thin trading, basing bond and firm returns on trades on single days before and after 
an event leads to: (1) many event dates without a calculable return, and (2) noisy event 
date returns for the events with observed returns. Calculating composite returns based 
on price observations on several days before and after the event (while putting more 
weight on returns based on trades on days closer to the event) results in a substantial 
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increase in test power despite the greater non-event noise over the wider window. Some 
of the increase in test power from widening the event window arises from the increase 
in sample size since some firms with no bonds which trade on both the day before and 
the day after the event do have bonds that trade on other days close to the event. 
However, we find that most of the increase in test power arises from averaging out more 
of the noise (including bid-ask bounce) in individual bond trade prices. 
                The resulting improvement in test power vis-a-vis current state-of-the-art 
bond event study methods is dramatic. For instance, using a 5% significance level, the 
power of the t-test to detect an event which lowers event day returns by 15 basis points 
rises from 22.7% for tests based on unstandardized abnormal bond returns from day t-1 
to day t+1 for a random sample of 300 possible firm/event days (Table 4) to 68.9% for 
tests based on standardized (t-1,t+1) returns (Table 4) to 90.2% for tests based on 
standardized composite returns over the t-3 to t+3 window (Table 9). For negative 15 
basis point events, the power of the signed-rank test rises from 60.0% for tests based on 
unstandardized abnormal bond returns from day t-1 to day t+1 to 81.0% for tests based 
on abnormal standardized returns from day t-1 to day t+1 to 95.l% for tests based on 
composite abnormal standardized returns over the t-3 to t+3 window. For positive 15 
basis point events, the power of the t-test rises from 20.6% to 68.0% to 86.3% while the 
power of the signed-rank test rises from 51.9% to 78.9% to 93.4%. We find that 
restricting the sample to institutional size trades has little net impact on test power but 
that restricting the sample to trades between dealers slightly reduces test power. We 
further find that the signed-rank test is somewhat more powerful than the t-test and sign 
test.  
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               Exploring test bias when event dates overlap, we find in the subsamples we 
examine that cross-sectional correlations among abnormal standardized returns are 
small when the benchmark for the abnormal return calculation is the return on other 
bonds of the same rating and approximate maturity. This suggests that cross-
correlations are likely less of a problem in bond market than in equity market event 
studies. Nonetheless, we find some evidence of bias in the t, signed-rank, and sign tests 
toward falsely finding evidence of an event when the event date is the same for all firms 
in the subsample using composite returns over a t-3 to t+3 window. However, we also 
find that an adaptation to the bond market of the t-test correction proposed by Kolari 
and Pynönnen (2010) removes this bias. 
                We hope bond market researchers find the procedures we suggest helpful. 
While we have utilized the TRACE data, our findings on heteroskedasticity, 
standardization and on test bias when event dates overlap should equally apply to tests 
based on dealer quotes or credit default swap data. 
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Chapter 3: Essay Three 
Bond Market Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift 
Abstract 
Exploiting a large sample of daily bond transactions from TRACE, we 
examine bond market reaction to earnings surprises and post-announcement return 
patterns. We find 1) significant bond price responses to both positive and negative 
earnings surprises, 2) evidence of bond market post-earnings announcement drifts 
driven by drifts following positive earnings surprises. Our results suggest that while 
both positive and negative earnings surprises have informational content for bond 
prices, negative earnings gets impounded into bond prices more efficiently than positive 
information.  Further, we find that the absolute magnitude of both the initial bond price 
responses and the post-announcement drifts are greater for firms with noninvestment-
grade debt, suggesting that prices of riskier bonds are more sensitive to earnings news 
and adjust to information less efficiently. 
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1. Introduction  
            Beginning with the seminal work by Ball and Brown (1968), extensive studies 
have documented that stock prices are strongly responsive to quarterly earnings news 
and that stock returns continue to drift in the same direction as earnings surprises, up to 
months after the announcements.
40
The apparent predictability of cross sectional returns 
based on past earnings news seems to be an enduring feature of stock returns and is 
among the most controversial aspects of the debate on market efficiency. 
            We investigate whether the extensive evidence of the significant post-
announcement drift in the stock market extends to the bond market and explore the 
implications for bond market efficiency.  During the decade 2005 to 2011, U.S. 
corporations issued a total of $6.6 trillion in corporate bonds, compared to $1.3 trillion 
in equity through common stock offerings.
41
 Given that corporate bonds are an 
important source of external financing for U.S. firms and that earnings announcement is 
the primary public information about firm’s performance, examining the behavior of 
bond prices around earnings announcements provides evidence of the impact of 
unexpected earnings on the wealth of a group of nontrivial claimholders and gives an 
opportunity to test bond market efficiency. 
             In general, the extent of market efficiency of corporate bonds has not been 
established in the literature. While Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) and Ronen and Zhou 
(2008) find that the bond market is efficient, Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2009) 
                                                 
40
 Empirical studies trying to provide the evidence and explanations include Bernard and Thomas (1989), 
Bhushan (1994), Ng,Rusticus, and Verdi (2008), Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000), 
Mendenhall (2004),  Battalio and Mendenhall (2006), and Chordia, Goyal, Sadka, Sadka, and 
Shivakumar (2009) who find that stocks with lower stock price, less liquidity, higher arbitrage costs and 
risks tend to have greater drifts. Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) and Doyle, Lundholm, and Soliman 
(2006) serve as benchmarks for the recent PEAD literature, which document significant PEAD using 
analyst consensus forecasts as the earnings expectation benchmark. 
41
Source:  Thomson Reuters. 
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find that the corporate bond market is less informationally efficient than the stock 
market. In the specific case of earnings announcement, though several studies provide 
initial evidence that the bond market is responsive to earnings surprises in terms of bond 
returns and trading activities (Datta and Dhillon (1993), Easton Monahan and Vasvari 
(2009), and Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002)), the pattern in post-announcement bond 
returns and thus market efficiency remain unexplored.  
Bonds, like stocks, are claims on a firm’s assets so that information that affects 
the value of the firm will impact prices of both the firm’s bonds and stocks. However, to 
the extent that the bond market has different features from the equity market, strong 
evidence of equity market response to earnings announcement and Post-Earnings-
Announcement Drift (PEAD) does not preclude that bond prices will behave in the 
similar way. First, bondholders are not residual claimaints and a bond’s payoff structure 
is asymmetric. Changes in accounting earnings may not translate to changes in 
bondholders’ wealth like they do for shareholders. Under this assumption, bond prices 
may not be sensitive to earnings surprises, especially for positive earnings news.  
However, it is also possible that earnings surprises reveal information about changes in 
the probability of default. An unexpected impairment of a firm’s operating performance 
which results in a higher default probability will clearly have a negative effect on 
bondholders while a large positive earnings surprise may resolve or alleviate 
uncertainty about a firm’s financial distress and therefore move bond prices upward. 
Under assumption of earnings surprises revealing information about default probability, 
bond prices are responsive to earnings surprises. 
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Second, the price adjustment of bonds is likely to be constrained by the relative 
illiquidity and higher transaction costs of bond market, compared to the equity market. 
For instance, Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) report that the average 
bond only trades 52 days a year with just a few bonds being actively traded. Ederington, 
Guan, and Yang (2012) document that during January 2005-December 2011 in TRACE 
sample, the median (mean) number of trades per day is only 3 (6.3) conditional on 
trading. The lower trading frequency of corporate bonds may reflect their relatively 
large trading costs. Actually, Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) report that effective 
spreads in corporate bond is 124 basis points for trades of $20,000, which triples the 
size of equity markets for retail-sized trades. If low market liquidity and higher trading 
costs constrain the informed trades that are necessary to incorporate new information 
into bond prices, then bond market may react sluggishly to the information, and in this 
case, earnings news.
42
 
A possibly delayed reaction to earnings announcements due to the relative 
illiquidity of the bond market may further implicate a less efficient market and thus 
increase the likelihood of post-announcement drifts. Coupled with equity market 
evidence from Chordia et al (2009) and Ng et al (2008), who find weaker return 
responses at the time of the earnings announcement and greater subsequent return drift 
for firms with higher transaction costs, this suggests that post-announcement drifts 
might be greater in the bond market.  
While lack of liquidity likely deteriorates bond market efficiency, being 
dominated by large institutions might improve market efficiency as institutions are 
                                                 
42
A line of finance literature studying the relation between liquidity and market efficiency finds that 
higher liquidity enhances market efficiency (see Chordia, Roll, Subrahmanyam (2008) for a review). 
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assumed to be skilled information processors.
43
  In general, Boehmer, Kelly, and 
Pirinsky (2005) observe a positive impact of institutional investors on intraday price 
efficiency. Evidence has also shown that there is a greater tendency for return drifts 
among stocks with less institutional ownership (Ng, Rustigus, and Verdi (2008) and 
Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000)).Therefore, it is not clear apriori whether 
and to what extent bond prices drift following earnings news, depending largely on the 
tradeoff among favorable or adverse factors affecting bond market efficiency.  
Further, we expect that investment grade and noninvestment grade bonds may 
behave differently. On the one hand, earnings news may have a stronger effect on 
speculative-grade bonds than higher rated bonds. This is because a bond investment can 
be viewed as a long position in a risk-free debt in combination of a short position in a 
put option on the issuer’s assets. As the put option is deep out-of-the-money for 
investment-grade bonds and in the money for speculative-grade bonds, investors should 
be more sensitive to firm-specific news for speculative bonds. On the other hand, bond 
price adjustments to earnings information may be less efficient for lower rated bonds 
due to higher transaction costs (Edwards et al (2007)) and greater uncertainty about 
their financial conditions. As such, how bond returns with different riskiness behave 
differently remains an open question. 
Despite the unclear pattern of bond returns in response to earnings surprise, 
empirical work on the bond return patterns around earnings news remain somewhat 
sparse. There are no studies examining the post-announcement return patterns in the 
                                                 
43
Bessembinder et al (2009) report that trades of $100,000 or more account for 96.7% of bond trading 
volume. However, Ederington et al (2012) find that 69.4% (46.5%) of bond trades are less than $100,000 
($25,000). This may imply that there are considerable amount of small investors on the bond market and 
that many bond price observations are determined by non-institutional size trades. 
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bond market. One possible obstacle that researchers face is data availability. Because 
most bond transaction prices have never been published until recently, extant studies 
providing early step towards understanding bond price behavior have relied on quotes at 
either monthly (weekly)frequency or data that covers only a subset of bonds.
44
  For 
example, Datta and Dhillon (1993) give early evidence that earnings announcements 
have information content for the bond market with a relatively small sample. Using 
Mergent FISD insurance company bond trades database, Easton et al (2009) investigate 
the role of earnings in the bond market and find that the incidence of bond trade during 
the days surrounding earnings announcements increases and some evidence of initial 
bond price responses to unexpected earnings, albeit with some exceptions. Wei and 
Zhou (2012) find that the direction of pre-announcement bond trading is significantly 
related to earnings surprises. Using a dataset of intraday transaction prices of a sample 
of 55 most liquid bonds, Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) find that the bond market reacts 
quickly to earnings surprises within shorter time windows.  These studies provide 
evidence that short-window trading and returns do react to announcements, but still 
leave open the question of whether there is post announcement drift and in turn the 
implication for bond market efficiency. 
Another obstacle comes from the estimation of abnormal bond returns, which 
can account for the unique issues with bond returns. Specifically, how to treat the 
multiple bonds issued by the same firm, how to deal with the constantly changing 
sensitivity to risk factors as a bond moves closer to its maturity date, how to determine 
                                                 
44
The main source of data regarding corporate bond trades pre-TRACE is the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners, who required insurance companies to report prices and volumes for their bond 
trades (Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008)). Insurance companies are estimated to hold between 33%-
40% of corporate bonds and have completed 12.5% of the dollar trading volume in TRACE-eligible 
securities during second half of 2002 (Campbell and Taksler (2003)). 
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the appropriate price and model used since few bonds trade on a continuous basis, and 
how to account for the considerable heteroskedasticity in bond returns. All these issues 
are found to make existing methods used to test abnormal stock returns not well 
specified in testing bond returns (Bessembinder et al (2009) and Ederington et al 
(2012)). Moreover, few bond pricing models have been developed to focus on 
noninvestment grade bonds until recently. As observed by Bessembinder et al (2009), 
lower rated bonds are less likely to detect an “event” by extant event study 
methodologies. Ederington et al (2012) propose that the low power observed for low 
rated firms is due to violation of the homoskedasticity assumption. As such, remedies 
are critical to get more reliable inference for riskier bonds.  
In light of the difficulties faced by prior bond event studies, we use a 
comprehensive record of U.S. over-the-counter corporate bonds from Trade Reporting 
and Compliance Engine (TRACE) database and apply event study methodologies 
developed by Bessembinder et al (2009) and Ederington et al (2012) to investigate the 
bond price behavior around earnings announcements. When calculating bond abnormal 
returns, we base benchmark returns on the portfolios based on the same maturity and 
rating groups instead of treasury bonds to account for the constantly changing 
sensitivity to risk factors as suggested by Bessembinder et al (2009). We then derive 
test statistic as proposed by Ederington et al (2012), which overcomes considerable 
cross-sectional heteroskedasticity in bond returns and simultaneously account for event-
induced increases in the variance.  Specifically, we standardize each individual bond 
return by its estimated volatility and get the standardized individual bond returns. We 
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then get inference based on the cross sectional standard deviation of these standardized 
returns during the event window. 
We test the bond market reaction to earnings news by examining firms’ bond 
abnormal returns over the short interval surrounding earnings announcement dates and 
find a significant bond price response to both positive and negative earnings surprises. 
We then separate sample firms into firms with investment- versus speculative-grade 
bonds. Investment-grade bond returns are responsive to negative earnings surprises but 
not to positive earnings surprises. This is consistent with the implications of the non-
linear payoff structure of bonds. Specifically, for an investment-grade firm, better 
performance does not lend much upside potential to bondholders’ payoff while an 
unexpected bad performance triggers the concern for the issuer’s financial condition. 
Therefore, investment-grade bond prices move quickly in response to negative earnings 
surprises but not to positive earnings surprises. In contrast, speculative-grade bond 
returns are strongly responsive to both negative and positive earnings surprises. We 
interpret this finding to be consistent with the fact that speculative-grade bonds behave 
more like stocks and that the probability of default is highly sensitive to changes in 
earnings. Though good news may not have much impact on higher-rated bond, it has a 
relatively large impact on speculative-grade bonds as it alleviates the concerns of 
financial distress. Overall, our findings of a significant bond price reaction to earnings 
surprises compliments the findings of Easton et al. (2009) and Wei and Zhou (2012),  
who document that the incidence of bond trade increases during the days surrounding 
earnings announcements, suggesting that earnings news has informational content for 
bond market.   
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Next, we examine whether there exits PEAD in the bond market. To estimate 
the drift, we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns over the period from the fourth 
day through the 63
rd
  trading day after earnings announcement as well as the short 
interval abnormal bond returns around subsequent announcement date. We find 
evidence of PEAD, which is driven by drifts following positive earnings surprises and 
speculative-grade firms.  Interestingly, while we find strong evidence of PEAD for the 
universe of common stocks during our sample period year 2005 to 2011, there is no 
indication of stock PEAD among the firms with a matched bond. Combined together, 
these findings may imply that firms in our sample are firms with relatively efficient 
information dissemination environment in the equity market and that it is lack of 
liquidity in the bond market that makes bond prices adjust sluggishly to earnings news. 
In addition, little evidence of PEAD for high rated bonds and observed PEAD for 
lower-rated bonds are also consistent with Edwards et al’s (2007) finding that highly 
rated bonds have lower transaction costs, such that earnings news is impounded into 
bond prices more efficiently.  
To justify our argument that bond market PEAD is driven by market illiquidity, 
we separate samples into high versus low liquidity firms based on their bond trading 
activities. Consistent with our prediction, the post-announcement drift in the bond 
market is driven by firms with low liquidity, even after controlling for firms’ riskiness. 
Our study contributes to the literature by studying the bond price behavior 
around one of most prominent firm-specific information events with a comprehensive 
database that covers all the U.S. over-the-counter corporate bonds. We interpret our 
findings as evidence that accounting earnings information is value relevant to bond 
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market and that bond market efficiency is likely hampered by illiquidity. To the extent 
that the complete record of corporate bond transactions from TRACE system begins in 
2005, our study represents one of the first empirical studies on the daily behavior of 
bond prices in response to firm-specific information. We use methodologies that 
accounts for the liquidity and other institutional characteristics specific to bond market 
(Bessembinder et al. (2009) and extended by Ederington et al. (2012)). Our study may 
have implication for market reaction timeliness for other firm-specific information 
release and possibly other forms of underreaction in bond market and thus the current 
study helps inform the controversy about bond market efficiency.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data 
and the variables construction. Section 3 presents the research design and empirical 
results, and Section 4 provides discussions of the robustness tests and further 
examinations. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Sample Selection 
Our sample consists of firms with bond trading observations in TRACE that 
have a matched common stock (share code equals 10, 11) listed on the NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ (exchange code equals 1, 2, or 3) when needed data on analyst earnings 
expectations from Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S)and accounting 
information from COMPUSTAT are available. Our sample period begins from the first 
quarter of 2005, when TRACE extended its coverage from a subset to almost the entire 
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corporate bond markets, and ends in the fourth quarter of 2011.We merge each bond to 
the issuer’s stock identifier, PERMNO, using CRSP’s historical name file.45  
We gather bond characteristics such as coupon, maturity, and ratings from 
Mergent’s FISD database. Moody’s rating is used if it is available; otherwise Standard 
&Poor’s rating is adopted. Particularly, bonds are designated as “investment grade” 
(rated BBB or better by Standard &Poor’s or Baa or better by Moody’s respectively), or 
“noninvestment grade.” To calculate the corresponding return measure for stocks, we 
obtain daily stock returns from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily 
tape. 
Criteria for inclusion of a bond and a trade are the same as those used in 
Bessembinder et al (2009) and Ederington et al (2012). We restrict the sample to 
industrial, non-convertible, non-putable, and non-zero coupon bonds, and bonds that 
have at least one year to maturity but mature in 50 years. We drop canceled, corrected, 
and commission trade observations. Very thinly traded bonds are also eliminated as we 
require that the bond be traded at least 100 times over the 2005-2011 period and that 2-
day returns be calculable for at least 10 days over this period. After implementing 
standard deletion criteria in PEAD literature and for bond return calculation, the 
remaining sample has 6,409 firm-quarters, involving 3,074 bonds issued by 549 
underlying firms.
46
 
                                                 
45We match bond’s issuer CUSIP with CRSP historical CUSIP instead of CRSP header CUSIP. Because 
Mergent FISD database keeps the issuer’s CUSIP as of the offering date, merging by header CUSIP 
which is the current CUSIP in WRDS will lose many bond observations. In addition, a few bonds have a 
different CUSIP with the CUSIP of their prospective issuer, thus we manually match these bonds to their 
prospective issuer’s stock. 
46
As suggested by Livnat and Mendenhall (2006), we require that the price per share be available from 
Compustat as of the end of quarter t, and be greater than $1 to reduce the noise caused by small deflators 
to calculate earnings surprise measure. This eliminates very small firms with low liquidity, as well as 
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2.2 Earnings Surprise Measure- Standard Unexpected Earnings (SUE) 
We define earnings surprises as actual earnings per share from the I/B/E/S detail 
file minus expected earnings based on analyst consensus forecasts, scaled by stock price 
at the end of prior quarter. In line with Livnat and Mendenhall (2006), the measure of 
analysts’ expectations is the median of forecasts reported to I/B/E/S. We only adopt 
individual analyst’s forecastsmade after the previous quarter’s earnings announcement 
and within 90 days of the current quarter’s earnings announcement. If a single analyst 
provides multiple forecasts during the 90-day pre-announcement period, we consider 
only the most recent forecast (or revision) for each analyst (Rees and Thomas (2010)). 
The standard unexpected earnings (SUE) are defined as follows: 
1


it
itit
it
P
FEE
SUE
,                                                       (16) 
Where Eit is actual quarterly earnings per share for firm i in quarter t, FEit is the 
median of analysts’ forecasts of quarterly earnings per share, and Pit-1 is the stock price 
at the end of prior quarter.
47
 
 
2.3 Estimation of Bond Abnormal Returns 
Raw returns. Largely following Ederington et al (2012), we calculate bond return from 
m days prior to and n days subsequent to earnings announcement date t as follows, 
 
Bond Retm, n= Ln (Pt+n) – Ln (pt-m)                                       (16) 
                                                                                                                                               
firms at their initial stages or close to liquidation. However, merging with bond data has effectively 
removed tiny firm observations. 
47
Our major conclusions are insensitive to whether we use analyst-based SUE measure or seasonal 
random walk measure. As such, we take Livnat and Mendenhall’s (2006) suggestion and use analyst-
based SUE measure. 
98 
 
            Pt+n is the price of bond n days following event day t,  and pt-m is the price m 
days prior to event day t. When a bond trades several times on a day, a volume 
weighted price is calculated by weighting each transaction price by logarithm of its 
trade size. Since Bessembinder et al (2009) report a slight tendency to find false 
evidence of negative events if using percentage returns, we use log returns as a remedy, 
as we suspect that the problem was due to positive skewness in percentage returns. 
 
Abnormal bond returns. We use a companion portfolio approach designed to control 
for risk effect that is specific to bonds. To account for the constantly changing 
sensitivity to risk factors as a bond moves closer to its maturity date, we assign bonds 
into portfolios on the basis of maturity and rating and estimate the mean returns on the 
matched portfolio as the benchmark returns.  Specifically, bond abnormal returns are 
calculated as follows: 
 
ABRm, n = Bond Retm, n– BM Retm, n                                  (17) 
 
Bond Retm, n is raw bond return, and BM Retm, n   is the mean return on a 
rating/maturity matched benchmark portfolio corresponding to each bond. We assign 
bonds into one of the 24 benchmark portfolios based on rating and maturity – six rating 
classes (Aaa and Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, and below B) and four maturity groupings (1 to 3 
years, 3+ to 5 years, 5+ to 10 years, and over 10 years). 
 
Standardizing bond returns. As observed by Ederington et al (2012), bond returns are 
characterized by considerable cross-sectional heteroskedasticity. Prices of long-term, 
99 
 
low-rated, and illiquid bonds are much more volatile, ceteris paribus. Further, bond 
prices are more volatile during periods of financial crisis. Since the t-test assumes bond 
returns are identically distributed, failure to control for this heteroskedasticity results in 
mis-specified t-tests. To overcome this issue, we standardize event window returns by a 
bond’s estimated return volatility as proposed by Ederington et al (2012).  We estimate 
return volatility slightly differently for short-window and longer-window returns (which 
we will describe below) for practical purposes. 
 
Short-window returns. We construct two alternative short-window bond abnormal 
returns. The first is standardized abnormal return (SABR), where we standardize 
abnormal bond return by its estimated standard deviation. We calculate the standard 
deviation of a n-day bond return using observed n-day returns over 25 days prior to and 
after the announcement date. For example, we standardize (t-1, t+1) return by standard 
deviation estimated by observed two-day returns over (t-25, t+25) window. The second 
approach is abnormal standardized return (ABSR), where we standardize the bond raw 
return by its time series standard deviation and minus the mean standardized return on 
its benchmark portfolio.  
 
Extant PEAD literature for equity examines three-day or two-day returns around 
earnings announcement date, i.e., cumulative return (-1, +1) or (0, +1). If we calculate 
bond returns in the same way, then bond price observations are required on day -1 and 
day +1. However, due to infrequent trading, use of transaction price observations on 
only day t-1 and t+1 as in most equity market event studies, will eliminate many bond 
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observations and tends to bias the sample toward larger firms with more actively traded 
bonds.
48
 Ederington et al (2012) show that enlarging the event window from (-1,+1) to 
(-3,+3) , i.e., exploiting transaction prices on days t-2, t-3 in addition to t-1, and t+2, 
t+3in addition to day t+1, in calculating event window returns increases the number of 
observations and thus yields more powerful tests, while false rejection rate is not 
inflated. As such, we calculate the short window returns as the average of (-1, +1), (-1, 
+2), (-1,+3), (-2, +1), (-2, +2), (-2,+3),(-3, +1), (-3, +2), (-3,+3) returns, whenever 
calculable.  For example, if a bond has price observations on day t-1, t+1, t+2, and t+3 
only, then returns for (-1, +1), (-1, +2), and (-1, +3) are calculable. We average the three 
window returns as {-3, +3} for this bond.  As such, we get averaged returns the short 
window standardized abnormal returns as SABR {-3, +3} and short window abnormal 
standardized returns as ABSR {-3, +3}. 
 
Longer-window returns.  Most PEAD studies examine post earnings announcement 
drift by estimating cumulative abnormal returns over one quarter after the 
announcement date. We therefore calculate bond returns from the 4
th 
trading day 
subsequent to earnings announcement to the 63
rd 
trading day (one quarter). Due to 
infrequent trading, we use trades from the closest day after the 4
th
 day post-
announcement, and the closest day before the 63
rd 
day. The longer-window abnormal 
return is calculated by subtracting the mean return on the maturity and rating matched 
                                                 
48
 Ederington et al (2012) estimate that on any day t during the sample period, two day returns from day t-
1 to day t+1 can only be calculated for 31.3% of the bond/days even after eliminating the least traded 
bonds. Since some firms have multiple bonds outstanding, the percentage of firm/days for which returns 
for the (t-1, t+1) window are calculable is somewhat higher but is still only 38.6%. 
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portfolio from the raw return. We then standardize abnormal returns by the cross 
sectional standard deviation of the abnormal returns within each rating/maturity group.  
 
Firm-level bond returns. Returns of multiple bonds issued by the same firm are 
combined into firm level returns for two reasons. First, treating each bond as a separate 
observation biases the sample toward larger firms with many bonds. Another reason is 
that returns for bonds of the same company will be correlated leading to biased test 
statistics (Bessembinder et al. (2009) and Ederington et al. (2012)). 
 
3 Research Design and Empirical Findings 
In this section, we investigate bond market reaction to earnings announcement and post-
earnings announcement drift using two approaches:  mean tests with SUE-ranked 
portfolios as well as cross-sectional regressions. We explore initial bond market 
reaction by examining bond return patterns during the short interval around earnings 
announcement dates. We study post-earnings- announcement drift by examining 1) 
bond return patterns over the 63 trading days subsequent to an earnings announcement 
and 2) short window returns around next earnings announcement date.  
3.1 Sorting and Means Tests 
SUE portfolios. Each calendar quarter, we form ten portfolios based on the level of 
earnings surprise (SUE). To investigate bond market reaction to earnings news, we 
calculate {-3,+3} bond return at the firm level around the earnings announcement date. 
We then calculate the mean returns for each SUE decile and get the statistic inferences. 
To investigate post-earnings announcement drifts, we estimate the longer-window mean 
returns for each SUE decile, and also calculate the mean {-3, +3} returns around 
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subsequent earnings announcement date for each SUE decile sorted during current 
quarter. We eliminate the observations if the next earnings announcement date is 
missing or more than 90 days after the current announcement date. Due to the fat tail of 
SUE, we conduct alternative tests by breaking sample firms into 20 groups based on 
SUE each quarter, and present mean returns for the top and bottom two vigintiles. 
 
Partition by Risk.To investigate how risk affects the initial response to earnings 
announcement and post-announcement drift, we separate firms into investment-grade 
and speculative-grade. Bonds are designated as “investment grade” if rated BBB or 
better by Standard & Poor’s (or Baa or better by Moody’s), or as “noninvestment 
grade” otherwise. A firm is rated by the highest rating of all its bonds. Within each 
credit risk group, we then sort stocks into portfolios based on the level of earnings 
surprise (SUE). 
3.2 Variable Transformation and Regression Tests 
We then adopt a regression approach to test bond market reaction to earnings news. To 
address outliers and potential nonlinearities in the relation between abnormal returns 
and explanatory variables in the regression tests, we transform SUE into coded scores 
based on their rank within each calendar quarter. This method was adopted by Bernard 
and Thomas (1990), followed by Bhushan (1994) and modified by Mendenhall (2004). 
Specifically, we rank earnings surprise into vigintiles, resulting in ranks from 0 to 19. 
We then divide the rank by 9.5 and subtract 1. For example, the coded vigintile rank for 
extreme negative earnings surprise is –1 (=0/9.5 – 1). As such, a coded score on SUE of 
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–1 represents extreme negative earnings surprise while +1 represents positive earnings 
surprise. We define RISK as a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the firm is 
rated as speculative and zero if rated as investment grade.  
To test initial bond market reaction to earnings announcement, we then regress 
the abnormal return bond variables on the ranked SUE variable and an interaction term 
of ranked SUE with RISK dummy as follows: 
SABR {-3, +3}q = a+ b1RSUE q,                                         (18) 
SABR {-3, +3} q = a+ b1RSUE q+ b2RSUE q*RISK,                         (19) 
where SABR {-3, +3}q is standardized abnormal return during the short interval of 
earnings announcement date at quarter q. RSUE is the ranked SUE variable, and RISK 
is the dummy variable that takes on the value one if the firm is rated as speculative 
grade and zero if rated as investment grade.  
To investigate the post-earnings announcement drift, we first regress longer-
window cumulative abnormal returns on coded SUE variable and an interaction term of 
ranked SUE with RISK dummy as follows, 
SABR (4,63)  = a+ b1RSUE q,                                         (20) 
SABR (4,63) = a+ b1RSUE q+ b2RSUE q *RISK,                            (21) 
where SABR (4,63)  is standardized abnormal return over one quarter subsequent to the 
earnings announcement date of quarter q. RSENT is the ranked SUE variable, and 
RISK is the dummy variable that takes on the value one if the firm is rated as 
speculative grade and zero if rated as investment grade.  
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We then regress the short interval abnormal return bond variables around next 
quarter’s earnings announcement on the ranked SUE variables as follows 
SABR {-3, +3} q+1 = a+ b1RSUE q,                                       (22) 
SABR {-3, +3} q+1 = a+ b1RSUE q+ b2RSUE q *RISK,                 (23) 
where SABR {-3, +3} q+1 is standardized abnormal return during the short interval of 
earnings announcement date in quarter q+1. RSUE is the ranked SUE variable, and 
RISK is the dummy variable that takes on the value one if the firm is rated as 
speculative grade and zero if rated as investment grade.  
 
3.3 Initial Bond Market Reaction to Earnings Surprises 
3.3.1 Initial Bond Market Reaction to Earnings News 
We first conduct means tests to provide straightforward evidence of the bond 
market reaction to earnings surprises across SUE portfolios. Specifically, we calculate 
mean standardized abnormal returns (SABRs {-3, +3}) and abnormal standardized 
returns (ABSR {-3, +3}) for each portfolio based on sorts of SUE. As a robustness 
check, we also provide 3-day stock returns CAR (-1,+1) around earnings announcement 
date. 
[Insert Table 19] 
Table 19 presents the results for initial bond market response to earnings 
surprises by means tests. The results suggest that bond market responses strongly to 
earnings surprises. Panel A shows results for SUE portfolios sorted into decile 
portfolios based on SUE for the current quarter and Panel B presents SUE portfolios 
sorted into 20 portfolios (vigintiles) based on SUE for the current quarter. We find a 
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significant negative price response to extreme negative earnings surprises and positive 
response to extreme positive earnings surprises. The bond return pattern is almost 
monotonically increasing when moving from the extreme negative surprise to the 
extreme positive surprise decile. As shown in Table 19 Panel A, the mean short-window 
bond return (SABR) is -.24 for negative earnings surprises, and the mean SABR is .35 
for positive earnings surprises. We get very qualitatively similar results for alternative 
abnormal return measures (ABSRs). The magnitudes of our unexpected earnings 
proxies SUE (analyst consensus forecast error standardized by stock price at the end of 
prior quarter) are also small. The mean SUE is -4.12% for negative surprises and 2.02% 
for positive surprises. And not surprisingly, stock market reaction is also strong for the 
sample period. Equity market reaction is consistent with extant literature, as the 
cumulative abnormal return of stock from 1 day before to 1 day after earnings 
announcement date is -4.26% for negative earnings news and 4.62% for positive 
earnings surprises.  
In order to explore the possible fat tail distributions in the extreme decile 
portfolios, we separate the bottom and top deciles into 4 portfolios and the results are 
shown in Table 19 Panel B. We find that the strong initial bond market responses to 
earnings surprises still hold for this sorting. Though vigintile 2 has a much smaller SUE 
in absolute value than vigintile 1, the negative response is strongly significant. 
[Insert Table 20] 
Table 20 provides additional evidence of initial bond market reaction to earnings 
surprises by regressions.  Specifically, we regress short-window bond returns on the 
coded SUE ranks (based on 20 sorting). Column (1) shows the result for a regression of 
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the magnitude of earnings surprises (SUE) in the current quarter on the magnitude of 
SUE from the prior quarter. The significant positive coefficient of 0.1535 suggests that 
SUE measures are positively serial correlated, which is consistent with Chan, 
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) who find that security analysts' earnings forecasts 
also respond sluggishly to past news. Column (2) further confirms that a firm’s SUE 
ranking are serial correlated. Column (4) confirms our mean test finding that bond 
market responds significantly to earnings surprises. The estimate of the coefficient on 
RSUE, the coded SUE ranking variable is 0.21 and statistically significant. 
Overall, both the mean test and regression results suggest that both positive and 
negative earnings surprises have informational content for the bond market so that bond 
prices react strongly to earnings surprises. Our results compliments Easton et al (2009) 
who find that the incidence of bond market trading volume is strongly responsive to 
earnings surprises, suggesting the information content of earnings announcement 
announcements is significant to bond market. 
 
3.3.2 Initial Reaction to Earnings News by Firm Riskiness 
To assess the impact of earnings surprises to firms with different risk level, we 
separate sample firms into investment and noninvestment grade firms. Specifically, 
bonds are designated as “investment grade” if rated BBB or better by Standard & Poor’s 
(or Baa or better by Moody’s), or as “noninvestment grade” otherwise. A firm is rated 
by the highest rating of all its bonds. Within each of the two credit risk group, we then 
sort stocks into portfolios based on the level of earnings surprise (SUE) each calendar 
quarter.   
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[Insert Table 21] 
The means tests results are presented in Table 21 and Table 22, which are based 
on decile sorting and vigintile sorting respectively. We find that both investment and 
speculative grade bond are strongly responsive to earnings surprises. However, the 
magnitude of absolute return responses is larger for non-investment grade firm, 
especially to positive earnings surprises. Actually, noninvestment grade bonds are 
responsive to both positive and negative earnings surprises, while investment grade 
bonds are only responsive to negative earnings surprises. Specifically, in Table 3 the 
standardized abnormal return (SABR) is -0.1772 to negative earnings surprises in 
investment grade firms and -0.1627 in noninvestment grade firms. For positive earnings 
surprise, the mean SABR is 0.4285 for noninvestment grade firm and statistically 
significant while there is no indication of significant response in investment-grade 
firms.  
In addition, the absolute magnitude of earnings surprises for the extreme 
portfolios are also much larger in the riskier firms. The mean SUE for negative 
surprises is only -.4% for investment grade firms but is -9.26% for noninvestment grade 
firms. Likewise, the mean SUE for positive earnings surprises is only .63% for 
investment grade firms and 3.87% for noninvestment grade firms. This result suggests 
that the information is more ambiguous for analysts to forecast the performance of 
riskier firms. 
[Insert Table 22] 
Table 22 suggests that the returns pattern we find in Table 21 is not affected by 
vigintile sorting on SUE. We find significantly negative responses to negative earnings 
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surprises for both investment-grade and noninvestment-grade bonds. In contrast, only 
noninvestment-grade bonds are sensitive to positive earnings surprises. 
Table 20 provides more results via regression approach. Column (3) suggests 
that while ranking of SUE is positively correlated, but the negative coefficient 
estimation on the interaction term of last quarter’s SUE ranking (RSUE_last) and RISK 
suggests that correlation is reduced for riskier firms. This may suggest that riskier firms’ 
performance is less persistent compared to low risk firms and that analysts’ forecast is 
less consistent.  Column (5) confirms the finding of our mean test that bond market 
reaction to earnings surprises is stronger for noninvestment grade firms. The estimated 
coefficient on the interaction term of RSUE and RISK is 0.299 and statistically 
significant. 
We interpret these results as consistent with the implications of bond’s nonlinear 
payoff structure. In general, a negative earnings surprise aggravates the concern of 
default and thus causes negative bond price response, while a large positive earnings 
surprise may resolve or alleviate uncertainty about a firm’s financial distress and 
therefore move bond prices upward. However, since bond payoff is capped above, for a 
firm with stable financial condition, there is little concern about default and therefore a 
positive earnings surprise is not that valuable for investors. On the other hand, for a 
financially risky firm, both good and bad news convey relevant information to change 
expectations of default risk. As such, bond prices respond strongly to both negative and 
positive surprises for risky firms. 
3.4 Bond Market Post-Earnings Announcement Drift  
3.4.1 Post-announcement drift in bond market 
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We have provided evidence that earnings news has significant information 
content for bond market, we then explore whether and to what extent there exists post-
earnings announcement drift in the bond market. Exploring bond market PEAD gives 
the opportunity to examine the bond market efficiency.  We first conduct means tests to 
determine if subsequent bond cumulative abnormal returns drift in the same direction 
with earnings surprises. 
[Insert Table 23] 
Table 23 reports the overall results from means tests. We find evidence of post 
earnings announcement drift, which is concentrated after extreme positive earnings 
surprises. To save space, we only report results for standardized abnormal returns 
(SABRs) and the results for abnormal standardized return are qualitatively unchanged. 
The SABR over 4 days to 10 days subsequent to earnings announcement is 0.0918 and 
statistically significant for extreme positive decile and continue to be significant for 
returns until one-month and one-quarter after the announcement date. In contrast, there 
is little evidence of post-announcement drift following negative earnings surprises. 
We then examine the short-window abnormal returns around the subsequent 
earnings announcement. Bernard and Thomas (1989) suggest that if market prices fail 
to reflect the full implications of current quarterly earnings for future quarterly earnings, 
then the full implications of quarter t earnings might not be assimilated until (in the 
extreme) earnings for quarter t+1 are announced. We identify SUE ranks based on SUE 
from quarter t, and then examine the bond market reaction to announcement of quarter 
t+1 earnings. 
[Insert Table 24] 
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Table 6 column (1)-(3) summarizes the results for short-window abnormal 
return around subsequent earnings announcements for overall bonds. We find that bond 
returns around subsequent earnings announcement date largely confirms the pattern 
with longer-window bond abnormal result from Table 23, in that post-announcement 
drift is driven by drifts following positive earnings surprises. Specifically, the short-
window standardized abnormal return (SABR {-3,+3}) is 0.1 and statistically 
significant for positive earnings surprises but there is no indication for negative earnings 
surprises. 
These results may suggest that bond market reaction to earnings surprises is 
relatively more complete and immediate for negative earnings surprises than for 
positive earnings surprises.As a result, there is little evidence of post-announcement 
drift following negative earnings surprises but indication of post-announcement drift 
following positive earnings surprises. 
3.4.2 Post-announcement drift and firm risk 
To assess the potential difference in post-announcement return pattern for lower-
rated and higher-rated firms, we partition firms into investment and non-investment 
firms and present results from means tests in Table 23. We find that the absolute 
magnitude of post-earnings announcement drift is greater for speculative grade firms, 
and the drift is still concentrated in drifts following positive earnings surprises. Among 
non-investment grade firms, the firm-level bond return SABR over 4 days to 10 days 
subsequent to earnings announcement date is 0.1254 following positive earnings 
surprises and continues to be significantly positive over one quarter subsequent to 
111 
 
earnings announcement. In contrast, the corresponding SABR is only 0.0651 for (4,10) 
and just marginally significant for investment grade firms. 
Table 24 column (4) through (6) present the mean short-window returns (SABR 
{-3,+3}) around subsequent earnings announcement. We show that short-window 
returns around subsequent earnings announcement are significant for speculative grade 
firms but not for investment grade firms. Combined, the post-announcement drift in the 
bond market is driven by incomplete initial response to positive earnings announcement 
among speculative-grade firms.  
[Insert Table 26] 
Table 26 provides supplemental results for longer-window abnormal returns via 
regression approach. The positive coefficient estimation on the coded SUE rank 
(RSUE) of 0.0399 from the regression of SABR (4,10) and 0.0497 from the regression 
of SABR (4, 63) suggest that post-earnings announcement bond return drift in the same 
direction of earnings surprises. The interaction term of SUE ranking (RSUE) and RISK 
is positive but insignificant.  Table 2 column (6) through (10) presents additional results 
for short-window returns around subsequent earnings announcement date. Column (6) 
suggests that short-window return around subsequent announcement date is 
significantly positively correlated with earnings rank determined in current quarter. 
However, Column (7) suggests that the impact of prior quarter’s earnings information is 
subsumed by current quarter’s information, as the estimated coefficient on Rsue_last 
becomes insignificant when Rsue is included. And consistent with our above finding, 
the short window return is stronger in absolute value for riskier firms. 
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Overall, we find evidence of post-earnings announcement drift in the bond 
market. And the drift is driven by drift following positive earnings surprises particularly 
among speculative-grade firms. Combined with the finding that initial reaction to 
positive earnings surprises are observed for only speculative-grade firms, this finding 
suggests that initial responses of speculative-grade firms to positive earnings surprises 
are not complete.  
3.5 Stock Market Reaction to Earnings Announcement and PEAD 
We have shown that the bond market is strongly responsive to earnings surprises 
and that there is evidence of post-announcement drift in the market. In this section, we 
check the robustness of equity market PEAD during our sample period and for sample 
firms with matched bonds. 
We examine equity market PEAD by regression post-announcement return on 
the coded SUE rank variable and RISK dummy. We calculate cumulative abnormal 
returns starting from 3 days (day +3) after the current quarter’s earnings announcement 
until the day after the next earnings announcement, which is typically adopted by the 
extant PEAD literature (Livnat and Menhenhall (2006)). 
[Insert Table 27] 
Table 27 summarizes the results for equity market PEAD. Not surprisingly, 
there is significant evidence of post-earnings announcement drift for all common stocks 
during our sample period 2005 to 2011. The estimated coefficient on coded SUE rank 
(Rsue) is 0.0119 and statistically significant. However, there is no indication of drifts 
for firms with matched bonds. The estimated coefficient on RSUE for regression (1) is 
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0.002 and statistically insignificant, and regression (2) shows that firm riskiness does 
not affect the extent of post-announcement equity return patterns. 
This finding suggests that the stock price adjustment to earnings surprises is 
efficient for matched firms and thus there is no evidence of post-announcement drift. As 
such, firms with matched bonds seem to have a good information assimilation 
environment. Then the evidence of PEAD in the bond counterparty might be caused by 
the substantial transaction costs and illiquidity that inhibit a complete and immediate 
response to earnings news. 
3.6 Bond market PEAD and Liquidity 
Since we suspect that bond market PEAD is driven by the relative illiquidity of 
bond market. In this section, we conduct additional tests to investigate whether bond 
market PEAD is affected by bond liquidity. We investigate how post-announcement 
bond return pattern differs with varying degree of liquidity, where the liquidity of a 
bond and in turn its issuer is determined based on trading activities of the bond. 
To measure the liquidity, we calculate the daily average trade size. We first 
calculate the total trade size and total days of a bond over the entire period from the first 
day the bond trades to the last day (including days that a bond does not trade). We then 
divide the total trade size by total days as the average trade size per day. For a firm with 
multiple bond issuances, we take the mean of the daily average trade sizes across its 
bonds. After a firm has be determined the daily average trade size and matched with 
earnings surprises, we then partition firms into two groups with high versus low trading 
activity.  
[Insert Table 28] 
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Table 28 provides results for means tests on post-announcement return patterns 
based on liquidity partition within investment- and noninvestment- grade firms. Panels 
A and B present means tests results for high versus low liquidity firms within 
investment-grade firms, and Panels C and D present results for high versus low liquidity 
firms within noninvestment-grade firms. We find that after controlling for firms’ 
riskiness, bond returns have greater drifts for those with lower liquidity. According to 
Panels A and B, the standardized bond return SABR (4, 10) is 0.2288 and statistically 
significant and SABR (4, 21) is 0.103 and marginally significant following positive 
earnings surprises for lower liquid firms while it is not significant for higher liquid 
firms. Panels C and D indicate that the PEAD for speculative-grade firms is largely 
driven by those with low liquidity. The SABR (4, 21) for low liquid firms is 0.1976 and 
statistically significant while it is insignificant for higher liquid firms. The SABR (4, 
63) is 0.164 and statistically significant.  
Overall, the tests provide some supportive evidence to our argument that bond 
market PEAD is driven by its relative illiquidity than equity market. This evidence is 
robust even after controlling for firm riskiness.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The phenomenon that post-earnings announcements returns tend to drift in the 
same direction as the earnings surprises (PEAD) has been documented as a robust and 
persist equity market anomaly. However, in light of the difficulties faced by researcher 
as to data availability and implementable methodologies specific to bond market, 
research has not yet investigated whether and to what extent there is a PEAD in the 
115 
 
bond market. Examining the bond return behavior at earnings announcements and post-
announcements provides a good opportunity to examine the sensitivity of bond market 
to certain kind of value-relevant information as well as the extent of bond market 
efficiency.  
In this paper, we utilize a comprehensive record of daily transactions for OTC 
bonds from TRACE, and apply bond event study methodologies developed by 
Bessembinder et al (2009) and Ederington et al (2012) to investigate how cross-
sectional bond return behaves around earnings announcements and find three major 
findings. First, bond prices respond positively to positive earnings surprises and 
negatively to negative earnings surprises, and both reactions are statistically significant, 
suggesting earnings news has information content for the bond market. Second, there is 
indication of post-announcement drifts, which is driven by positive earnings surprise 
among speculative-grade firms. The evidence of a slightly delayed response to positive 
surprises is consistent with the implication of non-linear payoff structure of bonds. 
Third, we find evidence of post-announcement drift in the bond market which is not 
observed for equity returns for the matched sample of firms with bond returns. This 
finding may suggest that bond market efficiency is limited by its considerable 
illiquidity, unlike its equity counterparty. We justify this argument by showing that 
bond PEAD exists in less liquid firms.  
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Figure 1. Magnitude of Underpricing Measured as Discount (%) over Time 
 
Panel A: Seasoned Bond Offerings 
 
Panel B: Initial Bond Offerings 
 
The figure plots corporate bond underpricing by year, from February 2005 through 
September 2012. Discount is calculated as the return from the offer price to the second-day 
average trade price on the post-offer secondary market. Initial bond offerings (IBOs) are 
bonds issued by firms with no publicly traded bonds outstanding. Seasoned bond offerings 
(SBOs) are bonds issued by firms with publicly traded bonds. The sample includes 2046 
investment grade and 334 high yield issues that meet the sample restrictions described in 
Section 2. 
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Figure 2. Secondary Market Price Relative to Offer Price around Additional Bond 
Offerings 
 
Panel A: Investment Grade Issues  
 
Panel B: High Yield Issues 
 
The figure plots relative bond price for additional bond offerings to an existing indenture 
(ABOs). Relative Price is measured as the weighted average secondary market trade price 
on day t  (relative to issue date) expressed as a percentage of the offer price, adjusted by 
market movement based on same period rating-matched index returns. Both the offer price 
(dashed line) and secondary market price (solid line) are shown for the offer date. The 
sample includes 62 investment grade ABOs and 22 high yield ABOs that meet the sample 
restrictions described in Section 2. 
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Appendix: Tables 
Table 1 Summary Statistics for Bond Offerings 
Bond issues characteristics are reported for 2,380 corporate bond offerings from February 
2005 through September 2012 that meet the sample restrictions described in Section 2. 
Initial bond offerings (IBOs) are bonds issued by firms with no publicly traded bonds 
outstanding. Seasoned bond offerings (SBOs) are bonds issued by firms with publicly traded 
bonds. Additional bond offerings (ABOs) are additional offerings to an existing indenture 
(with the same terms and CUSIP). Moody’s rating is used if available; otherwise Standard 
&Poor’s or Fitch rating is adopted. Offer Amount is the proceeds raised in the issue. 
Existing debt outstanding is the issuer’s debt outstanding as of the day prior to the offer. 
Relative offer size is calculated as offer amount divided by total debt outstanding.  
 
 
Panel A – Number of Observations         
Maturity N. Total SBOs  IBOs ABOs 
1<=years to maturity <= 5 616 537 63 16 
5 < years to maturity <= 10 1242 1089 110 43 
Years to maturity > 10 522 473 24 25 
Rating         
AA or above 211 179 22 10 
A 842 770 52 20 
BBB  1008 883 93 32 
BB  186 160 18 8 
B  123 98 12 13 
CCC or below 10 9 0 1 
 
Panel B – Summary Statistics : Investment Grade Issues 
 SBOs (excl. 
ABOs) 
N=1832 
 IBOs 
N=167 
 ABOs 
    N=62 
Variable Mean Media
n 
  Mean Media
n 
  Mean Media
n 
Offer amount ($mil) 701.16 500.00  707.9
6 
500.00  429.44 375.00 
Years to maturity 11.96 10.00  10.32 10.00  15.52 10.00 
Offer price 99.58 99.72  99.69 99.79  100.28 100.07 
Existing bonds outstanding (mil)-firm 
level 
6860.0
2 
3379.2
3 
 0.00 0.00  11546.1
4 
6350.0
0 
Relative offer size (%) 33.57 16.74  . .  10.59 6.67 
N. lead managers 3.69 3.00  3.44 3.00  3.37 3.00 
Gross spread (%) 0.57 0.60  0.58 0.6  0.62 0.65 
Days from Pricing to Issue 0.45 0.00   0.53 0.00   0.53 0.00 
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Panel C – Summary Statistics : High Yield Issues 
 SBOs (excl. 
ABOs) 
 IBOs  ABOs 
  N=267   N=30   N=22 
Variable Mean Media
n 
  Mean Media
n 
  Mean Media
n 
Offer amount ($mil) 527.46 450.00  383.5
0 
350.00  179.86 150.00 
Years to maturity 9.10 10.00  8.97 10.00  8.23 7.50 
Offer price 99.29 100.00  99.43 100.00  101.77 101.78 
Existing bonds outstanding (mil)-firm 
level 
1991.4
1 
1100.0
0 
 0.00 0.00  1876.53 1512.5
0 
Relative offer size (%) 61.72 40.00  . .  18.74 12.70 
N. lead managers 3.68 3.00  3.10 3.00  2.55 1.00 
Gross spread (%) 1.67 1.75  1.95 2.00  1.65 1.63 
Days from Pricing to Issue 0.42 0.00   0.50 0.00   0.18 0.00 
 
 
 
  
127 
 
 
128 
 
 
129 
 
 
130 
 
Table 4 Determinants of Underpricing 
Results are reported from regressions of underpricing on explanatory variables proposed to 
test alternative hypotheses. The dependent variable is Adjusted Discount. Discount is 
measured as the weighted average secondary market trade price (where trade prices are 
weighted by trade size) on the second day of trading minus the offer price expressed as a 
percentage of the offer price. Adjusted Discount is calculated by subtracting from the raw 
discount the same period index return corresponding to the same rating category. “A”, 
“BBB”, “BB”, and “B and below” are dummies, equal to one if an issue is rated as “A”, 
“BBB”, “BB”, or “B and below”, respectively by Moody’s. “5-10 Years” and “Above 10 
Years” are dummies, equal to one if an issue’s maturity is between 5 to 10 years, and above 
10 years, respectively. The omitted category is rated as “AA and Above” with maturity of 
1-5 years. “Call Option” equals one if the issue has a call option built in. “Rating 
Disagreement” equals one if the specific issue is rated as investment grade by one rating 
agency but as speculative by another. “Bond Price Volatility” is defined as the standard 
deviation of daily bond price changes over the one month period after the offer. “Days from 
Pricing to Issue” measures the number of days between the day when offer is priced and 
the first day with trading. “IBO” equals one if the bond is issued by firms with no publicly 
traded bonds outstanding. “Private Firm” equals to one if the issuer has no publicly traded 
stocks. “N. Analysts” represents number of analysts following the issuing firm. “MOVE 
Index” is Merrill Lynch’s measure of implied volatility of US Treasury markets. “VIX 
index” is CBOE’s measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. “Bid-Ask 
Spread” measures the average of daily bid-ask spread over the one month period after the 
offer. “Bid-Ask Volatility” measures the standard deviation of daily bid-ask spread over the 
one month period after the offer. “ABO” is an indicator for additional offerings to an 
existing indenture. “Relative offer size” is calculated as offer amount divided by total debt 
outstanding of the issuer prior to the offer. Model (1) shows baseline analysis; Model (2) 
through (5) report tests for each alternative hypothesis and Model (6) reports the full set 
regression. Model (1) to (5), T-values are calculated from White’s heteroscedasticity 
consistent standard errors. *** , ** indicate significance level at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
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Variable 
(1) 
Baseline 
Analysis 
(2)Uncertainty  
& Information 
Asymmetry 
(3)Uncertainty 
& Information 
Asymmetry  
(4) 
Liquidity  
(5) Price 
Pressure 
(6) Full set 
regression 
       Intercept 0.369
***
 -0.560
***
 -0.541
***
 0.250
***
 0.239
***
 -0.591
***
 
 
 (6.62) (-6.71) (-5.61)  (5.14) (4.47)  (-4.74)  
A 0.073 0.112
*
 0.110
*
 0.089 0.142
**
 0.129
*
 
 
 (1.22) (2.28) (2.21)  (1.73)
*
 (2.66)    (1.87) 
BBB 0.229
***
 0.242
***
 0.233
***
 0.200
***
 0.192
***
 0.229
***
 
 
 (3.65) (4.66) (4.36)  (3.74) (3.51)     (3.07) 
BB 0.666
***
 0.815
***
 0.819
***
 0.622
***
 0.519
***
 0.708
***
 
 
 (7.37) (10.14) (9.99)  (7.44) (5.94)     (7.21) 
B and below 0.723
***
 0.812
***
 0.812
***
 0.678
***
 0.632
***
 0.729
***
 
 
 (5.66) (7.54) (7.43)  (6.17) (5.44)     (5.49) 
5-10 Years 0.083
*
 0.050 0.047 0.072
*
 0.087
*
 0.039 
 
(1.87) (1.17) (1.09)  (1.70) (1.97)     (0.98) 
Above 10 Years 0.219
***
 0.179
***
 0.174
***
   0.205
***
 0.284
***
 0.212
***
 
 
 (3.55) (2.77) (2.65)   (3.46) (4.67)     (3.06) 
Call Option -0.139
**
 0.004 0.007   -0.082 -0.064 0.023 
 
(-2.41)  (0.07) (0.14)  (-1.51)  (-1.14)     (0.36) 
Rating 
Disagreement    
0.093 0.094 
 
 
0.100 
  
(0.65) (0.65) 
 
 
    (0.51) 
Bond Price 
Volatility  
26.112
**
 27.387
***
 
 
 
21.081
**
 
  
(2.49) (2.55) 
 
 
    (2.25) 
Days from 
Pricing to Issue  
0.060
***
 0.060
***
 
 
 
0.102
***
 
  
(2.80) (2.77) 
 
 
    (2.53) 
IBO 
 
0.095 0.100
*
 
 
  
  
(1.62) (1.70) 
 
  
ABO 
 
-0.011 -0.014 
 
 
0.100 
  
(-0.13) (-0.16) 
 
 
    (1.10) 
Private Firm 
 
-0.073  
 
  
  
(-0.39)  
 
  
N.Analysts 
 
 
-0.001 
 
 
0.001 
  
 
(-0.68) 
 
 
    (0.46) 
MOVE Index 
 
0.002
***
 0.002
**
 
 
 
0.001 
  
(2.08) (2.00) 
 
 
    (0.96) 
VIX Index 
 
0.022
***
 0.022
***
 
 
 
0.024
***
 
  
(6.13) (6.05) 
  
    (5.52) 
Bid-Ask Spread 
  
 78.177
***
 -15.412 
   
  (3.86) 
 
 (-0.56)  
Bid-Ask 
Volatility   
 
-15.037 
 
-2.069 
   
 (-1.41) 
 
 (-0.21)  
Relative Offer 
Amount   
 
 
0.230
***
 
0.226
***
 
   
 
 
(4.44)      (3.57) 
   
 
   
N.   2256       2238       2222    2216     2072        2016 
Adj R-square 0.055 0.177 0.178 0.068 0.066 0.186 
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Table 6 Summary Statistics for Bond Offerings of Financial Firms 
Offer characteristics are reported for 1186 financial firm bond offerings from February 
2005 through September 2012 that meet the sample restrictions described in Section 2. 
IBOs are initial bond offerings, issued by firms with no publicly traded bonds; SBOs are 
seasoned bond offerings, issued by firms with publicly traded bonds; and ABOs are 
additional bond offerings to an existing indenture. Moody’s rating is used if it is available; 
otherwise Standard &Poor’s or Fitch rating is adopted. Offer Amount is the proceeds raised 
in the issue. Existing debt outstanding is issuer’s debt outstanding as of the day prior to the 
offer. Relative offer size is calculated as offer amount divided by total debt outstanding. 
Self-marketed refers to bond issues where banks serve as lead managers while marketing 
their own bond offerings and Non Self- marketed issues are managed by other banks. 
 
Panel A N. Observations         
Maturity N. SBOs  IBOs ABOs 
1<=years to maturity <= 5 494 423 21 50 
5 < years to maturity <= 10 478 408 24 46 
Years to maturity > 10 214 197 5 12 
Rating         
AA or above 441 387 9 45 
A 520 453 21 46 
BBB  194 163 20 11 
BB  14 12 0 2 
B  16 12 0 4 
CCC or below 1 1 0 0 
 
Panel B: Investment Grade, Non self-marketed 
  SBOs (excl. 
ABOs) 
  IBOs   ABOs 
 N=536   N=42   N=41 
Variable Mean Media
n 
  Mean Media
n 
  Mean Media
n 
Offer amount ($mil) 700.1
0 
500.00  532.7
4 
500.00  384.27 250.00 
Years to maturity 9.88 10.00  8.95 10.00  7.54 5.00 
Offer price 99.63 99.81  99.62 99.78  101.09 100.43 
Existing bonds outstanding (billion)-firm 
level 
40.62
9 
5.356  0.00 0.00  139.48
3 
17.756 
Relative offersize (%) 24.45 11.70  . .  3.79 0.76 
N. lead managers 2.98 3.00  3.07 2.50  1.88 1.00 
Days from Pricing to Issue 0.83 0.00   0.33 0.00   0.22 0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
Panel C: Investment Grade, Self-marketed 
 SBOs (excl. 
ABOs) 
  IBOs   ABOs 
 N=467   N=8   N=61 
Variable Mean Media
n 
  Mean Media
n 
  Mean Media
n 
Offer amount ($mil) 844.9
6 
550.00  906.2
5 
875.00  599.90 350.00 
Years to maturity 9.56 7.00  12.00 7.50  9.95 9.00 
Offer price 99.85 99.97  99.78 99.83  101.14 100.81 
Existing bonds outstanding (billion)-firm 
level 
98.27
6 
87.089  0.00 0.00  115.26
1 
102.10
5 
Relative offersize (%) 6.75 5.93  . .  2.11 0.70 
N. lead managers 1.34 1.00  1.63 1.50  1.21 1.00 
Days from Pricing to Issue 0.23 0.00   0.63 0.00   0.00 0.00 
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Table 7 Self-marketed Vs Non Self- marketed Seasoned Bond Issues 
The table reports underpricing of investment grade seasoned bond issues by financial firms 
from February 2005 through September 2012. Self-marketed refers to bond issues where 
banks serve as lead managers while marketing their own bond offerings and Non Self- 
marketed issues are managed by other banks. Discount is measured as the weighted average 
secondary market trade price on the second day of trading minus the offer price expressed 
as a percentage of the offer price, where trade prices are weighted by trade size. Adjusted 
Discount is calculated by subtracting from the raw discount the same period index return 
corresponding to the same rating category. T-statistics are given in parentheses below the 
mean value. The significance level of the median is based on a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
The difference in means T-statistic assumes unequal variances across groups when a test of 
equal variances is rejected at the 10 percent level. The significance level of the difference in 
medians is based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. *** , **, and * indicate significance level at 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Variable N Mean (%) Median (%) 
Discount  – 1st day   
   
Non Self-Marketed 519 0.35
***
 0.18
***
 
Self-Marketed 405 0.08
***
 0.01
***
 
Diff: Non Self - Self 
 
0.27
***
 0.17
***
 
Adj. Discount  – 1st day 
   
Non Self-Marketed 519 0.36
***
 0.19
***
 
Self-Marketed 405 0.08
***
 0.01
**
 
Diff: Non Self - Self 
 
0.28
***
 0.18
***
 
Discount – 2nd day 
   
Non Self-Marketed 489 0.43
***
 0.23
***
 
Self-Marketed 273 0.23
***
 0.14
***
 
Diff: Non Self - Self 
 
0.20
***
 0.09
***
 
Adj. Discount  –  2nd day 
   
Non Self-Marketed 489 0.46
***
 0.27
***
 
Self-Marketed 273 0.20
***
 0.15
***
 
Diff: Non Self - Self 
 
0.26
***
 0.12
***
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Table 8 Self-marketed Vs Non Self-marketed Bond Issues 
The table reports OLS regression of investment grade financial seasoned bond offerings for 
public firms only. The dependent variable is Adjusted Discount. Discount is measured as 
the weighted average secondary market trade price on the second day of trading minus the 
offer price expressed as a percentage of the offer price, where trade prices are weighted by 
trade size. Adjusted Discount is calculated by subtracting from the raw discount the same 
period index return corresponding to the similar rating category. “A” and “BBB”are 
dummies, equal to one if an issue is rated as “A” or “BBB”, respectively. “5-10 Years” and 
“Above 10 Years” are dummies, equal to one if an issue’s maturity is between 5 to 10 years 
or above 10 years, respectively. The omitted category is rated as “AA and Above” with 
maturity of 1-5 years. “Call option” equal to one if the issue has a call option built in. 
“Rating Disagreement” equals to one if the specific issue is rated as investment grade by 
one rating agency but as speculative by another. “Bond Price Volatility” is defined as the 
standard deviation of daily bond price changes over the one month period after the offer. 
“Days from Pricing to Issue” measures how many days in between the day when offer is 
priced and the first day with trading. “N. Analysts” represents number of analysts following 
the issuing firm. “MOVE Index” is Merrill Lynch’s measure of implied volatility of US 
Treasury markets. “VIX index” is CBOE’s measure of the implied volatility of S&P 
500 index options. “Relative offer size” is calculated as offer amount divided by total debt 
outstanding of the issuer prior to the offer. “Bid-Ask Spread” measure the average of daily 
bid-ask spread over the one month period after the offer. “Bid-Ask Volatility” measure the 
volatility of daily bid-ask spread over the one month period after the offer. “Self-Marketed” 
equals to one if the issuer is one of the lead underwriters. “Year2009” equals one if the issue 
date is between Oct, 2008 and Oct 2009. T-values are calculated from White’s 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. *** , **,* indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively.  
 
Variable Coefficient t Value 
Intercept -0.305
**
 -1.98 
A 0.171
***
 2.84 
BBB 0.395
***
 3.88 
5-10 Years 0.095 1.44 
Above 10 Years 0.312
**
 2.26 
Call Option -0.186 -1.64 
Rating Disagreement  -0.053 -0.94 
Bond Price Volatility 17.598 1.12 
Days from Pricing to Issue -0.031 -0.56 
N.Analysts -0.003 -1.04 
MOVE Index 0.003 1.55 
VIX Index 0.015
**
 2.18 
Relative Offer Amount 0.106 1.31 
Bid-Ask Spread -10.769 -0.44 
Bid-Ask Volatility -40.799
*
 -1.86 
Self-Marketed -0.137
***
 -2.57 
Year2009 0.084 0.57 
   
N.                  617 
 Adj R-square 0.151   
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Table 9 Decision to Self-Market 
The table reports the results for the switching regressions. Panel A presents the Probit 
estimation results for the self-market decision for public firms only. The dependent variable 
is a binary variable equaling one if the issuer serves as one of the lead managers of the issue 
and zero otherwise. Panel B reports the second stage switching model, where the inverse 
Mills ratio derived from the first stage is included to control for the decision to self-
underwriting and the dependent variable is Adjusted Discount. Discount is measured from 
offer price to the weighted price from the second day of trading, where prices are weighted 
by trade size. Adjusted Discount is calculated by subtracting from the raw discount the same 
period index return corresponding to the similar rating category. Panel C compares the 
means of actual underpricing with their counterfactuals derived from the switching model. 
“Possibility of Self-Underwriting” equals one if the financial issuer is a commercial or 
investment bank who has investment banking as its one of its major business. “A” and 
“BBB” are dummies, equal to one if an issue is rated as “A” or “BBB”, respectively. “5-10 
Years” and “Above 10 Years” are dummies, equal to one if an issue’s maturity is between 5 
to 10 years or above 10 years, respectively. “Call option” equal to one if the issue has a call 
option built in. “Rating Disagreement” equals to one if the specific issue is rated as 
investment grade by one rating agency but as speculative by another. “Bond Price 
Volatility” is defined as the standard deviation of daily bond price changes over the one 
month period after the offer. “Days from Pricing to Issue” measures how many days in 
between the day when offer is priced and the first day with trading. “N. Analysts” represents 
number of analysts following the issuing firm. “MOVE Index” is Merrill Lynch’s measure 
of implied volatility of US Treasury markets. “VIX index” is CBOE’s measure of 
the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. “Relative offer size” is calculated as offer 
amount divided by total debt outstanding of the issuer prior to the offer. “Bid-Ask Spread” 
measure the average of daily bid-ask spread over the one month period after the offer. “Bid-
Ask Volatility” measure the volatility of daily bid-ask spread over the one month period 
after the offer. The omitted category is rated as “AA and Above” with maturity of 1-5 years. 
*** , ** indicate significance level at 1% and 5%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Selection Model — Decision to Self-Market     
Parameter Estimate t Value 
Intercept -2.800
***
 -6.17 
A 0.213 1.26 
BBB -0.874
***
 -3.16 
5-10 Years 0.283
*
 1.67 
Above 10 Years 0.664
**
 2.50 
Call Option 0.637
*
 1.85 
Bond Price Volatility -24.760 -1.44 
Days from Pricing to Issue -0.087 -1.51 
MOVE Index -0.007
*
 -1.86 
VIX Index 0.020 1.24 
Relative Offer Amount -0.142 -0.74 
Possibility of Self-Underwriting 3.721
***
 10.72 
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Panel B: Second Stage Regression — Determinants of Underpricing 
 
Self-Marketed 
 
Non Self- Marketed 
Variable Coefficient t Value  Coefficient t Value 
Intercept -0.302 -1.42  -0.421
**
 -2.22 
A 0.298
***
 2.83  0.194
**
 2.13 
BBB 0.115 0.59  0.413
***
 3.88 
5-10 Years 0.138 1.50  0.114  1.39 
Above 10 Years 0.509
***
 3.09  0.339
***
 2.69 
Call Option 0.028 0.18  -0.279
*
 -1.88 
Rating Disagreement  -0.273
***
 -3.09  0.018 0.23 
Bond Price Volatility -22.633 -1.02  20.022
*
 1.68 
Days from Pricing to Issue -0.063 -1.39  -0.006 -0.16 
N.Analysts -0.006 -1.36  -0.003 -0.69 
MOVE Index -0.001 -0.27  0.004
*
 1.93 
VIX Index 0.031
***
 3.40  0.013
*
 1.8 
Relative Offer Amount -0.127 -0.62  0.088 0.83 
Bid-Ask -57.744
*
 -1.85  3.116 0.12 
Bid-Ask Volatility -26.511 -1.49  -48.293
**
 -1.98 
Inverse Mills 0.416 1.47  0.063 0.78 
Year2009 -0.274
*
 -1.77  0.203 1.45 
      
N.           222 
  
          395 
 Adj R-square 0.1095   0.1589  
 
Panel C: Counterfactual Analysis: Actual versus Counterfactual Underpricing 
  No. Actual mean Counterfactual mean Difference 
Self-Marketed 222 0.241 0.774 -0.533 
  (6.44) (18.16) (-23.96) 
     Non-Self-Marketed  
 
67 0.478 -0.322 0.800 
(underwriting is possible)  (4.93) (-4.29) (12.71) 
Difference  0.237 1.096  
  (2.28) (12.47)  
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Table 11 - Size and power tests based on unstandardized abnormal returns  
 
In panel A, the percentage of times tests based on the abnormal firm-bond returns (ABRs) 
described in Table 1 and using a 5% significance level incorrectly find evidence of an event 
when no event occurred are reported. For 10,000 random samples, 300 firm-days are chosen at 
random from all days a firm had bonds outstanding and the tests are applied to those 
observations for which ABR returns from t-1 to t+1 could be calculated.  We report separately 
the percentage of times the tests find false evidence of a negative event (the 2.5% tail) and false 
evidence of a positive event (the 97.5% tail). In panel B, an artificial event is simulated by 
increasing or decreasing the (t-1,t+1) return by 15 basis points and the percentage of times a test 
correctly detects the event based on a 5% significance level is reported. 
 
Panel A - Size tests  t-test  
Signed-rank 
test  
Sign test  
Significance level  2.5%  97.5%  2.5%  97.5%  2.5%  97.5%  
No event null rejection rates  2.37%  2.18%  3.12%  1.68%  2.98%  1.30%  
 
Panel B - Power tests for 15 
basis point return shocks  
t-test  Signed-rank 
test  
Sign test  
Positive shock  20.62%  51.87%  59.33%  
Negative shock  22.67%  60.03%  70.23%  
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Table 12 - Abnormal bond return standard deviations by rating and maturity 
Standard deviations of 2-day abnormal bond returns (ABRs) are reported stratified by rating and 
term-to-maturity.  The bonds are classified by Moody’s rating if available; if not, by Standard 
and Poor’s rating. Returns are based on average daily prices in which each trade price is 
weighted by the size of the trade. Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the 
return on the bonds and the average for bonds of the same rating and maturity grouping over the 
same two-day window. 
 
Rating  
Bond term-to-maturity  
1 to 3 years  3+ to 5 years  
5+ to 10 
years  
Over 10 years  
Aaa and Aa  0.416%  0.520%  0.749%  1.551%  
A  0.682%  0.828%  1.008%  1.743%  
Baa  1.027%  1.313%  1.382%  1.970%  
Ba  1.215%  1.374%  1.376%  2.107%  
B  1.771%  2.055%  1.798%  2.147%  
Below B  2.685%  2.752%  2.450%  3.036%  
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Table 13 - Size and power of event study tests based on standardized returns  
 
First, descriptive statistics of standardized returns are presented in panel A.  SABR is the 
standardized return calculating by dividing each bond ABR by its standard deviation over the 
periods (t-55, t-6) and (t+6, t+55) where ABR is the unstandardized abnormal bond return 
calculated as the bond’s return from day t-1 to day t+1 minus the average return for bonds in the 
same maturity/rating category. ABSR is the difference between the standardized raw return and 
the average standardized raw return for bonds in the same maturity/rating category. Firm 
SABRs and ABSRs are calculated as a weighted average of the SABRs and ABSRs over all the 
firm’s bonds.  The size (Panel B) and power tests (Panel C) are conducted as described in Table 
2 with a 5% significance level.  ABSR-Pre is the ABSR standardized using the standard 
deviation of returns over the (t-101, t-6) period. ABR size and power statistics are repeated from 
Table 2 for easier comparison. 
 
Panel A - 
Return 
characteristics  
Mean  Median  
Standard 
deviation  Skewness  
Excess 
kurtosis  
Observa-
tions  
Abr. S d. Ret. 
(ABSR)  
-.0006  -.0048  .7900  .0290  1.675  720,742  
Std. Abr. Ret. 
(SABR)  
-.0029  -.0068  .8654  .0272  1.636  720,742  
Panel B - Size 
tests  
t-test  Signed-rank test  Sign test  
Significance 
level  
2.5%  97.5%  2.5%  97.5%  2.5%  97.5%  
ABSR  2.62%  2.65%  2.70%  2.46%  2.23%  1.65%  
SABR  2.87%  2.23%  3.12%  1.95%  2.64%  1.48%  
ABR 
(unstandardized)  
2.37%  2.18%  3.12%  1.68%  2.98%  1.30%  
ABSR-Pre  2.57%  2.13%  2.91%  2.00%  2.48%  1.47%  
Panel C - Power 
tests 15 basis 
point shocks  
Negative event  Positive event 
t-test  Signed-
rank 
test  
Sign test  t-test  Signed-
rank 
test  
Sign test  
ABSR  68.90%  81.02%  76.65%  68.04%  78.94%  71.88%  
SABR  71.89%  82.37%  76.27%  68.41%  78.29%  69.81%  
ABR 
(unstandardized)  
22.67%  60.03%  70.23%  20.62%  51.87%  59.33%  
ABSR-Pre  66.21%  81.30%  76.59%  62.71%  74.84%  67.06%  
Panel D - Power tests for 10 and 25 basis point shocks  
10 bp - 
unstandardized  
11.46
%  
25.77%  28.76%  12.54%  33.79%  40.76%  
10 bp - 
standardized  
38.30
%  
50.77%  45.51%  37.38%  46.69%  39.59%  
25 bp - 
unstandardized  
47.97
%  
90.63%  95.08%  49.54%  92.90%  96.83%  
25 bp - 
standardized  
97.55
%  
99.30%  98.27%  97.35%  99.05%  97.83%  
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Table 14 - Test power stratified by bond rating and maturity for a 15 basis point 
return shock 
Based on abnormal standardized returns, ABSR, the percentage of times the signed-rank test, 
correctly finds evidence of an event which shifts 2-day bond returns by 15 basis points are 
reported by rating and maturity.  The reported percentages are averages of the percentage of 
times positive and negative return shocks are correctly identified.  Results are based on 10,000 
simulations at a 5% significance level for each maturity/rating category.  Tests are conducted at 
the bond level. The bonds are classified by Moody’s rating if available; if  not, by Standard and 
Poor’s rating. 
 
Rating  
Bond term-to-maturity  
1 to 3 years 
 3+ to 5 
years  
5+ to 10 
years  
Over 10 years  
Aaa and Aa  100.00%  99.92%  90.76%  31.75%  
A  99.98%  97.91%  82.27%  28.76%  
Baa  97.33%  80.44%  64.73%  30.81%  
Ba  68.28%  59.71%  54.14%  22.95%  
B  45.57%  36.78%  43.24%  20.89%  
Below B  26.22%  21.82%  25.11%  13.54%  
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Table 15 - The effect of trade sampling on test power 
  
The power of test statistics based on all trades are compared with (1) samples based on trades of 
100 or more bonds (in Panel A) and (2) samples based on interdealer trades only (in Panel B). 
We report the percentage of times the tests correctly found evidence of an event using a 5% 
significance level. All are based on 10,000 simulations where 300 firm-days are chosen at 
random from all possible firm-days when the firm had bonds outstanding.  Results are reported 
both for an across-the-board shock in bond returns of 15 basis points and shocks which are 
proportional to the average return standard deviation for bonds of that rating and maturity class.  
Results in Panel A are based on TRACE data 2005-2011. Results in Panel B are based on data 
starting in November 2008 when TRACE started identifying interdealer trades. 
Panel A - Large trades  
Negative event  Positive event  
t-test  Signed-
rank 
test  
Sign 
test  
t-test  Signed-
rank 
test  
Sign 
test  
Across-the-board 15 bp shocks 
 All trades  68.90%  81.02%  76.65%  68.04%  78.94%  71.88% 
 Trades of 100+ bonds 
only  
73.77%  82.26%  72.90%  72.74%  79.94%  68.12%  
Proportional shocks 
 All trades  55.75%  68.61%  62.04%  53.91%  65.32%  56.79% 
 Trades of 100+ bonds 
only  
60.03%  70.43%  59.51%  59.35%  67.92%  54.98%  
Panel B - Interdealer trades  
Across-the-board 15 bp shocks 
 All trades  75.38%  87.06%  83.47%  74.82%  84.73%  78.20% 
 Interdealer trades only  74.08%  85.16%  79.45%  70.38%  79.99%  72.30%  
Proportional shocks 
 All trades  61.57%  74.58%  68.88%  60.58%  70.67%  62.61% 
 Interdealer trades only  56.93%  69.50%  61.74%  52.72%  62.81%  52.89%  
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Table 17 - Comparing the size and power of tests based on different abnormal 
standardized return measures over a four-day window 
The size and power of test statistics based on different abnormal standardized return measures  
over the four-day window (t-2, t+2) are compared.  ABSR(t-1,t+1) is the abnormal standardized 
return based on observed prices on days t-1 and t+1.  It is not calculable if there are no trades on 
either date so tests based on this statistic have fewer observations than the other two measures.  
ABSR-Short(t-2, t+2) is the shortest observable ABSR among the set of ABSR(t-1,t+1), 
ABSR(t-1,t+2), ABSR(t-2,t+1) and ABSR(t-2,t+2). ABSR{t-2, t+2} return, which we designate 
the composite return is an average of the ABSR(t-1, t+1), ABSR(t-2, t+1), ABSR(t-1, t+2), and 
ABSR(t-2, t+2).  In panel A, the percentage of times the tests incorrectly found evidence of an 
event in 10,000 simulations in which 300 non-event firm-days were chosen at random are 
reported.  In panel B, the percentage of times the tests correctly found evidence of a 15 basis 
point event at the 5% level is reported. The tests in Panel C are identical to those in panel B 
except the event day shock for bonds of maturity m and rating r is proportional to the average 2-
day return standard deviation for bond of the same rating and maturity relative to all bonds. 
 
Panel A - Size tests  t-test  Signed-rank test  Sign test  
Significance level  2.5%  97.5%  2.5%  97.5%  2.5%  97.5%  
ABSR(t-1,t+1)  2.62%  2.65%  2.70%  2.46%  2.23%  1.65%  
ABSR-Short(t-2,t+2)  3.14%  1.92%  3.19%  1.82%  3.02%  1.54%  
ABSR{t-2,t+2}  2.60%  2.34%  2.79%  2.25%  2.46%  1.98%  
Panel B - Power tests - 
15 bp across-the-board 
shocks  
Negative event  Positive event  
t-test  Signed-
rank 
test  
Sign 
test  
t-test  Signed-
rank 
test  
Sign 
test  
ABSR(t-1,t+1)  68.90%  81.02%  76.65%  68.04%  78.94%  71.88%  
ABSR-Short(t-2,t+2)  81.44%  89.57%  85.34%  74.36%  82.58%  77.65%  
ABSR{t-2,t+2}  84.77%  92.23%  88.38%  82.40%  90.22%  85.61%  
Panel C - Power tests - proportional shocks  
ABSR(t-1,t+1)  55.75%  68.61%  62.04%  53.91%  65.32%  56.79%  
ABSR-Short(t-2,t+2)  71.27%  80.67%  75.41%  62.52%  71.97%  65.20%  
ABSR{t-2,t+2}  75.23%  83.69%  78.50%  71.71%  81.14%  74.99%  
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Table 18 - Comparing the size and power of tests based on 2-day and composite 4-
day, 6-day, 8-day and 10-day event windows  
 
The size and power of test statistics based on abnormal standardardized returns over the (t-1, 
t+1) window, ABSR(t-1,t+1), and composite abnormal standardized returns over the {t-2, t+2}, 
{t-3,t+3}, {t4,t+4}, and {t-5,t+5} event windows are compared.  The composite returns are 
averages of all ABSR returns surrounding day t within the event window.  In panel A the 
percentage of times the tests incorrectly found evidence of an event in 10,000 simulations in 
which 300 non-event firm-days were chosen at random are reported.  In panel B, the percentage 
of times the tests correctly found evidence of a 15 basis point event at the 5% level is reported. 
The tests in Panel C are identical to those in panel B except the event day shock for bonds of 
maturity m and rating r is proportional to the average 2-day return standard deviation for bond 
of the same rating and maturity relative to all bonds. 
Panel A - Size 
tests  
t-test  Signed-rank test  Sign test  
Significance level  2.5%  97.5%  2.5%  97.5%  2.5%  97.5%  
ABSR(t-1, t+1)  2.62%  2.65%  2.70%  2.46%  2.23%  1.65%  
ABSR{t-2, t+2}  2.60%  2.34%  2.79%  2.25%  2.46%  1.98%  
ABSR{t-3, t+3}  3.14%  2.19%  3.02%  2.24%  2.63%  1.75%  
ABSR{t-4, t+4}  3.26%  1.96%  3.15%  1.86%  2.59%  1.86%  
ABSR{t-5, t+5}  3.32%  1.81%  3.15%  2.04%  2.58%  1.84%  
Panel B - Power 
tests 15 bp across-
the-board shocks  
Negative event  Positive event  
t-test  Signed-
rank test  
Sign 
test  
t-test  Signed-
rank test  
Sign 
test  
ABSR(t-1, t+1)  68.90%  81.02%  76.65%  68.04%  78.94%  71.88%  
ABSR{t-2, t+2}  84.77%  92.23%  88.38%  82.40%  90.22%  85.61%  
ABSR{t-3, t+3}  90.19%  95.47%  93.33%  86.30%  93.44%  90.06%  
ABSR{t-4, t+4}  92.28%  96.54%  94.73%  87.87%  94.89%  91.83%  
ABSR{t-5, t+5}  93.33%  97.17%  95.58%  88.21%  95.33%  92.86%  
Panel C - Power tests - proportional shocks  
ABSR(t-1, t+1)  55.75%  68.61%  62.04%  53.91%  65.32%  56.79%  
ABSR{t-2, t+2}  75.23%  83.69%  78.50%  71.71%  81.14%  74.99%  
ABSR{t-3, t+3}  82.44%  89.64%  85.22%  77.18%  86.43%  80.43%  
ABSR{t-4, t+4}  85.71%  91.93%  87.64%  79.03%  88.33%  83.69%  
ABSR{t-5, t+5}  87.40%  93.26%  89.31%  79.46%  89.37%  85.37%  
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Table 28 Stock Return Patterns  
 
 
  
stock (with bonds 
sample) 
 stock (with bonds 
sample) 
 
  
stock (whole 
sample) 
 
    
Intercept -0.0043 
 
0.0044 
 0.0044 
 
 
-5.37  1.79 
 
1.79 
 
RSUE 0.0119  0.0020 
 
0.0046 
 
 
8.97  0.49 
 
0.89 
 
RSUE*RISK  
 
  -0.0068 
          -0.81  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
